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The overarching question presented in this dissertation focuses on 
the way Dutch military personnel dealt with work-related discontent 
during a turbulent period of austerity in the early 2010s. This question 
is interesting for two main reasons. First, just like military personnel 
in many other Western countries in the post-Cold War period, Dutch 
military personnel face a changing organization. Arguably, this means 
increased organizational and socio-economic pressures and a 
prolonged period of turmoil. Second, military personnel operate within 
a specifi c context, marked by a unique military culture and specifi c 
legal rules. 
By leaning on Hirschman (1970) and of those who applied his work, I 
looked at various possible reactions to discontent – voice, defi ned in 
terms of participation in collective protest, exit, defi ned as an attempt 
to leave the organization, silence, deliberately deciding not to protest, 
and neglect, engaging in anti-organizational behaviour. 
The results show that most Dutch military personnel still appreciate 
their jobs. At the same time, many are worried about detrimental 
developments which threaten both their position as well as the 
Dutch military organization in general. Personnel react to these 
developments in various ways. In spite of turmoil, most opt to do 
nothing – hence engage in behaviour defi ned as silence. Exit is also 
reported widely, while only a small minority engage in voice or neglect. 
Panel data analysis produced limited evidence of a causal relationship 
between increased socio-economic and organizational pressures 
and protesting and exit among military personnel. At the same time, 
there is evidence that personnel reporting lower levels of loyalty and 
those with permanent contracts engage in more protest and exit once 
confronted with socio-economic and organizational pressures or when 
they perceived an improved labour market situation.
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The choice between the Navy and our families is a painful one, but simple…()… We are 
asking you respectfully, but with urgency to take our concern under consideration” 
two hundred Dutch Navy officers wrote in a letter to Dutch Defense ministry in the 
spring of 2018, demanding the abandonment of the plans for a relocation of a military 
base to another part of the Netherlands.1 Soon thereafter, a serving general expressed 
his support for their protest and engaged in a debate with the members of the Dutch 
parliament.2 When the government refused to cancel the planned relocation, so 
many marines left the forces that certain units could not operate anymore.3  In the 
end, after a prolonged and painful discussion, the government had to succumb to the 
pressure and relocate the base to a place more close to the original location. 
During the heated discussion about the planned relocation, the Telegraaf (a major 
Dutch daily newspaper) opened its online discussion page for their readers and 
asked them to express their opinions on this issue.4 Some of the readers reacted in 
disbelief at the protest as a sign of disobedience. They noted that marines used to be 
required to serve in overseas Dutch territories for years which is far more demanding 
than a relocation within the Netherlands.  Other readers however pointed out that the 
times have changed. Being a marine is not a lifetime occupation anymore. Moreover, 
nowadays spouses often work and are dependent on their family and network in 
the vicinity to organize childcare – making a relocation to another province highly 
problematic or even impossible. Therefore, many readers concluded, marines had 
no other option than to make sure their grievances are heard or to leave their jobs.  
In fact, while some MPs, politicians and part of the Dutch public seemed to be taken 
by surprise when marines and even their leadership started protesting and quiting 
their jobs in 2018, these kinds of events have become increasingly common within 
1 Brandbrief mariniers over verhuizing kazerne. Telegraaf 15th of May 2018. https://www.telegraaf.nl/
nieuws/2035805/brandbrief-mariniers-over-verhuizing-kazerne
2 Generaal oogst hoon met verzet tegen verhuizing van Korps Mariniers naar Zeeland. Volkskrant 16th 
of May 2018. https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/generaal-oogst-hoon-met-verzet-tegen-
verhuizing-van-korps-mariniers-naar-zeeland~be0f8cb0/ 
3 Eenheid ligt tijdelijk stil door groot aantal vertrekkende mariniers. NRC 11th of September 2018. https://www.
nrc.nl/nieuws/2018/09/11/eenheid-ligt-tijdelijk-stil-door-groot-aantal-vertrekkende-mariniers-a1616051 





the Dutch military. Ever since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 and the related 
austerity measures, Dutch military trade unions have been organizing street protests 
and actions against austerity measures. At the same time, both retired and serving 
military personnel have been openly publicizing their disagreements with the political 
leadership. One could say that this is a sign of a healthy democracy in which soldiers 
fully participate in all political and labor activities available to other citizens, including 
those aimed at pressuring their employer. Others would be highly critical, pointing to 
the need for the democratic control of the military or at least they would be worried 
about the consequences for military readiness and discipline. This critical view is 
reflected in the reaction of Hans Hillen, the by then Dutch ex minister of Defense, 
“This is a general who shows his personnel that it is perfectly normal to debate orders. 
I wonder if he does the same when deployed in the field?” 5
Yet, the issues military personnel are worried about are usually not the orders they 
get while deployed but rather the socio-economic and organizational consequences 
of political decisions, often related to budgetary constraints. In fact, the discussion 
about the relocation of the marine base is a showcase of the ways in which military 
personnel might react after a prolonged period of austerity and crisis. These pressures 
strained not only the budgets but also the willingness of military personnel to act in 
traditional ways – to obey, be loyal and carry on in spite of problems which might 
come their way. It might not have been the intention of the Dutch governments to 
introduce the phenomenon of an activist soldier or make the soldiers increasingly 
ready to leave from what used to be knows as a way of life and not just a job. And yet, 
the focus on efficiency and tight budgets might have fueled such developments. It is 
within this context that I conducted a study into how Dutch military personnel reacted 
to work-related discontent. 
Understanding work-related discontent among Dutch 
military personnel: theory and methods
If we consider opportunities for collective action, military personnel differ―in terms 
of formal and informal regulations―from most other employees in the Netherlands. 
5 Generaal oogst hoon met verzet tegen verhuizing van Korps Mariniers naar Zeeland. Volkskrant 16th 




Formally, they are not allowed to strike and when exercising their right to join 
associations, protest or publicize, they may not jeopardize the functioning of the 
military organization. Informally, they function within an organization which places high 
importance on loyalty, hierarchy, discipline and cohesion and is commonly perceived 
to be restrictive towards any form of dissent. This brings us to the central question in 
this dissertation:  How do military personnel deal with work-related discontent, and in 
which way, if any, do they voice their discontent? 
In this dissertation I approach this research question broadly – by focusing not only on 
protest. As social movements scholars often emphasize, protest is behavior of a small 
minority of citizens (e.g. Marwell and Oliver, 1993). That is even more the case if we 
focus on the military, an organization which is famous for rejecting dissent. Therefore, 
I decided to investigate a variety of reactions which military personnel might resort 
to when experiencing discontent. As the example of the angry Marines shows, while 
they might protest the decisions they see as wrong, they also have other options – 
such as leaving the organization and starting a civilian career. 
I leaned on the theory of Hirschman (1970) and of those who applied his work, to 
investigate how Dutch military personnel dealt with discontent by looking at various 
possible reactions to discontent – voice, defined in terms of participation in collective 
protest, exit, defined as an attempt to leave the organization, silence, deliberately 
deciding not to protest, and neglect, engaging in anti-organizational behavior.
I conducted a series of individual interviews followed by a three-wave panel survey 
among Dutch military personnel. The combination of a qualitative and a quantitative 
study offered the opportunity to prepare the survey by asking relevant and up-to-date 
questions about the real-life experiences of personnel working in the highly specific 
military context. In that way, it was possible to avoid a pre-determined focus which 
might not correspond to the experiences of the respondents but also to interpret the 
meaning of the quantitative surveys in the later stage of this research project.  
For the qualitative study we recruited participants within each of the four main 
branches of the Dutch armed forces (Marine, Army, Air Force and Constabulary) to 
ensure good representation of the whole organization and cover the differences 
which might arise due to their different tasks and organizational cultures. The goal 
of this qualitative study was to explore the key concepts outlined in the theoretical 
approach: discontent, formal and informal restrictions to what personnel can resort to 




For the three-wave online panel study conducted in 2013, 2014 and 2015, I sampled 
participants through military trade unions which e-mailed their members and applied 
snowball sampling to reach non-members. Measured variables included: various 
aspects of discontent, perceptions of formal and informal restrictions, loyalty and the 
action repertoire of voice, exit, neglect and silence. The panel study yielded unique 
insight in various attitudes and behavior of military personnel as well as the changes 
which took place in the period 2013-2015. 
Scientific and societal relevance
This dissertation offers new insights into two specific fields of social sciences. 
From the viewpoint of military sociology, it offers empirical evidence on attitudes 
and behavior of military personnel who are confronted with pressures caused by 
both austerity measures as well as long term structural shifts. A particular novelty 
concerns insights into sorts of behavior which are less often researched within the 
military context – engaging in protest or,  anti-organizational behavior (neglect). From 
the viewpoint of those interested in the consequences of austerity, engagement in 
social movements and industrial relations, this dissertation sheds light on a context 
which is rarely studied. Military personnel are not the typical activists found in social 
movements. They function within an organization with a specific legal framework and 
organizational culture which is highly dismissive of protest. And yet, understanding 
the behavior of this group can be fruitful, as both the pressures they face as well 
as the restrictive context might resemble the situation of many other citizens and 
employees. For example, police officers, healthcare professionals and firemen also 
work under similarly difficult circumstances while facing many restrictions military 
personnel face as well. 
With this inquiry into how Dutch military personnel deal with discontent I hope to 
offer more clarity about the peculiar position of this group of personnel. This study 
and its findings might be of use to military trade unions in their quest to promote 
the welfare of Dutch military personnel. The findings might also be interesting to 
military leadership, policy makers, the general public and all those concerned with 
guaranteeing a stable and reasonable social position for military personnel. After all, 
without military personnel, it is impossible to envision a military force which, let us not 




Chapters to come 
This dissertation consists of four articles, three of which have been published in a peer 
reviewed journal. While each article takes a different methodological perspective and 
can be read separately, together they form a whole which describes how military 
personnel react to work-related discontent. 
The first chapter6 presents a literature review and a theoretical framework for 
understanding protest within the military organization in Western countries. It is based 
on an article which aims to integrate the literature on the transformation of Western 
militaries, insights on the unique context of the military organization and how it might 
influence (dealing with) discontent, and the empirical evidence on protest within the 
military organization. The chapter assesses the evidence amassed so far, identifies the 
limitations in existing research and proposes an encompassing framework for future 
study of protest within militaries in Western democracies. This chapter concludes that 
although military personnel in Western democracies rarely resort to protest tactics, 
this does not mean that they never experience work-related discontent. In fact, due 
to the transformation of the military organization in the period following the Cold 
War, socio-economic pressures on military personnel have intensified. When facing 
these challenges, military personnel operate within a specific context in which the 
unique military culture and a specific legal framework often make engaging in protest 
more difficult than elsewhere in society. Therefore, the chapter concludes, a broader 
approach which includes various reactions to discontent is needed.
In the second chapter7 I present a qualitative study which focuses on how Dutch 
military personnel cope with work-related discontent. In 24 in-depth interviews with 
personnel from the four major branches of the Dutch armed forces I discussed their 
positive and negative experiences while working in the military, the strategies they 
apply to cope with discontent and the restrictions they face when doing so, the role of 
the trade unions, the possibility of exit and finally loyalty and their work-related pride. 
The results show that while military personnel value their jobs highly, they also feel 
pressured by the organizational changes which have both material and immaterial 
6  Published as: Petrovic, I., and van Stekelenburg, J. (2017). Protest in Western militaries. Sociopedia. isa.
7 Published as: Petrovic, I., Klandermans, P. G., & van Stekelenburg, J. (2017). Coping with Discontent in 





consequences. Protesting such developments remains elusive, also due to the 
restrictions present in the organization – in particular hierarchy, feelings of loyalty, 
feelings of inefficaciousness and the threat of repercussions. Personnel see individual 
coping strategies as far more common – whether that is individual voice supported 
by the collectivity of the trade union or leaving the organization altogether. 
The third chapter8 studies how Dutch military personnel respond to austerity-related 
discontent. Based on the first wave of the online panel survey (N=579) conducted 
among military personnel in 2013, I investigated four response strategies to austerity 
measures applied in the Dutch military: voice (collective protest), exit (leaving the 
organization), silence (deliberately deciding not to protest in spite of dissatisfaction) 
and neglect (engaging in anti-organizational behavior). I applied cluster analysis to 
understand how personnel combine these strategies. I identified six typical response 
patterns which are labeled as protesters, escapers, quiescents, conformers, 
obstructionists and combaters. I concluded that these clusters are not only distinct 
in the way they react to discontent – their sociodemographic characteristics and 
perceptions of the unique military environment differ as well. 
In the fourth chapter I present the results of the panel study and I focus on the changes 
in behavior of military personnel in the period of 2013-2015. Specifically, three sorts 
of behavior are investigated: demonstrating, signing a petition and searching for a 
new job. In this chapter I searched for evidence of a causal relationship between, 
on the one side, changes in socio-economic and organizational pressures and the 
perceived labor market position and, on the other side, two forms of voice (petition 
signing and demonstrating) and exit. While doing so, I took into account the levels 
of loyalty reported by military personnel and the type of contract (permanent or 
temporary) they worked under. The results presented in this fourth chapter offer very 
limited evidence of a direct causal relationship between increased socio-economic 
and organizational pressures and protesting and exit among all military personnel. At 
the same time, there is more evidence of an indirect causal relationship, as personnel 
reporting lower levels of loyalty and those with permanent contracts engage in more 
protest and exit once confronted with socio-economic and organizational pressures 
or when they perceived an improved labor market situation.
8 Published as: Petrovic, I., van Stekelenburg, J., & Klandermans, B. (2018). Dealing with austerity measures 
within armed forces: The Dutch case. Military Psychology, 30(4), 321-334.
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In Western democracies, military personnel rarely engage in protest, whether political 
or labour related (Langton, 1984). Luckily so, one could argue – military personnel 
getting on the barricades in order to achieve political goals has often meant a serious 
crisis for the democratic order, like the (attempted) coups in Turkey in 2016 or in Spain 
a few decades ago. However, even the modes of protest which are widely accepted 
as legitimate and concern issues such as work-related discontent rarely take place 
within the military. By and large, this is not a voluntary choice. While the severity of 
the rules differ from country to country, all Western democracies place some kind of 
legal restrictions on protest behaviour among their military personnel (Nolte, 2003). 
Additionally, the military remains an organization with a specific organizational culture 
which makes the route to protest complicated, if not impossible. The motivation 
behind these restrictions concerns the irreconcilability of protest with military tasks, 
and, more broadly, the democratic order.
At the same time it is a paradox that those who defend democracy with their lives 
do not get to enjoy it to the full (Sugin, 1987). While this might be an interesting 
theoretical and judicial question, for military personnel there are important practical 
ramifications. They, just like all other citizens, sometimes face situations which cause 
discontent. While only a minority of citizens tends to engage in protest, it being even 
less available to military personnel might make them unusually weak in the face of 
social and economic challenges.
In this article, we focus on protest by military personnel in Western democracies. 
Protest itself can take many forms, and can be divided into actions within norms of 
existing social systems, like petitioning or taking part in a demonstration, and actions 
which violate the law, like illegal protest or civil disobedience (Wright et al., 1990). It 
remains important to note that, often, a reaction to discontent implies different kinds 
of behaviour, such as silence, remaining passive, exiting the situation altogether or 
even resorting to anti-social behaviour, as forwarded by Hirschman (1970) and those 
who built upon his framework. Such forms of behaviour lie largely beyond the scope 
of this article. 
9 Published as: Petrovic, I., and van Stekelenburg, J. (2017). Protest in Western militaries. Sociopedia. isa
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We aim to shed light on the whole process of engaging in protest in the specific 
context of the military organization. Therefore, we cover the causes of discontent, 
the restrictions military personnel experience when considering protest and the 
instances when protest does materialize. To understand these issues we review three 
strands of literature: (1) military sociology, (2) social movements and trade unions and 
(3) organizational science, in line with other interdisciplinary studies on the military (e.g. 
Harries-Jenkins and Moskos, 1981: 3). 
Our focus is solely on militaries in Western democracies. While militaries all over the 
world have a similar raison d’être and tend to show a similar organizational culture, 
when considering the position of military personnel and protest specifically, the 
differences in context are vast. Importantly, in non-democracies, the rights of all 
citizens are limited while the lack of democratic institutions and civil society creates 
a situation profoundly different than in Western societies. Furthermore, the role of the 
military in non-democracies is different as well, as the concept of civilian leadership 
is often blurred and the military is commonly employed to protect the authoritarian 
structures. Consequently, while just as interesting, we do not address the topic of 
protest in militaries outside Western democracies.
This article consists of four sections. In the first theoretical section we discuss three 
key theoretical elements: (1) the origins of discontent in the contemporary Western 
military organization, (2) the specific context of the military organization and (3) the 
traditional arrangement for dealing with discontent within this context. In the second, 
section we review empirical evidence on protest among military personnel in Western 
democracies. In the third section we assess the evidence observed so far and identify 
the limitations in its scope and content. Finally, in the fourth section we propose an 




Theoretical section: From discontent to protest in the 
military organization 
Change and discontent in the Western militaries
In recent decades, Western military organizations went through a process of 
profound transformation. This process influenced almost every aspect of the military 
organization and resulted in shifts regarding tasks, organizational structure, culture as 
well as position of personnel. 
The literature forwards a number of factors causing this transformation. Arguably 
the most influential is the changing geopolitical situation. In the period following the 
Second World War, Western militaries prepared to confront the danger coming from 
the Soviet Union. Then, rather abruptly, the Cold War ended and the enemy Western 
militaries were designed to deter disappeared or at least seemed less relevant. 
Downsizing the military is a common practice at the end of any major conflict – and 
in that sense, the end of the Cold War was no exception (Wong and McNally, 1994). 
NATO countries immediately started reducing military spending and making plans to 
downsize their militaries (McCalla, 1996), thereby capitalizing on the so-called peace 
dividend (Intriligator, 1996; Ward and Davis, 1992). Multiple rounds of budget cuts 
followed, especially in Europe, but early in the 1990s in the United States as well 
(Brasher, 2000). Aside from budgetary pressures, numerous other factors brought 
about change as well. Many of these appeared long before the watershed moment 
of the fall of the Soviet Union. For example, continuous technological advances 
produced both new possibilities and new adversaries (see Farrell and Terriff, 2002). 
The introduction of New Public Management since the 1980s has had a dramatic 
effect on (semi-) governmental organizations. The military did not escape this trend 
as business-like efficiency practices (Dandeker and Paton, 1997; Heinecken, 2006) 
and market forces (Levy, 2010) increasingly play a role within the organization. Since 
the Cold War, the role of the private sector ‘has grown exponentially and such 
firms now play a pivotal role in international relations’ (Ballard, 2007: 43). Aside from 
management practices, ‘in society, social, cultural and legal changes provide a less 
robust supporting framework for the core values of military culture’ (Dandeker, 2001a: 
5). In particular, values of authority and obedience became increasingly challenged 
after the 1960s (Bartle, 2006b). When Janowitz (1960) first noted the convergence 
of the military sphere and the civilian mainstream he referred to the relaxation of 
the strict authoritarian modes of behaviour within the military but also the changes 
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in other practices and rules. For instance, the recruitment of officers became more 
open and started to resemble recruitment in civilian society. The traditional traits 
of the military leader such as personal bravery increasingly became replaced by 
managerial and technological qualities. Furthermore, rising individualism might lead 
personnel to increasingly defend their own personal interests (Heinecken, 2006). New 
norms inevitably find their way into the organization itself with the recruitment of new 
personnel (see Van Schilt (2011) on changing norms among different generations 
of Dutch officers-to-be) but militaries also experience direct political and societal 
pressure to adapt to the new norms within broader society, such as for example the 
rapidly changing public opinion on LGBT rights (see Baunach (2012) on the shift in US 
public opinion in this regard). 
Inevitably, the diverse set of pressures caused numerous and multifaceted changes 
within many Western military organizations, going far beyond the easily visible process 
of downsizing. In the 1970s, Charles Moskos (1977) proposed the so-called I/O 
(institutional/occupational) model in order to describe the social organization of the 
military and the military profession. Based on the American example, Moskos made 
a claim that the military was shifting from an institutional towards an occupational 
model. The core idea of the institutional model is that it is 
… legitimated in terms of values and norms, i.e., a purpose 
transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed 
higher good. Members of an institution are often viewed 
as following a calling; they generally regard themselves as 
being different or apart from the broader society and are so 
regarded by others. … When grievances are felt, members 
of an institution do not organize themselves into interest 
groups. (Moskos, 1977: 42)
Contrasting with the institutional model, Moskos presented the occupational model, 
as
… legitimated in terms of the marketplace, i.e., prevailing 
monetary rewards for equivalent competencies. In a 
modern industrial society employees usually enjoy some 
voice in the determination of appropriate salary and work 
conditions. … The occupational model implies priority of 
Chapter 1
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self-interest rather than that of the employing organization. 
A common form of interest articulation in industrial- and 
increasingly governmental-occupation is the trade union. 
(Moskos, 1977: 43)
While elements of both types were present within military organizations, Moskos 
(1977: 43–44) argued that, traditionally, militaries corresponded more to the institutional 
than the occupational model and in fact opposed the organizational outcomes of the 
occupational model. The signs of the shift identified already in the 1970s included 
restructuring of the benefits towards a market-like system and higher levels of 
desertion and attrition (Moskos, 1977: 45). 
After the end of the Cold War, changes in the military organization intensified (Booth et 
al., 2001: 320–321). In the 1990s, the I/O model was redeveloped into the postmodern 
military model. While the term postmodern should be taken with much caution (see 
Booth et al., 2001), this framework was repeatedly applied to understand the changes 
in the Western militaries in the post-Cold War period. The postmodern military model 
presents a typology of three forms of military organization in the 20th century: early 
modern (roughly until the WWII), late modern (post-WWII) and postmodern (post-
Cold War). According to Moskos et al. (2000: 2), five key organizational changes mark 
the switch towards the postmodern military: (1) increasing contact between the 
military and the civilian sphere, (2) diminution of differences based on branch of the 
military, rank and the combat/support roles, (3) the switch from fighting to missions 
which are traditionally not seen as a military task, (4) the increasing role of international 
bodies which authorize and govern such missions and (5) the internationalization of 
military organizations themselves, especially in Europe. 
In addition to the broader organizational changes, a number of specific trends directly 
influenced not only the status but also the very composition of military personnel. Most 
visibly, at the end of the 20th century, more and more Western democracies opted 
to end obligatory conscription of their male population and abandon the model of a 
mass army. In 1997, France, the birthplace of mass conscription, symbolically joined 
this growing group of countries (see Haltiner, 1998). Furthermore, military organizations 
increasingly saw greater involvement of civilian employees, full integration of women, 
removal of the families from the military realm and acceptance of sexual minorities. 
As stressed by Moskos (1977), in different countries and in different segments of the 
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military organization changes go at a different pace or might not even be visible. Also, 
the postmodern model is by no means predictive in the sense that it guarantees 
that the transformation will always go in the predicted, postmodern direction (Moskos 
et al., 2000), although developments such as the recent acceptance of gays and 
lesbians within the US military show that turning back the clock is even less realistic, 
given the social and structural pressures which caused these changes.
While both the I/O model and the postmodern military model focused on the 
organizational and cultural aspects of the changes, others stressed the economic 
background of the same process. King (2006) interpreted the transformation of 
the military organization by employing the concept of economic post-Fordism 
and its four crucial elements: (1) the move from a mass to a core and peripheral 
workforce, (2) outsourcing, (3) centralization of management control and (4) network 
capitalism. According to King (2006), these four concepts can be used to interpret 
the developments within the military organization, as both industry and military face 
similar pressures to which they respond with similar organizational solutions. 
Levy (2010) combined both the organizational-cultural elements highlighted in the 
postmodern military model and the economic elements proposed by King (2006), 
in a model in which he identified a shift from the citizen army towards the market 
army. Within the market army, militarism as a value system is subject to the market 
and economic calculations. In terms of structure, the organization is becoming post-
Fordist. The hierarchy, so typical of the military, shifts from vertical to network-centric. 
In terms of culture, the military profession is increasingly looking civilian. Military 
service is becoming commodified instead of being a civic duty. Finally, in terms of 
labour relations the contractual nature of the profession produces a push towards 
unionization. And while unionization might still be illegal in some countries, Levy 
(2010) asserts that the commodification of the profession in the end produces new 
ways of addressing one’s grievances – including protest. 
While the models describing the transformation of the military might differ in the way 
they interpret the background of this process, the actual developments and their 
consequences for personnel are clear. Those who were declared redundant had to 
cope within a job market they were not necessarily qualified for, while those who 
remained faced increased workloads with fewer people and less funding. Privatization 
and outsourcing changed not only how military operations are conducted but also the 
Chapter 1
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military profession itself. For personnel this meant facing an erosion of the traditional 
elements of the military profession including control over the unique knowledge and 
skills which used to bring prestige and status to the profession, the autonomy of the 
professional soldier within the military domain, the loyalty to the chain of command 
and the group cohesion but also service ethics in which selfless service and not 
remuneration used to be central (Heinecken, 2014). Widespread introduction of 
flexible contracts produced uncertainty and discontent among personnel but also 
an occupational attitude towards the military profession (Soeters et al., 2006). As a 
result, from a place where the material side of the job was less important and the 
organization took care of the employee’s life and family, the military has become a 
more civilian-like workplace where personnel are regularly exposed to social and 
economic pressures (see for instance, Heinecken, 2006). 
Interestingly, while the theoretical models which explain the changes within the 
military identify the pressures which military personnel face, they also predict more 
resistance to such developments. Already in 1977, Moskos was arguing that with the 
shift from the traditional soldier’s profession to a more civilian-like occupation, military 
personnel would look for the same kind of representation and protection as civilians 
do. At the time, Moskos (1977) also referred to the increased tendency of military 
personnel to bring grievances to litigation. Especially in cases where the more usual 
forms of labour activism are not available, seeking judicial protection from measures 
perceived as unfair can be seen as a form of protest. In the same period, the attempt 
to unionize US military personnel occurred. This was widely interpreted as a sign 
of the looming shift towards the occupational model. Notably, while unionization 
of American military personnel failed to materialize, in many other countries trade 
unions did gain a foothold within military organizations (see Bartle and Heinecken, 
2006). According to Heinecken (2006: 2) the clash between a deteriorating labour 
position and increasing operational demands causes increased interest in military 
representation and unionism, a trend partially fostered by the rise of individualism in 
the broader society. Levy (2010) goes even further and highlights increased activism, 
not only regarding the socio-economic position of personnel but also the policy 
regarding the deployment of the military forces. 
At the same time, while pressures might call for more activism, it has been noted 
that the end of conscription might in fact impede protest. Vasquez (2005) argued 
that collective action aimed at preventing military casualties is more likely to occur in 
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democracies with conscription than in democracies with a volunteer force. Namely, 
conscription results in more citizens with political power being influenced by the risks 
of combat, which promotes engagement in activities to curb such risks.
Whether military personnel will indeed become increasingly assertive remains the 
question. Engaging in protest and activism is by no means an easy process, even 
in the civilian world, let alone in the military. And while the military might be turning 
more civilian, most authors agree that military organizations will never become just 
another company. Under pressure or not, military personnel will have to deal with their 
discontent in a very specific context. 
Context of the military organization: Working, living and protesting within 
the military 
Those who write about the military often refer to it as a place that is different from 
the rest of society. In understanding the effect of the military context on protest we 
focus on two important aspects. First, the military environment is unique and vastly 
influential. Hence, military personnel often find it difficult to operate independently of 
their organization, even when engaging in activities which are unrelated to the military 
tasks. Second, a number of typical organizational characteristics have consequences 
for engaging in protest, usually by suppressing or limiting it.
Military uniqueness and exceptional impact on individuals. 
While most organizations and organized groups in society have their specific cultures 
and practices, the military is often represented as being a world apart – because 
of its customs and rules distinct from the mainstream civilian world, its historical 
persistence and the relatively large number of people who (used to) work within it. 
It is well known that soldiers are routinely trained to be different than citizens. 
Goffman’s (1991 [1961]) theory of ‘total institutions’ has been widely applied to 
understand the position of military personnel. They often find themselves within a 
place ‘where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society 
for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered 
round of life’ (Goffman, 1991 [1961]: 11). Many military sub-organizations, army barracks 
for example, belong to a type of total institution formed to pursue a work-related 
goal. While many of the military institutions are nowadays semi-total rather than total 
institutions (Van Schilt, 2011), certain characteristics of life within a total institution still 
apply. For example, all aspects of life conform to institutional rules and regulations 
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while many of the habits and manners typical for the outside world are rejected. The 
line between private and professional lives is blurred and those who have spent a 
long time within the military find it difficult to continue life in the civilian world. 
Segal (1986) and Soeters et al. (2006) also highlight the great personal impact of 
military service. The military is, they argue, just like family, a greedy institution which 
takes a high toll on individuals in terms of loyalty, commitment, time and energy. 
The risks involved in military service, frequent mobility and prolonged stays abroad 
all make working within the military distinctively different than working elsewhere in 
society. 
While the transformation of the military organization described in the earlier section 
highlighted a move towards the civilian mainstream, most authors dealing with the 
military stress the need to maintain military uniqueness in spite of the pressures for 
change and adaptation (see for instance, Boëne, 1990; Dandeker, 2001b). When 
compared with the civilian society, the military continues to be typified by numerous 
characteristics with a far-stretching impact on those working within it, in spite of a 
certain convergence with the civilian mainstream (see for instance, Booth et al., 2001).
Organizational characteristics and protest.  
While there are many elements which make the military unique, several important 
characteristics have particular ramifications on whether and how personnel can 
engage in protest: military loyalty, bureaucracy and hierarchy, discipline and 
authoritarianism, unit cohesion and the unique legal position of personnel.
Military loyalty is one of the most important and most often mentioned military values 
(Coleman, 2009; Robinson, 2008). According to Winslow (1998), loyalty is instigated at 
all levels of the military organization as it supports its crucial collective goals. 
At the level of the military organization as a whole, Heinecken (2006) describes 
loyalty as a reciprocal relationship where government serves as a guardian of the 
personnel’s interest while personnel trust their employers and need no independent 
representation to fight for their interests. More often, loyalty concerns the lower level 
of operational units. Connor (2007: 71–72) argues that ‘it is a truism that small groups 
of soldiers fight for each other first, and higher ideals second’. Connor (2007: 69) also 
sees striking similarities between this kind of military loyalty and family loyalty and 
points out that military training commonly aims to place individuals within a new 
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family. What are the consequences of such strong loyalty in situations where military 
personnel experience discontent? 
Importantly, Coleman (2009: 111) notes that ‘Given that military personnel place their 
lives at risk in doing their duty, and that these personnel know that in combat situations 
they are expected to demonstrate extreme, possibly unlimited, loyalty to their 
colleagues by placing their lives in each other’s hands, it should hardly be surprising 
that these same extreme perceptions of the demands of loyalty tend to be extended 
to more ordinary circumstances’. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how loyalty forged 
under the most difficult circumstances can suddenly be switched off once personnel 
return to a non-combat work environment. While in such circumstances protest 
might be actually acceptable as it does not hurt key military tasks, military loyalty 
commonly works to restrain protest, both at the organizational level (Heinecken, 2009) 
and when dealing with wrongdoings of fellow service(wo)men (Coleman, 2009). In 
such situations, loyalty leads personnel to defend their colleagues and organization, 
especially if the perceived attack is coming from the outside society (Kleinig, 2001). 
Unit cohesion has been defined as ‘the bonding together of members of an 
organization in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their 
unit and the mission’ (Johns, 1984: 4). It stands closely to loyalty felt for one’s nearest 
colleagues, also because loyalty has the most meaning within a small unit where 
success and survival rest on cohesion (Connor, 2007). In the military, cohesion has 
been hailed as a crucial value as it is deemed necessary for maintaining unit integrity, 
enhances performance and supports mission motivation (Siebold, 2006).
The concept, background and the role of unit cohesion were described in detail 
by Shils and Janowitz (1948). Their study examined cohesion and disintegration in 
the German Wehrmacht during the Second World  War based on documents and 
interviews conducted with German prisoners of war. The authors’ fascination was 
rooted in the fact that in spite of their desperate position German prisoners of war 
remained remarkably stable until the very end of the war. According to Shils and 
Janowitz (1948), the unit cohesion played a key role in achieving this. The study 
concludes that ‘Where conditions were such as to allow primary group life to function 
smoothly, and where the primary group developed a high degree of cohesion, morale 
was high and resistance effective or at least very determined, regardless in the main 
of the political attitudes of the soldiers’ (Shils and Janowitz, 1948: 314–315). Similarly 
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to loyalty, the effectiveness rested on primary group functioning which could only 
be compared to one’s family back home. According to Stouffer (1949), this especially 
mattered in combat situations, where all the primary needs of the individual are being 
denied. 
While cohesion can prevent protest as a subversive activity which might hurt the 
group, cohesion can also foster protest, depending on the situation and the norm 
within the group. In fact, group cohesion is one of the necessary ingredients of 
collective action (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013). 
Discipline and authoritarianism. Lang (1965) stressed that discipline concerns 
respect for orders, acceptance of authority and punishment for unruly behaviour 
(see Donohue (1993) for a detailed discussion on the meaning of military discipline). 
Importantly, while Donohue (1993) argues that the nature of military discipline has 
been changing, irrespective of the way we conceive it, obedience remains one of 
its key elements. For the soldier at the bottom of the command chain this means 
that he, or she, has ‘no recourse but to obey; discipline is his primary virtue. His 
judgment concerns only how to overcome the external difficulties he encounters in 
the execution of orders’ (Lang, 1965: 852). 
Soeters and Recht (1998) found that even in cases where the formal discipline does 
not enjoy much value, informal group norms matter a lot and general military discipline 
alternates with self-steering through informal group norms. The consequences of 
this is that ‘the hierarchical military environment, notwithstanding a formally rigid 
command structure, places a high premium on flexibility and initiative within the limits 
of that command structure’ (Lang, 1965: 851). 
Concerning protest, we can conclude that in this kind of organization, engaging in 
behaviour which does not correspond to general norms of behaviour is difficult. Even 
if the exact rules might not ban certain protest actions, informal norms of behaviour 
which go together with discipline might have the same suppressive result. 
Bureaucracy and hierarchy. Ever since Weber used the Prussian military as 
a prototype of a bureaucracy, military organizations have been hailed for their 
bureaucratic model of organizational behaviour. According to Janowitz and Little 
(1965: 27), ‘the career soldier is assumed to be an ideal example of the professional 
operating under bureaucratic authority’. While the bureaucratic modes of organization 
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have changed greatly in the meantime, bureaucracy persists – ‘It is difficult to 
imagine how soldiers would be recruited, trained, and deployed without a supportive 
bureaucratic apparatus’ (Shields, 2003: 181). 
Yet, while some might note that all modern organizations rest on a higher or lower 
level of bureaucratic organization, it is important to highlight the specific nature of 
military bureaucracy. Drawing on Adler and Borys’s (1996) distinction between 
coercive and enabling bureaucracies, Soeters et al. (2006) highlight the coercive 
nature of the military bureaucracy when compared to business organizations. In 
particular, they refer to the higher level of power distance and rule orientation found 
in military academies. 
For those facing bureaucracy and hierarchy, there are often consequences if they 
want to voice complaints outside the prescribed hierarchic structure. Lang (1965: 
855) wrote that the ‘hierarchical command authority as a rule is highly suspicious 
of granting lower-level participants the right to appeal outside of regular command 
channels’. Chief reasons for this are the possible disruptive consequences for military 
discipline and effectiveness. In addition to this, Lang cites Evan (1962), who found that 
when there are individuals or institutions which personnel can complain to, many have 
internal constraints from doing so – especially if such instances even indirectly form 
a part of the military hierarchy – as they still symbolize authority. At the same time, 
Lang (1965) maintains, those forming the instances where personnel can complain, 
if a part of the military hierarchy themselves, will not readily take necessary action, 
in order to avoid endangering the organization which is ultimately important for their 
own position.
Legal position and restrictions regarding protest. In all Western democracies, 
military personnel enjoy a specific legal position. They are subject to various rules and 
regulations different from the civilian mainstream (think for instance of the military law 
system or separate health care arrangements). One of the recurrent elements of this 
specific position concerns limitations on labour rights and political behaviour. While it 
is not our aim to provide an extensive overview of the exact rules in different countries 
regarding specific activities, a rough pattern can be discerned. In general, military 
personnel have fewer options available than most other citizens and the options they 
do have tend to be less effective. 
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For instance, while Western democracies sometimes do allow unionization within the 
military, even when it is permitted a number of limitations on specific activities tend 
to hollow out this right. Striking, normally a key pressure tool of trade unions, is nearly 
always forbidden (Hummel, 2014; Nolte and Krieger, 2003) Other activities such as 
demonstrating or petitioning are allowed in a number of countries, but can often be 
applied with more restrictions than for other citizens. If we consider general political 
rights, the tendency is similar and the political neutrality of military personnel is highly 
valued although exact regulations tend to vary from extreme restrictions (such as in 
Spain or France) to tolerance of political activities as long as the military service is not 
impeded (such as in Germany or the Netherlands) (see Leigh and Born, 2008). 
Understanding discontent and protest in the military context: psychological 
contract and beyond
While protest was never a prominent element in the literature on the military 
profession, the manner in which discontent is dealt with within Western military 
organizations has been clearly outlined. This arrangement is commonly referred to as 
the psychological (Bartle, 2006a) or social contract (Farley et al., 2006), and in Great 
Britain as a segment of the military covenant (Tipping, 2008). In organizational science 
literature the psychological contract is a well-established concept which denotes 
subjective beliefs regarding an unwritten agreement about mutual obligations 
between an employee and an organization (Rousseau, 1989). The literature on the 
military defines the specific form of psychological contract in the military organization 
as a two-sided arrangement. On the one hand, military personnel fulfil demanding 
and sometimes dangerous duties while facing cultural and legal restrictions to 
their political and labour rights. On the other hand, the employer protects military 
personnel more than is the case in common civilian organizations, by shielding them 
from market forces and providing for a stable socio-economic position. 
Inevitably, just like in every other organization, military personnel might sometimes 
face a crisis or a problematic situation which causes discontent, no matter how well 
things are arranged. In such instances of discontent, personnel will weather the 
difficulties, remain loyal to their employer and refrain from protest not only because 
protest is difficult, but also because in the greater picture, their employer is also loyal 
to them and deserves reciprocal loyalty. 
The transformative processes which culminated after the end of the Cold War have 
a direct influence on the psychological contract, chiefly by removing the stability and 
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the guaranteed socio-economic position of military personnel but also by numerous 
other changes within the organization and the military profession. There are warnings 
that this psychological contract might collapse in numerous countries (see for 
instance, Bartle, 2006a), which brings forth the idea that military personnel might get 
more assertive, as long ago predicted by Moskos (1977). The question of whether 
and how the behaviour of personnel might change once the psychological contract 
is under pressure or disintegrates completely can only be answered by consulting 
empirical evidence, to which we turn in the next section. 
Empirical section: Evidence on discontent and protest in the 
military
In this section we review studies which provide evidence on discontent and protest 
within the military. We distinguish between three major topics – studies on labour 
relations and unionism, studies on anti-war protest within, and studies focused on 
diversity issues including gender, ethnic/racial and sexual minorities. 
Labour relations, trade unions and protest
Forming associations in order to protect the interests of employees was a crucial 
tool in the social struggles during much of the 20th century (Streeck, 2005). The 
fact that military personnel in many countries did not participate in this historical 
development was one of the important divisions between them and the rest of the 
labour force. Subsequently, the issue of unionization of military personnel became a 
topic of interest, among both policy makers and scholars. Most research focuses on 
the question of whether and how the possibility of unionization was offered to military 
personnel, while engaging in actual union activities is addressed only occasionally. 
The discussion on unionization within the military first fired up in the 1970s as an 
element of Moskos’s notion of a switch towards an occupational model of organization 
within the military. A good overview of the developments and the arguments in the 
discussion of the 1970s can be found in the study by Mittelstadt (2011), where she 
describes what turned out to be the failed attempt to unionize the US military. At the 
time, congressional budgetary cuts and the general move towards an occupational 
model of organization led to calls for the unionization of military personnel. These 
attempts ‘generated a furor. Pollsters frantically registered public opinion on the 
matter; Congress called hearings; Presidents Ford and then Carter weighed in 
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immediately; and military leadership became, in the words of one observer, hysterical’ 
(Mittelstadt, 2011: 29–30, emphasis original). Mittelstadt argues that the attempt to 
unionize inserted extra drama into the serious question of whether the new volunteer 
military is a job just like any other or still a calling. Military leadership was afraid of 
the consequences for discipline, readiness and national security. In the end, the 
proposed unionization was defeated by renewed political support for the military 
budgets and the benefits for military personnel and their families. In other countries, 
such as Canada and Great Britain, similar pushes for unionization were addressed by 
forming alternative bodies for dispute resolution, yet short of association.
Harries-Jenkins (1977) argued that the push towards unionization in most cases came 
from the increased feeling that the military’s social standing and rights have been 
endangered. At the same time, arguments against independent trade unions were 
proclaimed in many countries – largely based on the fact that the military profession 
is profoundly different from civilian professions,  with the possible consequences of 
unionization including a breakdown of discipline, undermining of the military authority 
structure and subversion of the political control (for a detailed discussion on historical 
arguments against unionization of military personnel see Caforio, 2006).
As already stipulated, after the failed, but tumultuous attempt to unionize personnel, 
the United States reinforced the socio-economic position of military personnel, 
thereby strengthening the psychological contract and delaying the effects of the 
organizational model. However, when the Cold War was ending, in many other 
countries the strategic incentives to invest in such arrangements disappeared. 
Bartle and Heinecken’s (2006) comparative volume on military unionism in the West 
highlights a distinction between three groups of countries. Countries like France, Italy 
and Spain forbid military personnel to join or form military unions – their interests are 
protected by the commanding officer or the state itself. In countries such as Slovenia, 
South Africa and Ireland, military trade unions have been introduced in recent 
decades. In countries such as the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, military unions 
have been allowed for a longer period of time. In general, the role of the unions is to 
bargain with the employer, but, as in the Dutch case, they sometimes also protect the 
individual interests of the employees. The key message of  Bartle and Heinecken’s 
(2006) volume is that regardless of the status of unionization, the socio-economic 
situation of military personnel seems to be similar across the Western world and 
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can be described as precarious. Furthermore, whether unionized or not, exerting 
influence remains difficult for personnel. 
The similarities in pressures but also the increased internationalization are mirrored in 
the activities of the European organization of military associations, EUROMIL, which 
aims to support the social rights of soldiers at the European level but also pressure 
governments ‘to lift all existing restrictions rights of soldiers which are not an inevitably 
and proportionate result from the military assignment’ (EUROMIL, 2017). 
On the individual level, Heinecken’s (2009) international comparative study among 
middle-ranking officers found that the introduction of business-like practices in order 
to improve efficiency, cost-effectiveness and flexibility changed the way officers see 
their profession and the relationship with their employer. Heinecken concludes that 
these reforms undermined the traditional values which included selfless service, 
loyalty and commitment. In addition to that, changes caused officers to stop trusting 
military leadership when it comes to defending officers’ interests. This in turn led 
military personnel to consider other possibilities when it comes to influencing their 
position, for instance unionization in situations where this was previously not the case, 
but also to consider other forms of applying pressure. Still this is more of a prediction 
than reality as there is very little evidence for increased activism. In France, for instance, 
the military is commonly known as Le Grande Muette (‘the big silent one’). Officers are 
not supposed to engage in politics and the civil domain has a clear dominance over 
the military one (Cogan, 2003). In the 1950s and early 1960s this changed – the French 
army went from obedience to mutiny, but in the period afterwards the silent and 
obedient position of the French armed forces was restored and lasts to the present 
day. 
Similar patterns are present in other countries – military personnel rarely resort 
to protest. Some authors however take a more normative turn and argue that the 
time might be ripe to break this pattern. In Great Britain, Strachan (2003) proposes 
increased politicization in order to strengthen the position of the military personnel 
versus the political leadership. Strachan sees the need to breach the mode of 
silence which, especially in a media-driven world, leads to servicemen and women 
being unable to express their views. He questions the depoliticized manners of the 
servicemen and women and points out that, historically, issues which endangered 
professional interests used to be addressed by briefing the press and blackmailing 
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politicians (Strachan, 2003). In the US, Sarkesian (1998) made a similar argument and 
cited General Ridgeway, who proclaimed that no military leader should forget that 
he or she is a citizen first and soldier second, meaning that he or she has a duty to 
warn politicians and the people of problems they see. The years of austerity and the 
introduction of flexible and short-term contracts in Europe might have produced the 
effect of increased politicization – with street demonstrations of military personnel 
and military retirees occurring in Greece, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands (see 
EUROMIL, 2015, 2016). 
Yet, the existing empirical evidence shows that military personnel remain largely 
passive when it comes to defending their labour rights. Even when unionization is 
allowed, the typical ways of fighting for labour issues remain out of reach for military 
personnel in most Western democracies. 
Anti-war protest in the military 
Historically, combat refusal is probably the most common expression of dissent 
within the military. Recently, collective refusals to engage in combat were often 
closely related to broader social movements which agitated against war in various 
Western countries. 
Kriner and Shen (2010) found that military casualties in the United States lead to drop of 
support for military operations, particularly within the groups which have felt the costs 
of war directly. However, these costs are often felt in disadvantaged communities 
with fewer political assets and less leverage. Levy (2013) draws on Hirschman’s (1970) 
thesis that voice is more likely when exit is not an option, such as when conscription 
is obligatory. Levy (2013) compares two anti-war mothers movements – an American 
and an Israeli one – and argues that even though the Israeli movement faced a 
situation which was, compared to the American situation, ‘less convenient in terms of 
opportunity structure and the politics of war, the recruitment-related variables tipped 
the scale. Due to these variables, the movement could rely on middle-class resources 
and power, favor voice over exit, and, mainly, perfect the framing of republican 
motherhood and adhere to it in a manner that was instrumental in mobilizing support. 
An initial social-base supportive of this protest constrained the movement to keep its 
relatively mainstream tone, thanks to which it became very effective’ (Levy, 2013: 37).
In the United States, memories are still alive of the massive protest activities by 
conscripted soldiers during the Vietnam War (see Cortright, 2005; Foley, 2003; Moser, 
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1996). Nowadays, there is no draft, and even though a direct comparison is difficult it 
seems that the protest activities within the military are less common than during the 
Vietnam War. Yet, protest does occur, as seen in the testimonies provided first hand 
by families (Leitz, 2014) and military personnel themselves (Gutmann, 2010; Levinson, 
2014). 
In sum, the evidence shows that the removal of conscription might have made 
protest more difficult. Yet, under the right circumstances protest can still appear, as 
seen during the unpopular Iraq War. 
Diversity and protest
Literature focusing on diversity occasionally touches upon the issue of protest in 
addition to its main focus on organizational policies and external societal pressures. 
Within Western militaries, diversity usually concerns three broad groups – ethno-
religious (or racial) minorities, women and LGBTs (Van der Meulen and Soeters, 2007).
The earliest discussion on diversity centred on the inclusion of minority ethnic and racial 
groups. In the United States, the struggle for the emancipation of African Americans 
within the US military was embedded within the general civil rights movement and in 
the conflicts leading up to it and included a full repertoire of protest activities which 
in concert with the broader social movements led to racial integration (see Binkin, 
2011; Nalty, 1989). In Europe, similar issues appeared only after the arrival of a large 
number of non-European immigrants after the Second World War, which raised the 
question of inclusion of these minorities (see Winslow et al., 2006). However, given 
the specific history and legal position of these minorities, the processes seen in the 
US throughout the 20th century did not occur. In this case, diversity is commonly 
approached in terms of organizational needs rather than activism and protest.
The inclusion of women in the military organization often produced conflict. 
Katzenstein (1999) focused on women’s movements inside the military and the 
church and found that military women pursue unique ways of struggling against 
discrimination, in particular by turning to courts and political bodies. Carreiras (2008) 
compares the Dutch and Portuguese situations with a focus on the problems faced 
by military women seeking gender integration. She identifies four strategies women 
apply, and finds that the strategy of conformism – belief that gender differences 
should be minimized and excessive visibility should be avoided – is most commonly 
employed. Other strategies, assimilation, adapting to the military ways and in a way 
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beating the men at their own game, complicity, remaining loyal while preserving the 
gender differences and femininity, and assertivity, where women want to preserve 
the gender difference in an emancipatory sense by employing voice to channel their 
demands, are far less common. Notably, increased acceptance of women within the 
military has also led some men to rebel. Miller (1997) presents evidence on how men 
use anti-social behaviour – chiefly harassment – to protest the increased presence of 
women, which they perceive as threatening. 
In the United States, the position of LGBTs within society was a contentious political 
issue for decades (Fetner, 2008). Direct protest by LGBT servicemen was long 
impossible, as the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell (DADT) policy required openly declared LGBTs 
to leave the organization. Eventually, external pressures and the success of the 
political allies of the LGBT community led to the removal of discriminatory policies. In 
many other Western countries, the issue of LGBTs within the military organization was 
not as politicized as in the United States, issues of harassment and inclusion certainly 
did and continue to exist (see, for example, a qualitative study by Bullinga (1984) on 
the Dutch military in the conscription period). A more recent example by Richardson 
and Bosch (2002) shows that the activism of minority groups within the Dutch military 
is nowadays formalized in networks of LGBTs, women and ethnic minorities, whose 
activities include information days and symposia where issues are discussed and 
communicated to policy makers and the organization – reflective of broader societal 
trends. Similar networks exist in other countries as well, for example Great Britain and 
Australia. 
In sum, we can conclude that when protest regarding diversity takes place, it is often 
an organization-friendly, cooperative approach. Confrontation rarely takes place and 
it only tends to be effective when external allies can support it – in particular policy 
makers and general public opinion.
Assessment of research to date 
Literature on behaviour within organizations stresses that remaining passive is the 
most common response to discontent among employees (see Kolarska and Aldrich, 
1980). Unsurprisingly, the same can be said of the military, which is famously hostile 
towards contentious behaviour. Our review shows that while protest is not completely 
absent within the military, it remains an exceptional form of behaviour. 
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There is a large consensus in the literature that the arrangement governing the 
position of military personnel has been threatened by the numerous changes in the 
military organization (e.g. Bartle and Heinecken, 2006). Looking at the consequences 
of these changes, some authors hypothesized that both socio-economic pressures 
and the increasing convergence with the civilian mainstream might cause more 
activism among military personnel (Heinecken, 2009; Moskos, 1977). The empirical 
evidence does not unequivocally confirm such a trend, however. Certainly, there is 
some evidence of growing dissatisfaction and also of more opportunities to express 
that dissatisfaction. For example, in recent decades more countries have begun 
to allow trade unions for military personnel. Still, collective protest as a form of 
behaviour among military personnel remains rare. In fact, there is evidence that the 
changes within the military organization might have suppressed protest rather than 
encouraged it, as seen in the removal of conscription and the subsequent decrease 
of contact with the more activist segments of the general population (Levy, 2013). 
Moreover, the changes which make protest easier should not be overstated – both 
legal limitations and unique cultural traits specific for the military persist, especially 
regarding behaviour which could endanger key military tasks: take for example the 
limitations on striking, normally a crucial tool in civilian labour relations, which remain 
firmly in place in almost every Western democracy. 
When protest behaviour does take place, it often concerns the issues of diversity 
and to some extent the anti-war movements – probably because these issues 
figure prominently in public debate within the civilian society. The forms of protest 
which are applied (usually not too disruptive) suit the specific organizational setting 
of the military. However, the developments outside the organization matter as well. 
Studies which investigated the instances of activism within the military highlight the 
importance of external allies which can assert influence on policy makers (Fetner, 
2008). Such allies are able to inject their resources and have experience with similar 
issues in other settings, thereby aiding those within the military. Notably, not much 
has been written about the relationship between military trade unions and the civilian 
labour movement, nor about the support for the position of military personnel by the 
labour movement. The lack of such a relationship might be a part of the explanation 
for the relative passivity when it comes to socio-economic issues within the military. 
At the same time, the protests which occurred in recent years in Europe are yet to be 
addressed by the literature. 
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In sum, the existing literature enables us to understand the organizational context 
of the military and the ways it might suppress protest. We also have a fairly good 
picture of the salient issues among personnel and the way they are addressed. 
Yet, based on the current state of research, the most important conclusion about 
protest within the military concerns the things we do not know. This knowledge 
gap can be summarized in two main points: the lack of empirical research and the 
missing link between military-specific research and the mainstream sociological and 
organizational science literature. 
The lack of empirical research
While the literature largely agrees on the nature of pressures faced by military 
personnel and some empirical evidence has been presented about the discontent 
among them, a number of crucial issues remain unresolved – chiefly because they 
haven’t been researched properly.
To begin with, no real evidence has been presented on how specific aspects of the 
organizational changes influence discontent among personnel and their relationship 
with the employer. While Moskos et al. (2000) stress that the transformation of the 
military organization varies greatly between different countries and even within the 
same military organizations, there is very little evidence on how this transformational 
diversity relates to work satisfaction. While one could argue that downsizing and 
austerity as a rule produce discontent, we must wonder about the impact of other, less 
material aspects of the transformation of the military organization. As such changes 
might place traditional military norms under pressure, the question is whether this 
could have unintended consequences and indeed lead towards more non-traditional 
behaviour. Regrettably, if we focus on the reaction of military personnel when under 
pressure, particularly in terms of protest, we face an even bigger lacuna. While the 
turn towards trade unions has been a hypothesized result of the transformation of the 
military and we indeed know a bit about trade unions within the military organization, 
evidence on the opinions of personnel about unionization, membership rates and 
readiness to engage in union-related activities is non-existent or difficult to find. 
Subsequently, protest behaviour, in the case of labour conflicts usually organized by 
trade unions, remains under-researched as well. 
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The lack of a link to findings from other fields 
The second major problem concerns the lack of a connection between the existing 
research on protest-related issues within the military and the literature on similar 
topics within other types of organizations and spheres of life. While this isolation can 
partially be attributed to mainstream academia which nowadays commonly ignores 
the military organization (Malešević, 2010; Zürcher, 2013), our review shows that military 
sociologists do not invest enough effort into understanding how the developments 
within the military relate to trends described in other sectors. 
For example, ever since the 1970s military-specific literature has focused on the 
increased interest in trade unions by military personnel. At the same time, we know 
that trade unions in other sectors are going through a difficult period with severe 
consequences on their ability to attract membership as well as influence policy 
makers (Streeck, 2005). No attempt has been made to relate this profound crisis to 
developments within the military and the attempts to spread unionization among 
military personnel. Subsequently, questions on whether military trade unions are an 
exception or whether they will follow suit of other sectors remain unresolved. 
More broadly, issues such as discontent, protest and trade unions are rarely observed 
in comparison to other organizations where personnel face similar constraints, such 
as the police or medical services. Besides sharing a number of aspects of their 
organizational culture (Soeters et al., 2006), military organizations in the Western 
world face pressures such as austerity and increased focus on efficiency, which are in 
fact typical for many other public institutions. Failure to observe military personnel in 
comparison to other (public) employees results in a profound lack of understanding 
of not only the effects of the developments within the military on the behaviour of 
personnel but also the effects of the specific organizational characteristics when 
facing these developments.
Future research
In this final section we aim to address the two limitations in our knowledge on protest 
within the military – the lack of empirical research and the lack of a link to the findings 
and developments in other spheres of life. We see the need to investigate specific 
and urgent questions and propose a path to do so by leaning on both the existing 
knowledge on military affairs and abundant research from outside the military. 
Chapter 1
40
A framework for research on protest within the military organization
Empirical evidence shows that, within the military, protest is rare. When it does 
occur its form is often adapted to the specific organizational circumstances. Hence, 
it makes sense to observe collective protest as only one of the possible strategies 
when coping with discontent, especially since a similar approach is commonly 
applied when studying activism in the wider society. Wright et al. (1990) noted that 
disgruntled citizens at first have a choice between remaining passive or engaging 
in some kind of action. When they engage in action, they can do that individually or 
collectively. Collective action itself can be normative and takes place within the norm 
of the law (for example taking part in a legal demonstration) or non-normative (for 
example illegal protest). Evidence shows that in the civilian world the choice to protest 
is made only occasionally, as other reactions, such as remaining passive, are more 
prevalent (Marwell and Oliver, 1993). This has been recognized within organizational 
settings where studies commonly apply the framework which has been proposed by 
Hirschman (1970) and later expanded on in numerous empirical studies on employee 
behaviour. Hirschman (1970) identified two key sorts of behavioural strategies, voice 
– communicating the need for change – and exit – leaving the problematic situation 
altogether. Importantly, while not the direct focus of this article, exit is an option which 
is routinely and extensively investigated within the military organization – chiefly 
because it has enormous impact on its functioning. The choice between exit and 
voice can be influenced by loyalty – the feeling of commitment which can provide 
for the readiness to endure the problematic situation and stick with the organization 
– but also by a great number of other demographic and personal variables. Later, 
more refined applications of Hirschman’s framework commonly included behaviour 
defined as silence – ‘the intentional, conscious decision of employees to withhold 
their opinions and concerns about organizational circumstances’ (Bell et al., 2011: 135) 
– but also neglect, which refers to anti-organizational or anti-social behaviour such 
as investing less effort into work or causing damage to the employer (Farrell, 1983). 
Importantly, neglect can also refer to bullying, which was in fact identified as a form 
of protest by military personnel in a study by Miller (1997). 
Applying Hirschman’s framework and its more recent variations within the military 
setting might be useful as it could provide us with a better understanding of the 
behaviour of military personnel. Furthermore, In addition to the usual factors which 
influence individuals’ behaviour, such as demography and personal experiences, 
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special attention should be given to understanding how specific elements of the 
military context influence the decision whether and how to engage in protest or 
other types of behaviour. It is often mentioned that the military context is a protest-
unfriendly environment but we do not know much about how different elements of 
this environment work to suppress protest and in which ways they could influence 
alternative forms of behaviour such as exit or neglect. For example, cohesion is a 
typically military characteristic which can work to prevent protest but is at the same 
time also its necessary ingredient. A better understanding of this and similar issues 
has in fact value which extends far beyond military-specific studies. 
Regrettably, insights from the military organization are often overlooked. From the 
1970s on, the classical focus on the military has all but disappeared and the military 
as organization has been neglected by mainstream sociologists (Malešević, 2010). 
While the military organization itself could always count on sustained policy-driven 
research on its effectiveness and deployment (Haltiner and Kümmel, 2009), military 
personnel’s welfare was rarely a subject of academic research. For example, labour 
force research routinely omitted military personnel, based on the argument that they 
form an institutionalized population, subject to different constraints and choices than 
other employees (Booth and Segal, 2005). That is a pity, as, even today, many other 
organizations share at least some of the typical military aspects such as discipline, 
high cohesion or specific legal restrictions. Think of the police force, the ambulance 
service, fire fighters but also of other professions with a strong professional culture 
and feeling of separateness. Shedding more light on the issue of protest within the 
military might be a valuable contribution towards understanding why some groups of 
citizens face difficulties expressing their discontent in an effective way. Furthermore, 
while changes in the military organization might be having unique consequences 
because of the specific position of military personnel, understanding and comparing 
them to similar developments, especially in the public sector, might provide us with 
a better understanding of how different segments of the public sector in Western 
democracies are transforming themselves. Finally, while the military organization has 
been under pressure, Western societies tend to ask more and more of their military 
personnel – making the mission to understand their position important for both their 
welfare as well as our own security.

CHAPTER 2
MILITARY PERSONNEL ON COPING 




CHAPTER 2 : MILITARY PERSONNEL ON COPING WITH DISCONTENT WITHIN THE DUTCH ARMED FORCES10
In Western democracies, military personnel rarely resort to actions such as 
demonstrations, strikes and blockades. Sometimes, such actions are illegal, but even 
when legally allowed, they are often inconceivable. Traditionally, relative passivity on 
the part of personnel pursuing such a risky, demanding profession was compensated 
for by a well- secured socio-economic position and prospect of lifelong employment. 
This arrangement was the basis for the psychological contract specific to the armed 
forces in Western democracies (Bartle, 2006a). Yet, in recent decades, most armed 
forces there went through budget cuts and deep organizational changes, often with 
negative consequences for personnel. The Netherlands is a case in point. Ever since 
the 1980s, Dutch military personnel have been exposed to the effects of budgetary 
retrenchment and private sector modes of operation (Moelker, 2006). Such obviously 
detrimental changes commonly produce work- related discontent and conflict. This 
leads to questions about whether and how military personnel can respond to such 
developments, and whether protest remains inconceivable. This qualitative study 
focuses on the case of the Netherlands and on the question: how do Dutch military 
personnel cope with work-related discontent?
It is well-known that military personnel face formal restrictions which may include 
limitations to free speech, demonstrations, unionization and striking. The extent 
of these restrictions varies from one country-specific legal framework to the next 
(Leigh & Born, 2008). Besides formal restrictions, military personnel also work in an 
organization marked by specific cultural traits such as loyalty, strict hierarchy and 
discipline, authoritarianism and cohesion (Janowitz, 1960; Lang, 1965; Boer, 2002; 
Soeters, 2002; Kaurin, 2014), which in the context of a military organization commonly 
work to inhibit protest and act as informal restrictions.
These restrictions used to be of little importance during periods when there were few 
reasons to be dissatisfied. In recent years, however, structural changes in the military 
have caused discontent among military personnel (Heinecken, 2009). Scholarly 
attention to how service members cope with discontent has been limited. The scarce 
research on discontent within the armed forces typically focuses on unionization 
within the military (e.g., Caforio, 2006) and turnover issues (e.g., Weiss et al., 2003). 
10 Published as: Petrovic, I., Klandermans, P. G., & van Stekelenburg, J. (2017). Coping with Discontent in 
Contemporary Armed Forces - The Dutch Case. Res Militaris, (ERGOMAS issue n°4). 
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As a result, while changes in military organization and the consequences they entail 
for military effectiveness are thoroughly investigated (see for instance Larrabee, 
Johnson, Gordon, Wilson & Baxter, 2012), we neither know how military personnel 
experience these changes, nor how they cope with them – especially in terms of 
applying protest. This study aims to take a first step towards filling that gap. 
Coping with discontent
Social movement scholars note that discontent often fails to result in protest. Wright 
and colleagues (1990) made the point that aggrieved citizens face basic choices: 
do nothing, or engage in action; if the latter is chosen, opt for individual or collective 
action ; when the action envisaged is collective, keep it non-contentious (e.g., 
petitioning or taking part in legal demonstrations), or go for contentious means (e.g., 
civil disobedience or illegal protest).
Within organizations, discontent has commonly been approached based on 
Hirschman’s classic framework on ‘exit, voice and loyalty’. Hirschman (1970) 
considered two possible reactions of consumers or citizens once they are dissatisfied. 
They can resort to voice, defined as “any attempt at all to change, rather than escape 
from, an objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition 
to the management directly in charge ; through appeal to a higher authority with the 
intention of forcing a change in management ; or through various types of actions and 
protests” (Hirschman, 1970, p.30).
Voice contrasts with exit where “some customers stop buying the firm’s products or 
some members leave the organization” (ibid., p.4). The choice between exit and voice 
is influenced by loyalty which can be defined as a feeling of attachment and hope 
that there is a chance for improvement. Loyalty makes exit less likely but does not 
remove it because, as Hirschman (p.79) wrote, “the barrier to exit constituted by loyalty 
is of finite height”.
Loyalty is not the only factor influencing whether and in which manner discontent 
translates into action (Kolarska & Aldrich, 1980). If we consider collective protest, 
discontent itself matters ; but, as the early 1970s resource mobilization theorists 
point out, discontent alone is a weak predictor of protest, as discontent is ubiquitous, 
while protest is not (e.g. McCarthy & Zald, 1976). So, for instance,  while the chances 
of losing a job matter, so do age, education and especially chances of alternative 
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employment (Farrel & Rusbult, 1982; Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995; Ng & Feldman, 
2009). Feelings of efficacy are important (Van Zomeren et al., 2004)  as those who 
feel their action is efficacious resort to protest despite repression and the lack of 
opportunities (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). Identification might play a 
role as well (Klandermans, 2014). However, the willingness to protest may suffer when 
two identities clash as in the cross-pressure of union member and loyal employee 
identities (Oegema & Klandermans, 1994) considered in the following.
Furthermore, restrictions on and opportunities for protest play a role. The existence 
of repression increases the costs of participation and makes collective action 
unattractive (Tilly, 1978). Numerous informal restrictions might exist as well, for 
instance career repercussions (Van Winkle, Rock, Coffey & Hurley, 2014) or specific 
norms of behaviour (Marwell & Oliver, 1993). On the other hand, embeddedness in 
formal organizations or in informal networks fosters action (McAdam, McCarthy & 
Zald, 1996). However, as these factors vary as a function of contexts, the choice of 
whether and how to protest will be influenced by the situation in which mobilization 
processes take place (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013).
Understanding protest in the military context
The context of the military organization is influential – beyond what is common for 
most other organizations. Described as a total (van Schilt, 2011) or greedy institution 
(Soeters, 2002), the military impacts the lives of its members tremendously (Lang, 
1965). Moreover, because of its roles and organization, it is seen as unique or different 
from the rest of the society (Boëne, 1990). This uniqueness also has consequences 
for how personnel can react to discontent. To map these consequences, a rough 
distinction is in order: between formal restrictions, based on the legal framework 
governing the behaviour of military personnel, and informal restrictions, based on the 
military’s organizational culture.
Formal restrictions
As in all other Western democracies, the legal position of Dutch military personnel 
differs from the position of other employees, not the  least regarding what personnel 
can do during a labour conflict. Importantly, striking is not allowed (Coolen & 
Walgemoed, 2011, pp.47-49). Freedom of speech is secured – as long as it does not 
endanger the functioning of the organization or breaches confidential information. In 
practice, harsh critique on governmental policy is prohibited (ibid., pp.71-72). While 
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Dutch military personnel enjoy freedom of association, this excludes membership in 
organizations which might harm the military or hamper mission performance. Joining 
legally recognized political parties and trade unions is not prohibited, but if these 
organizations engage in illegal behaviour military personnel may not participate (ibid., 
pp.75-76). Gathering for a demonstration is allowed but not during service hours as 
the rules regarding striking apply. Demonstrating in uniform is only allowed at events 
concerning work-related discontent (ibid., pp.77-78).
Informal Restrictions
Max Weber (1978 [1922]) saw the military as an ideal type of bureaucracy – a system of 
governance typically characterized by a hierarchical structure and adherence to rules 
(see also: Lang, 1965). According to Soeters (2002), this might lead to authoritarianism 
as a norm – made visible by ‘power distance’ between different levels of the hierarchy 
and a tendency to enforce the rules strictly. Although Janowitz (1960) observed that in 
the post-WWII era the authoritarian commanding style shifted towards softer styles, 
military organization remains authoritarian when compared to civilian organizations. 
Another trait highlighted by Weber (ibid., pp.1152-1153) was strict discipline, a basis on 
which the formation of the modern military rested, which according to Lang (1965) 
chiefly concerns respect for orders, acceptance of authority and punishment for 
deviant behaviour. Soeters (2002) mentions that in the Netherlands, informal group 
norms seem more important than the ceremonial aspects of discipline, such as 
uniforms or military salute. As protest in most cases turns against authorities, traits 
such as hierarchy, authoritarianism or discipline tend to suppress it.
Cohesion or esprit de corps is a key military value which plays an ambiguous role if 
we consider protest. The “we-feeling” is facilitated by military leadership and serves 
important military goals, such as enhancing morale or overcoming losses (Boer, 
2001);  but it might also play a role in forging protest – as identification with the group is 
a necessary ingredient for collective action (Klandermans & van Stekelenburg, 2013). 
At the same time, strong identification may prevent protest in situations where group 
interests are hurt (Oegema & Klandermans, 1994).
While Hirschman (1970) saw loyalty as crucial in all types of situations, many argue that 
in the military environment it enjoys an even more central role (Kaurin, 2014). Wheeler 
(1973) described loyalty within the military as a two-sided relationship and stressed 
the importance of inspiring loyalty, because loyalty cannot be imposed. Traditionally, 
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armed forces used to evoke loyalty by positioning itself as a good employer. This is 
the very basis of the ‘psychological contract’ (Bartle, 2006a) which, while present in 
all organizations, assumes a unique form within the military. While military personnel 
lack certain rights, in return they are cared for beyond what is found in most civilian 
organizations (Heinecken, 2006). In that way, loyalty poses a barrier to protest in 
cases of insignificant incidents or pressures – as in the greater picture the employer 
deserves the loyalty of its personnel.
Empirical evidence on discontent in the (Dutch) armed forces
As early as the 1970s, Moskos (1977) identified a shift from an institutional towards 
an occupational model of military profession in which a traditional, divergent military 
organization started resembling a civilian-like organization in a number of aspects. 
In the post-Cold War period, this became increasingly visible and many of Moskos’ 
(1977) predictions materialized. Manigart (2006) highlights five trends common to 
almost all militaries in advanced democracies : downsizing, professionalization, 
increased reliance on reservists, civilians and outsourcing, integration between 
different branches of the armed forces and also, in Europe more specifically, 
‘multinationalization’ of military structures. The Netherlands is a good example of such 
changes – its armed forces have faced continuous reorganizations and downscaling 
since the end of the Cold War (Moelker, 2006). This culminated in large scale austerity 
packages in 2011 and 2012, resulting in the removal of up to one sixth of all positions 
within the organization. 
For military personnel these developments mean that employment is getting 
increasingly contract-based, segmented and civilianized (Heinecken, 2006). For 
those who manage to keep their jobs until retirement, career and advancement 
prospects have become increasingly limited. At the same time, Heinecken argues 
that the increased frequency of foreign operations has led to “problems of overstretch, 
undermanning and work-life balance, exacerbating problems of recruitment and 
retention” (ibid.).
Heinecken (2006) adds that the clash between a deteriorating labour position and 
increasing operational demands causes more interest in representation and unionism. 
Moskos (1977) argued that with the shift to a more civilian-like occupation, military 
personnel will look for the same kind of representation and protection as civilians. 
Further, Heinecken (2006) argues that the rise of individualism may have similar 
consequences.
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Recent empirical research into these claims is scarce. In her international compa- 
rative study of middle-ranking officers, Heinecken (2009) found that the introduction 
of private sector practices changed the way officers perceive their profession and their 
relationship with their employer. Traditional values like selfless service, loyalty and 
commitment became undermined. Officers stopped trusting military leadership to 
defend their interests and started considering other possibilities such as unionization 
in situations where this was previously not the case.
Unlike Great Britain and the United States, where attempts to unionize met fierce 
opposition, the Netherlands allows trade unions for military personnel (Moelker, 
2006). The role of these unions is twofold. First, they negotiate with the employer over 
a range of employment issues, and engage in public pressure either through media 
or even protest actions. Second, they provide legal assistance to individual members 
who file complaints or face punishment (Moelker, 2006). The right to join military trade 
unions is exercised fervently : no other sector in the Netherlands labour force has 
maintained unionization levels of around 80%. Still, Hummel (2014) notes that because 
striking is forbidden, trade unions lack effective pressure tools. At the other hand, they 
are not completely toothless as their opposition can slow down the procedures and 
make changes difficult. 
Dutch military personnel can also influence the policies of their employer through co-
determination bodies (MCs)11  to which members are democratically elected. Issues 
of consultation include work safety and organization, service hours, living and work 
climate, reorganization, social and financial policies, and other issues falling within the 
responsibility of commanding officers, though with a clear exemption for operational 
issues (Moelker, 2006 ; Staatsblad, 2008).
Finally, some instances of protest by Dutch military personnel (Moelker, 2006) have 
been recorded. In the 1970s, low-flying planes above The Hague in protest against 
austerity caused enormous scandal (Kromhout, 2011). More recently, the media 
reported spontaneous actions against austerity measures, but also large street 
demonstrations organized by trade unions (e.g., Reformatorisch Dagblad, 2011). Still, 
academic attention to these events has been minimal ; consequently, knowledge on 




The behaviour Hirschman named exit, e.g. leaving the organization, is well researched 
– obviously because it has direct influence on military capabilities. International 
research shows that the overall satisfaction with military life is strongly linked to the 
likelihood of staying in the armed forces. Adequate facilities, pay, amount of leisure 
time, quality of leadership, job satisfaction and deployments all play a role (Weiss et 
al., 2003). In the Netherlands, job and career insecurity was found to increase turnover 
intentions (Van Eetveld, van de Ven, van den Tooren & Versteeg, 2013).
From discontent to drotest? Uncharted territory
In sum, we could say that possible causes of discontent among military personnel 
have been well identified. Existing literature points to both long-term organizational 
changes and austerity measures. Few studies focused on how service members 
experience these changes – and which aspects pressure personnel the most. Even 
less is known about how military personnel cope with discontent. There are fears 
that loyalty is eroding but definitive evidence is lacking. Moreover, while ‘exit’ has 
been extensively researched, the literature barely touches upon behaviour we can 
describe as ‘voice’. In what follows, we report a study that attempts to get a better 
understanding of work-related discontent and labour conflict in the Netherlands 
military. Dutch military personnel have access to several avenues to express their 
voice. But do they indeed resort to these avenues and what influences their decision 
to do so? Furthermore, how is this decision affected by perceptions of the formal and 
informal restrictions they face?




This study encompassed 24 individual in-depth interviews – six per service : Army, 
Air Force, Navy and Constabulary. Interviewees included 21 men and 3 women, 8 
officers, 14 non-commissioned officers and 2 privates; the average age was 44 years. 
The interviews were held at 13 locations in the Netherlands, mostly at neutral places 
such as cafés in order to assure privacy (though a few took place at participants’ 
working places when they themselves found that more convenient). The length of 
interviews ranged from 45 minutes to 2 hours, with the average slightly above one 
hour.
The recruitment of interviewees occurred through three major military trade unions 
(ACOM, AFMP and MARVER)12. Their ‘people on the ground’ spread the word about 
the research and a small article appeared in union magazines and websites. While 
recruitment was primarily directed at union members, information by trade unions 
is commonly shared and reaches the whole unit. Hence, several non-members 
participated as well. While we made sure to include a wide variety of individuals – male 
and female, younger and older staff in different ranks and positions –, interviewees 
were not perfectly representative of Dutch military personnel : they were older, higher 
in rank, and among them union- and co- determination officials were overrepresented. 
For this type of study, however, exact representativeness was not crucial. The primary 
goal was to capture as much variation as possible and discuss different opinions 
which exist within the armed forces – not to make conclusions about the quantitative 
incidence of certain opinions. Hence, while limited, the sample of 24 interviewees 
offered us enough space to achieve variety in terms of socio- demographics and 
experiences, also confirmed by saturation in terms of new information which occurred 
after conducting roughly two thirds of the interviews.
Given the qualitative nature of this study, we were looking for the views and the 
opinions of the interviewees about the specific context of the Dutch military. To 
achieve this goal, we opted for in-depth interviews as combining structure with 
flexibility (Legard, Keegan & Ward, 2003). This ensures that relevant issues have been 
tackled while participants have the full freedom to present their views and introduce 
issues which they deem important. While a list of topics was prepared in advance (see 




Appendix I), the conversation mostly took a natural course with researchers broadly 
moderating the interviews and listening to the participants’ own stories. We asked the 
interviewees about positive and negative experiences regarding their work, reactions 
to any discontent they may experience, the role of trade unions, the possibility of 
leaving the armed forces altogether, and finally loyalty and pride related to their work.
Privacy, an important issue in a military setting, was guaranteed by separating personal 
data from other items. All but one respondent allowed us to record the interviews. The 
audio recordings were transcribed13  and then analyzed using Atlas Ti Software.
Results
Discontent within the Dutch Armed Forces: Weighing the pros and cons
Working in the Dutch armed forces means living with the two sides of the same coin 
– enjoying an inspiring, dynamic job with quite a few benefits that other citizens do 
not have, and at the same time feeling insecure due to the sweeping changes within 
the organization.
Interestingly, participants highlight the value of immaterial incentives such as the 
adventurous side of the job: “It is a safe way to discover the world. You have your bed, 
your food, people who can help you. But you have still wandered all over the world !”. 
Also, the social aspects such as collegiality and group spirit matter a lot: “Within the 
military you really do it together”. Camaraderie is often described as a basis for success 
“We do it together, we get the planes off the ground quicker than Americans… Trusting 
each other, helping each other… If I call for help, then I know somebody will come”. When 
these immaterial incentives disappear, feelings of disappointment and worry for the 
future of the organization arise.
Material incentives matter as well. This includes benefits which can still be enjoyed in 
the old-fashioned way, e.g. easily accessible health care, or breathing space provided 
to deal with personal problems: “In a commercial company, they won’t tell you to work 
half a day for some time, arrange your stuff back home and then come back in three 
weeks or so…”. While some interviewees note that civilian jobs pay more, they also 
13 Interview transcripts include 23 fully transcribed interviews and one document with written notes directly 
recorded during the interview where no audio recording was made due to privacy concerns.
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understand that life “beyond the gate” is not perfect: “If I look around, all my nephews 
have fixed-term and flexible contracts, that is a bit less secure than in the military”.
Often, interviewees stated that they came to talk about issues worrying them, but 
also stressed that they did not want to be overtly critical. This positive stance coexists 
with a realization that their organization is facing a series of threats. These threats 
can be grouped in three major trends: (1) the push for efficiency, professionalization 
and private sector management; (2) a weakening of the armed forces due to 
political choices; and (3) a shift from personalized and warm social relations towards 
impersonality, harshness and individualism.
From traditional military to business-type organization
Changes in the organization seem to cut both ways. Service members themselves 
do see the necessity for a more efficient organization which does not waste taxpayers’ 
money as in the past: “Before, we never used to speak about financing, things just got 
bought”. Some think that the changes should even go faster in order to keep up with 
commercial technological and organizational state-of-the art practice. Furthermore, 
there are several positive effects of professionalization, e.g. increased attention to 
safety, service hours regulations, and rules in general.
However, somewhere along the road the push for efficiency seems to have gotten 
out of control – “At one point you reach a limit, you cannot go on and on”. For example, 
some rules seem to produce just the opposite of their original purpose – aircraft 
mechanics who are not allowed to replace a bulb, or outsourcing to save money 
in one place that entails higher costs elsewhere. We have heard complaints about 
increased workloads occasioned by sick leaves when no one is available to step 
in. Also, the increasing number of both minor peacekeeping missions and major 
operations as in Afghanistan, which caused increased pressure on both personnel 
and materiel.
Downsizing the armed aorces
The second change concerns austerity and continuous downsizing. While the 2011 
reorganization is described as a big shock, surprisingly, interviewees do not seem 
impressed by it. For those longer in service, it is  just  another reorganization in  a 
row  –  “I cannot even count how many reorganizations I have been through” ; or “If 
we are finished with this round, the next one will follow soon”. And indeed – before we 
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even completed analysis of the interviews conducted in the late spring of 2013, new 
austerity measures were announced.
The present study shows that two of the main negative aspects of continuous 
downsizing are perfectly identified. First, it is irresponsible and dangerous for the 
country’s security. Second, there are social consequences such as job insecurity, 
postponed retirement age limits, salaries falling far behind commercial standards, 
and most notably a shift from lifetime employment towards fixed-term contracts.
From personal to impersonal
Individualization is one of the complaints we have very often encountered: “Before, we 
used to drink a beer or watch a movie in the communal room, today this space is empty”. 
Interviewees understand that individualization might be a consequence of broader 
social trends. However, they see it as particularly dangerous because, as  highlighted 
earlier, collegiality and group feeling are considered very important. It is not surprising 
that they are perplexed by what they describe as a “rat race” – unhealthy competition 
between colleagues, or the increased lack of job dedication, individualized forms 
of behaviour which cannot be reconciled with the nature and goals of a military 
organization.
The related complaint about the shift towards market sector management has several 
facets. First, service members are left to sort out their problems on their own and 
are shocked to find out that the responsibility for their future is now entirely in their 
own hands. Second, internal communication has become bureaucratic, entailing 
a constant need for phone calls to central offices about problems concerning 
payments, contracts and overheads. Third, the organization is seen as being harsh, 
forcing people to leave and making use of “naïve” young adults while not offering 
them a perspective. This in particular is seen as asocial, given the sacrifices some of 
these young adults make. Finally, the rotation system where most personnel apply for 
a new function every three years causes much frustration. While a few interviewees 
appreciated the dynamism brought by rotation, most described it as bad for the 
organization and personnel alike due to the loss of specific knowledge, disarray in 
certain services and the ensuing never-ending stress.




In the previous section on discontent, we saw that while changes in the organization 
bring a few positive developments, their influence is seen as overwhelmingly 
detrimental. When coping with the consequences, military personnel face a number 
of formal and informal restrictions.
Formal restrictions
Prohibition of strikes is the most important formal restriction mentioned. The lack of 
this powerful ‘pressure tool’ is seen as bad for their bargaining position: “We are not 
allowed to strike, so politicians can rob us, and snatch from the Defense (budget) as they 
please.” Those working for the Constabulary talked about the imagined possibility of 
striking, which would have a powerful impact on the society : “We could shut down the 
airport in a moment. But then you would hurt the passengers. You could apply this heavy 
measure but that would be counterproductive.” Some express a wish to be allowed 
to  strike : “I actually think we should have the right to strike and that the judge should 
always be able to assess whether a strike would harm the public interest.”
Interestingly, formal restrictions were exaggerated few times, when interviewees 
erroneously mentioned that protests or demonstrations are not allowed. Possibly, the 
informal norms are so strong that they feel formal, but one might also wonder about 
the quality of information and knowledge on exact rules governing labour relations.
Informal restrictions
Informal restrictions play a far more important role than formal restrictions. The analysis 
of interviews brought up four major sources of informal restrictions: (1) hierarchy, (2) 
possible repercussions, (3) feelings of helplessness, and (4) loyalty.
Hierarchy. “Annoying hierarchical situations” were mentioned as the very cause of work-
related problems. They may involve conflicts with superior officers which are difficult 
to resolve: “If that guy has been around so long and everyone knows it, even the general, 
who can expect me, as a young lieutenant, to make a formal complaint ?”. More directly 
related to protest, others mention that superior officers use their influential position 
to prevent opposition, often by simply advising not to do certain things. Hence, the 
independence of trade unions is seen as their key strength. Namely, the fact that 
most  union officials are not serving military personnel anymore frees them of the 
same hierarchical structure which inhibits serving personnel from taking action.
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Repercussions. During the interviews, references to potential repercussions in the 
form of reprisals from superiors were often heard. Two different opinions crystallized 
in interviewees’ discourse.
The first came from trade unions or MC officials. While being aware of potential 
repercussions, they see their activities within MC or trade unions as beneficial for 
their position by providing them with a network, specific knowledge and important 
experience. Additionally, these activities foster good working relations with their 
commanding officers and bring respect.
The second opinion refers to the fear of potential negative consequences, due to 
activism or showing opposition, when it comes to the frequent personnel rotations 
(thus job applications), especially in the context of an ongoing reorganization – so 
that antagonizing superiors may backfire: “Nowadays, with 12 guys applying for a 
function, they can say you don’t match the profile. That’s not the reason. The reason is 
that you have a big mouth. But you can never prove that…”. Apparently, these are not 
only imagined fears. Lower commanding officers unofficially warn of a ‘cross against 
your name’ which will be memorized by successive superiors. Others cite examples 
of commanders who refused to implement austerity plans which they perceived as 
inadequate, and got replaced by those willing to oblige. 
Helplessness. The lack of any real influence is commonly mentioned: “You have two 
circles, one big and one small. Inside that small circle you have influence, and inside 
the big circle you have only involvement… I am inside that big circle, I don’t have any 
influence”. Interviewees agree that the opportunities for change are small : “You can 
keep kicking a rock, but if they don’t want to move, you won’t see any improvement”.
Despite a general feeling of lacking influence, specific tools for action such as union 
activities and MCs are also considered. For these particular mechanisms, views are 
more nuanced, but the general conclusion seems to be that: “It is a tanker…you cannot 
just make it move left of right, not with the MC and not with the AFMP”. However, some 
do believe that up to a certain degree, success is possible: “I always say, if we [the 
union] were not there, then they [at the ministry] would just suit themselves. Nowadays, 
the situation only gets worse ! We cannot avert the austerity measures but we were able 
to make some changes in the way they are conducted…”.
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Loyalty. In general, loyalty is seen as immensely important. In fact, interviewees often 
spontaneously mentioned it. There seems to be a consensus that loyalty is two-
sided: “They take good care of you, and you are there if you are needed. I always say 
before the missions, I have eaten well for 30 years, and if I have to go on a mission, I will 
go, regardless of the danger.”
What do military personnel mean when they refer to loyalty? In essence, “[…] doing 
things which are asked of you, things which are not part of your own job or a  normal 
day’s work, you just do them”. Apparently, this has to do with the so called “can- do 
mentality” which means that tasks are completed regardless of the difficulties: “Never 
heard anyone say, no way! Or, we are not doing this… We’ll solve it, or we do it this way 
or we do it that way”. Still, loyalty is not uncontested. While the organization tends to 
count on loyalty, it sometimes fails to grant recognition for it: “They know we will never 
strike, we are not allowed to. But that also gives responsibility to the other side, and they 
don’t necessarily fulfil it.” This is illustrated by the practice of breaking certain rules or 
regulations (such as working time regulations) in order to get tasks done. Superiors 
silently accept the practice but do not support their inferiors if things go wrong : “You 
should have said no. How can I say no when the task needs to be accomplished?”.
Others note that over time, changes within the organization affect loyalty as well. 
It starts eroding and resembling manners which they describe as typical of civilian 
organizations – “There are also guys who say, at 17:00 it’s done and I am going home.” 
This lessening of the traditional mentality endangers the performance of tasks, 
since working extra hours or days is common. Older interviewees ascribe this new, 
uncertain loyalty to the younger generations: “For them, it is just a job”.
Coping strategies
What do personnel do in the face of discontent? Just as expected in theory, the 
most obvious reaction is to do nothing: “Within the military, you always have to swallow 
stuff, you shouldn’t be whining, you’re a soldier!”. Some interviewees actually accuse 
others of remaining silent when they should speak up, in particular the higher-ups 
who adhere to the illogical moves of politicians: “The people who still really put up 
with everything are the higher officers….otherwise it’s the end of their career”. It is not clear 
whether and how far organizational changes modify the habit of remaining passive. 
Some claim that staying silent is no longer the norm: “You can do everything, but if 
you touch somebody’s money, they will speak up”. Others note that reorganizations 
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temporarily cause people not to complain, in order to protect their jobs. Due to 
specific rules, older personnel still enjoy the old protective status and cannot be laid 
off – all of them noticed that they can speak up more easily: “I am protected, nothing 
will happen to me, and then it’s easier to fight”.
Voice
When people decide to speak up, they can do that individually or collectively. Our 
results suggest that most complaining is done individually. The first step is often to 
simply process an informal claim up the chain of command: personnel talk to their 
commander about an issue and then it gets resolved or goes to the next higher 
level. The next, common step is filing an official complaint – for instance regarding a 
promotion, application for a new position, salary or pay supplements. In order to get 
assistance for these individual complaints, they often turn to a collective tool : trade 
unions.
Trade unions
While unions conduct both individual and collective representation of interests, it 
is actually the individual kind which gets the most attention. According to a trade-
union activist we talked to: “It is in 90% of cases individual interest representation. People 
who feel mistreated by the organization. Maybe even 95%... Our members are not really 
concerned about collective representation. It is only, hey boys, I am treated unfairly, I was 
refused a position, I did not receive a supplement…”.
Concerning involvement in the union, a large majority sees membership as a norm, 
a natural step when joining the military: “It is as if it was a part of your employment 
contract”. Still, some activists worry that the norm of being a member of the union 
is fading. Given the individual focus, the biggest threat is the competition from 
commercial legal assistance – as confirmed by a young non-member who cited 
commercial insurance as a reason not to become a member. Others mention lack of 
understanding of the unions’ collective role: “Lots of people have no idea what exactly 
the union is doing”. For many, membership in the union is the only form of voice they 
resort to. This is logical, as they can avoid repercussions while still supporting union 
representatives in their struggle.
There is much scepticism about what unions can achieve: “A few years ago retirement 
age went from 55 to 60. The military does that often, unilaterally forcing things. And the 
unions…at the end they cannot [do much], except stopping the consultations. That won’t 
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keep the minister awake in the night”. In 2013, however, the unions found themselves in 
a more powerful position than usual. 
While their cooperation was necessary to conduct reorganization, a conflict emerged 
over the so called WUL issue.14 Unions stopped consultation with the Ministry, 
effectively delaying the reorganization. For some personnel, this meant a prolonged 
period of uncertainty. Still, the unions could count on wide support – “I am glad that 
they are not giving in”. During the interviews, we heard  that whole units filled in the 
official complaint letter provided by unions, members and non-members alike.
However, mobilization for more demanding forms of participation such as a 
demonstration is more difficult. One of the union organizers said: “I asked the union 
to send ten buses, and I managed to fill one and a half. The issue was higher retirement 
age. My colleagues had to take a day off. How is it possible that they didn’t do it ? Bunch 
of idiots”. According to others, taking a day off makes a big difference – if the unions 
reach an agreement with the officers to protest during work time, mobilization is easier.
Co-Determination Bodies (MCs)
MC members among our interviewees highlighted the collective nature of the MCs – 
“Look, the MC is not for individual cases, the MC is for the collective, so if there are four, 
five or more guys coming with something, you take that. If there are two of them, then 
that is not yours to deal with”. MC members have a positive, but balanced image of 
their influence. They are able to fix certain things and exert some influence, but only 
up to a point, and not always successfully: “Sometimes you do and sometimes you 
don’t [achieve something]. It also depends on your relationship with the commander”. MC 
members complain about the difficulties they face when it comes to recruiting new 
members, especially skilful ones:
Everyone knows that it is important, and everyone knows where to find the MC if it’s 
necessary. But if you ask them to come because we need members, then they don’t 
dare or they won’t apply or they are afraid that it will damage their career.
Interviewees who are not active within the MC seem to be more sceptical and 
barely informed: “Yeah, we do have one here. I know an old colleague who is an MC 
member. I don’t really know much about it; I see it as something officially required by 
14 WUL – Wet uniformering loonbegrip –was supposed to be a budget-neutral tax simplification measure 
which unintentionally produced income decreases for military personnel of up to 5%. This issue caused 
huge friction between the Ministry of Defense and military trade unions.
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the management…they are obliged to establish one. Do they really have such a crucial 
function ? I have no idea…”
Public demonstrations
During the interviews, the 2011 demonstration of around 6,000 (both civilian and 
military) Defense employees was mentioned several times. While the turnout was 
seen as satisfactory, opinions about the effectiveness of such a demonstration 
were divided. Some see such large manifestations as proof of the support for the 
trade unions, while others think that it does not upset the Minister as it has no real 
consequences.
Occasionally, spontaneous collective action was mentioned. When budget cuts 
threatened their unit, lower-ranking officers spread flyers to inform the public about 
the importance of the unit: “We wanted to promote our unit as military personnel, but we 
were not allowed to. So we went there without uniforms. Luckily we had a commander 
who gave us a day to do it…”. In this particular event, while protesting in uniform was 
not allowed, officers had a facilitating role in organizing protest – mobilizing their 
personnel and arranging a day off. In this case, the hierarchy facilitated rather than 
prevented protest.
Exit
Lifetime employment in the armed forces is becoming less common (Soeters, 2002), 
which generates resentment. Our analysis confirms that. We talked to a female 
marine who left the organization shortly before we interviewed her, due to the ‘up 
or out’ system which makes exit mandatory for those who fail to rise in rank. For her, 
even though she quickly found another job, this was tough : she felt hurt when she 
had to leave after years of faithful service and several missions abroad. It was a harsh 
example of how new rules clash with loyalty and attachment to the organization.
Apart from such examples of involuntary separation, however, interviewees 
commonly consider exit as a free choice. In fact, a majority of personnel we talked to 
considered leaving at one point, often after they were disappointed or experienced 
a conflict: “The military was everything for me. The thought of not serving in the military 
was horrible and unthinkable ; it was not an option... At some point, things happen, you 
have a conflict…That was the point when I had to think, if this is not it, if we are not going to 
have a happy marriage we have to separate”. Many refer to colleagues who are leaving 
or consider leaving, often motivated by forthcoming budget cuts: “There were people 
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who always thought, I join the Army, maybe I can stay until my 60th birthday, but due to 
the budget cuts you see that people are reconsidering and using the possibilities to leave. 
Look, if you wait too long, you won’t be getting a civilian job either”. Several interviewees 
mention joining the police force as the next best option, citing similar culture.
When considering exit, the opportunities in the “civilian world” are commonly assessed. 
Some see civilians as better paid and having less demanding jobs while others value 
the remaining benefits and the adventure military personnel enjoy. Sometimes, 
the adventure became problematic once their personal situation changes – “If you 
have a family with small children, you are not keen on going on a mission for half a 
year or moving to another place every three or four years”. Numerous reasons not to 
leave the organization are cited as well – being close to (low) retirement age, lack 
of skills necessary for civilian jobs, or a strong affective engagement with the armed 
forces. Even when exit is a choice, it often takes a big clash or a prolonged period of 
problems before the attachment and loyalty to the organization eventually pale into 
insignificance. Then, personnel start making calculations and weighing the pros and 
cons of leaving the organization. 
Discussion and conclusions
This qualitative study explored how Dutch military personnel cope with work- related 
discontent. We focused on the origins and nature of discontent, the restrictions 
personnel have to overcome when coping with it and their actual behaviour in terms 
of voice and exit.
Results show that while military personnel value their jobs, they are deeply concerned 
about the organizational changes which they see as irreconcilable with the traditional 
way in which military organization operates. Analysis identified three main aspects 
of these changes: the shift from a traditional military organization to one mimicing 
the private sector, continuous downsizing, and the change from a personal to an 
impersonal organization.
Military personnel highlighted several restrictions which prevent them from protesting 
against the detrimental developments they may experience. Among formal 
restrictions, service members see the ban on striking as crucial. It denies them an 
important pressure tool and diminishes the leverage exerted by trade-unions’ activities. 
This in turn causes personnel to feel helpless despite collective representation of 
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interests by the unions. The strict hierarchy and threat of career repercussions matter 
as well. Finally, loyalty is seen as a key military value which encourages personnel 
to continue as faithful serving members in spite of difficulties, and thus to abstain 
from protest. While often referred to, loyalty seems contested. Interviewees feel 
that loyalty to the organization is not being returned anymore. Second, personnel 
increasingly identify civilian-like behaviour among their colleagues, often related to 
the rising individualization.
In spite of restrictions, military personnel can resort to different types of voice, chiefly 
through labour unions. Interestingly, when discussing unions, most personnel refer 
to individual issues. Collective representation seems delegated to officials. We 
also found that processes of individualization might be clashing with the unions’ 
collective nature and threatening their role by removing the norm of membership 
and introducing economic calculations and free-riding. Finally, while personnel see 
many reasons to stay in the armed forces, most considered leaving or even looked 
for another job at one point in their careers, often after experiencing a major conflict 
or a disappointment.
Our findings have multiple ramifications for the way we understand coping with 
discontent in the armed forces. Changes like the shift towards a “civilian” (business 
sector) organizational model and downsizing have been thoroughly discussed 
in the literature (see Moskos, 1977 ; Moskos, Williams & Segal, 2000). Personnel 
we interviewed provided numerous examples of how the focus on efficiency and 
downsizing caused hardship and insecurity. Interestingly, this study also reveals 
that there is an important immaterial side to organizational changes, characterized 
by individualization, harshness, and a bureaucratic approach to personnel’s issues 
and problems. Personnel fear that these trends may endanger the unique values 
crucial for fulfilling the tasks of the military organization. Given the nature of these 
immaterial pressures, we expect that they are difficult to pinpoint and therefore also 
to cope with, certainly in terms of protest.
This study confirmed that when deciding how to cope with discontent, military 
personnel face a number of specific restrictions. In fact, the results show that the 
shift to a more civilian-like organization has not been followed by a similar shift 
regarding restrictions on protest. Bearing in mind that Dutch military personnel only 
face relatively mild formal restrictions – for instance, personnel can unionize freely 
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(Moelker, 2006), we found that informal restrictions play an important role in inhibiting 
protest. In particular, interviewees fear career repercussions and have little faith in the 
influence exerted by the trade unions and co-determination bodies. Conversely, in 
line with the argument advanced by Hummel (2014), such scepticism does originate in 
the formal prohibition of striking. Finally, as often emphasized in the literature (Kaurin, 
2014), loyalty is a crucial notion within armed forces. Our study shows that personnel 
describe loyalty in conventional terms – as a reciprocal tie between employee and 
employer (Wheeler, 1973; Heinecken, 2009). More specific to the Netherlands, loyalty 
is related to the “can-do mentality”, a perception that a solution can always be found, 
regardless of the difficulties (Soeters, 2002). Unlike other restrictions, loyalty, which 
needs to be inspired (Wheeler, 1973) is proving more difficult to maintain in a changing 
environment. In agreement with Heinecken (2006), some personnel think that fading 
loyalty might lead to more protest. However, in the Dutch context, this claim needs 
further empirical testing as the same processes of diminishing loyalty and rising 
individualization might undermine support for unions and their activities as well.
Indeed, with formal and informal restrictions firmly in place, eroding loyalty may not 
automatically produce more collective protest. Even though Hirschman (1970) barely 
considered the option of doing nothing (or withdrawing good will) while remaining 
within the organization, Kolarska and Aldrich (1980) argue that “silence” is the most 
common reaction of dissatisfied members – it requires little effort and is related to 
loyalty, but also apathy and inability to voice dissatisfaction. Our results show that 
passivity is widespread and that military personnel see silence as a norm. At the 
same time, they disagree as to whether this particular norm will survive in light of the 
recent changes. When personnel do resort to voice, it is usually individual. Collective 
voice, such as demonstrations or petitions, remains rare and difficult to organize, even 
though legally possible in the Netherlands.
Exit, an individual form of behaviour, seems to be commonplace. Still, our results 
show that it is often an emotionally difficult step, as personnel see exit as parting with 
a way of life. Subsequently, we found that some aim to mitigate this loss by joining the 
police force which is considered to have a similar organizational culture (on values of 
uniformed professions, see: Soeters, 2002).
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This study aimed to take a first step towards a comprehensive understanding of  how 
military personnel cope with work-related discontent. Its focus was on personnel 
and their opinions, and less on organizational developments, an approach which has 
rarely been employed up until now. For those concerned with the welfare of military 
personnel, such a study may bring more insight into the consequences of pushing 
towards a more civilian- like organization and the way personnel cope with it.
Many questions remain, which could not be resolved in a study of this scope and 
design – a large-scale survey and representative sample would be better suited for 
the provision of conclusive answers to a number of issues. For instance, except where 
almost all interviewees expressed the same sentiment, we refrained from statements 
about the frequencies of certain opinions. Furthermore, we could not say much 
about how military personnel react to specific types of discontent, nor how their 
sociodemographic backgrounds and other specific circumstances influence their 
behaviour. Finally, as we deal with an organization in flux, the task remains to assess 
the impact of change on service members and their behaviour. Are we, as some of 
our interviewees fear, witnessing the advent of a nine-to-five soldier?
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CHAPTER 3: DEALING WITH AUSTERITY MEASURES WITHIN ARMED FORCES: THE DUTCH CASE15
On May 26th, 2011, the Koekamp grounds in The Hague were crowded with 
protesters. Although The Hague witnessed many protests after the 2008 financial 
crisis, the scene of 6,000 mostly uniformed Dutch military personnel protesting 
austerity was unusual. Indeed, military personnel rarely engage in demonstrations. 
As one of the demonstrators said, “We are not really a demonstrating type of people 
… however …” In fact, not only do military personnel rarely demonstrate, they have 
limited access to rights like striking or freedom of speech. At the same time, military 
personnel nowadays face similar pressures like many other citizens. This led us to 
focus on military personnel and austerity and ask the question: How do Dutch military 
personnel respond to austerity-related discontent?
Our specific focus on the Dutch situation is motivated by the sheer scale of the 
downsizing, which makes it a prime example of how many Western militaries fare in 
the post-Cold War setting and also of how military personnel deal with the resulting 
pressures.
Traditionally, military personnel’s response to work-related discontent has been 
described in terms of a psychological contract―defined as subjective beliefs regarding 
an unwritten understanding about mutual obligations between an individual and 
an organization (Rousseau, 1989, 2001)―which implies that military personnel remain 
passive in return for protection by the employer (Farley, Walker, & Mendoza, 2006). 
However, following organizational changes in the recent decades (Manigart, 2006; 
Moskos, 1977), and widespread dissatisfaction (Heinecken, 2009), it was argued that 
the psychological contract was broken up (Farley et al., 2006). Although we know 
much about how ordinary citizens respond to austerity (e.g., Fominaya & Cox, 2013), 
systematical study on how military personnel respond to work-related discontent is 
lacking.
In this study, we consider various strategies one can resort to when facing discontent. 
In his famous 1970 treatise, Hirschman outlined two major possibilities: exit (i.e., leaving 
the problematic situation) and voice (expressing a demand for change). The choice 
between these two is partially based on loyalty (commitment and hope that things 
might improve). Hirschman’s framework has been commonly supplemented with 
silence (deliberately deciding to do nothing in spite of the wish to demand change) 
15 Published as: Petrovic, I., van Stekelenburg, J., & Klandermans, B. (2018). Dealing with austerity measures 
within armed forces: The Dutch case. Military Psychology, 30(4), 321-334.
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and neglect (resorting to anti-social or anti-organizational behavior; Farrell, 1983).
The choice for specific strategies is informed by personal factors such as education, 
skills, organizational embeddedness, and by the context in which the choice is 
made (Farrel & Rusbult, 1992; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). The military context 
is powerful and unique. Powerful because militaries, commonly referred to as an 
example of Goffman’s (1991 [1961]) total institution and a so-called greedy institution 
(Soeters, Winslow, & Weibull, 2006), impact all aspects of one’s life and create a 
sharp division with the rest of the society. Militaries are unique because regulations 
and military culture influence the behavior of military personnel in a way most other 
citizens will never experience. As for regulations, all Western democracies restrict 
political and labor rights of military personnel (see Leigh & Born, 2008). As for military 
culture, typical characteristics include discipline, hierarchy, cohesion (esprit de corps), 
and loyalty (Burk, 1999; Janowitz, 1960; Lang, 1965; Soeters et al., 2006).
Based on an online survey (N = 579), this study examines how Dutch military personnel 
responded to austerity-related discontent in terms of four response strategies—voice, 
exit, silence, and neglect. As individuals commonly resort to more than one strategy 
simultaneously we applied cluster analysis to identify typical response patterns. 
Finally, we assessed how different aspects of the military context (i.e., cohesion, 
discipline, and loyalty) and individuals’ circumstances (i.e., chance of losing one’s job 
and finding a new one) influenced military personnel’s behavior.
The Dutch armed forces: Austerity and organizational 
changes
In 2010, following the financial crisis, a major austerity package removed nearly 12,000 
out of around 60,000 jobs within the Dutch armed forces, with 6,000 employees 
being actually forced to leave.16 Two years later―while the previous round of downsizing 
was still uncompleted―an additional package was approved (including the removal 
of another 2,400 jobs and 900 forced layoffs). The impact of these measures was 
profound. Although in the end most employees could stay, nearly everyone in the 
organization was under risk to lose their job for a certain period of time.
16 Information on the number of “forced layoffs” tends to differ. 2012 Ministry of Defense official information 
mentioned 6,000 employees being actually forced to leave the organization, which is lower than the 
number of jobs cut. The ambiguity is caused by voluntary departures, retirements, and jobs that were not 
manned at the time but were cut during the downsizing and did not lead to employees being forced out.
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At the same time, downsizing, the most obvious pressurizer for personnel, represents 
only one segment within the larger process of organizational change of the Dutch and 
Western militaries after the Cold War. In fact, many pressures on personnel appeared 
even earlier. Already in the 1970s, Moskos (1977) identified the shift from the institutional 
model toward the occupational model of the military profession. Traditionally, the 
military profession was seen as a calling, different from the rest of society, with 
remuneration outside the marketplace economy and no developed means of labor 
relations. The shift toward the occupational model blurred the differences with the rest 
of the society. What used to be a lifelong employment became increasingly contract-
based, segmented, and civilianized (Heinecken, 2006, p. 1). Career and advancement 
prospects became limited while daily work increasingly meant business-type 
management style and practices (Manigart, 2006; Moelker, 2006). Military personnel 
engage in foreign operations more than before, leading to “problems of overstretch, 
undermanning and work-life balance, exacerbating problems of recruitment and 
retention” (Heinecken, 2006, p. 1). The laws of the marketplace started applying to 
military as well—including monetary payments, the acceptance of self-interest 
(leading to higher rates of turnover), but also the need of the employees to exert 
influence on issues such as salaries and working condition.
Although austerity measures and their negative influence on military capabilities 
have attracted much attention (e.g. O’Donnell, 2012), few studies focused on the 
consequences of austerity on personnel and the way they respond to it. Normally, it 
was assumed that no protest ever occurs within the military and hardly any strategies 
based on conflict are allowed (e.g. Leitz, 2014). If personnel face a problem, they 
would remain silent, knowing that in the greater picture their employer protects 
them. However, organizational changes and lately austerity arguably changed this 
equilibrium. This situation begs the question whether military personnel facing 
austerity remain silent, or start engaging in protest, anti-organizational behavior, or 
even leave the organization altogether.
Exit, voice, silence, and neglect
To understand how military personnel respond to austerity measures, we consider 
various response strategies. Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam (1990) stated that those 
who face discontent have a basic choice between doing nothing and engaging in 
some kind of action. This action can be individual or collective. Collective action can 
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be normative and take place within the norm of the law (like petitioning or taking part 
in a legal demonstration) or non-normative (for instance civil disobedience or illegal 
protest). Protest is thus only one of the strategies available to citizens, and in fact a 
rather uncommon one. Other reactions, such as doing nothing, are more prevalent 
(Marwell & Oliver, 1993).
Albert Hirschman’s famous framework (1970) describes how people―in the face of 
discontent―choose between taking action (voice) or leaving the situation altogether 
(exit). These two choices interplay with loyalty, defined as feelings of commitment 
combined with hope that things might improve. Loyalty makes exit less likely but 
does not exclude it, because “the barrier to exit constituted by loyalty is of finite 
height” (Hirschman, 1970: 79). Later studies incorporate silence and neglect. Silence is 
defined as “the intentional, conscious decision of employees to withhold their opinions 
and concerns about organizational circumstances” (Bell, Özbilgin, Beauregard, & 
Sürgevil, 2011: 135), thereby acknowledging that many people choose to remain 
passive (Kolarska & Aldrich, 1980). This makes silence meaningful “beyond simply 
the absence of voice” (Greenberg & Edwards, 2009: 18). Neglect, finally, refers to anti-
organizational behavior and is defined as lax and disregardful behavior such as being 
late or investing less effort into work (Farrell, 1983).
Although Hirschman’s framework has been frequently used, Dowding, John, 
Mergoupis & van Vught (2000) warned for three issues of concern. First, Hirschman’s 
framework did not distinguish between collective and individual voice. Second, 
much work treats voice and exit as mutually exclusive options—while in reality these 
responses can be combined. Third, loyalty is operationalized as a behavioral instead 
of a attitudinal variable, which impacts the exit/voice calculus. We will take these 
three issues at heart by (a) clearly focusing on collective voice as a response strategy, 
(b) analyzing patterns of responses, and (c) relying on loyalty as a attitudinal variable 
rather than a behavioral one.
Even though the full range of Hirschman-responses has never been applied to 
examine discontent in military, single response strategies have been studied. Moskos 
(1977) argued that the transformation into a business-like military leads to increased 
litigation and the appearance of trade unions. Three decades later, a study focused 
on officers shows that the shift toward a business-like organization resulted in “the 
perception that there is no longer a reciprocal sense of loyalty between the military 
Chapter 3
72
as employer and the service member, that military leadership can no longer be 
trusted to defend the officers’ interests” (Heinecken, 2009, p. 494). Consequently, the 
need for greater participation in decision making regarding organizational and labor 
issue appears (Heinecken, 2010). However, although Heinecken’s study examined 
declining loyalty and the need for change, application of specific forms of voice by 
military personnel remains understudied.
The occurrence of anti-organizational behavior in the military following budget cuts 
is equally understudied. However, we know that within military, increased levels of 
overwork are related to anti-organizational behavior (Tucker et al., 2009), and that 
army men may turn to harassment to protest the changing gender norms within the 
military (Miller, 1997). Consequently, there is a real possibility that anti-organizational 
behavior might be applied by military personnel facing austerity.
Exit received more attention, possibly because it directly impacts operational 
capabilities, which makes it an interesting topic for policy-oriented research. A 
number of studies point out that pressures on personnel immediately result in 
problems with recruitment of new personnel and retention of existing one (Apt, 2014; 
Korb & Duggan, 2007). Satisfaction with military life seems to be strongly linked to 
the likelihood of staying. The decision to leave the armed forces is driven by lack of 
career perspective, decreasing job certainty, misbalance between work and private 
life, and lack of leisure time, job dissatisfaction, deployments, the lack of facilities, and 
lengthy reorganizations (Rabkin, 2000; Van Eetveldt, Van De Ven, Van Den Tooren, & 
Versteeg, 2013; Weiss et al., 2003).
Hence, although we know a lot about exit, our knowledge about voice, silence, and 
neglect within the military is limited. Fortunately, based on studies outside the military 
we know much about who might resorts to what strategy and why.
Factors explaining who resorts to what strategy include age, gender, and personal 
resources. In terms of age, there is evidence that older employees hold high value 
for loyalty (Ng & Feldman, 2009) and are less likely to engage in neglect (Hornung, 
Rousseau, & Glaser, 2008). Older employees are also less likely to engage in riskier 
forms of behavior such as voice and exit. Regarding gender, it was traditionally 
considered that males are more likely to exit, though recent evidence is inconclusive 
(Moynihan & Landuyt, 2008). Personal skills and high level of education are well 
known to promote voice (Verba et al., 1995), whereas evidence from public workforce 
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reveals that higher educated personnel are also more likely to exit (Moynihan & 
Landuyt, 2008).
Factors explaining why personnel resorts to certain response include job insecurity, 
chances to find alternative employment, feelings of efficacy, and norms of behavior. 
Job insecurity incites exit and may cause a drop in commitment (see Cheng & Chan, 
2008; Sverke, Hellgren, & Näswall, 2002) and is positively related to neglect (Berntson, 
Näswall, & Sverke, 2010). Chances of alternative employment have been found to 
play a crucial role in stimulating both voice and exit (Farrel & Rusbult, 1992). Finally, 
those experiencing efficacy, defined as a feeling that their action will lead to change, 
resort to voice (Klandermans, 1984), while internalizing the norm to remain silent and 
not engage in protest will inhibit voice (Marwell & Oliver, 1993).
In addition to individual factors explaining the response patterns to austerity we argue 
that the perception of the organizational context of the armed forces matters as well. 
The military has commonly been referred to as a world apart (Callaghan, Dandeker, 
& Kuhlmann, 2000), as an example of Goffmans’ (1991 [1961]) total institution and a 
greedy institution (Soeters et al., 2006).
The context of the armed forces
In characterizing the military organizational context we can roughly distinguish 
between formal and informal factors, based on whether they originate from the 
specific, military legal framework or the military culture.
Formally, all countries place legal limits to military personnel’s political and protest 
activities. This ranges from outright bans of any political activism (e.g., Spain), bans on 
trade unions (e.g., United States and the United Kingdom) to softer forms of limitations 
as present in the Netherlands (Leigh & Born, 2008). Dutch regulations allow military 
trade unions and even protest demonstrations. Striking remains banned and so is 
collective action or speech that might impair the functioning of the armed forces. Dutch 
military personnel readily use this relative freedom: 80% are unionized, compared to 
the national average of less than 20% (Ter Steege, Van Groenigen, Kuijpers, & Van 
Cruchten, 2012). Although these rights seem comprehensive they can also be seen as 
hollow, because, without the right to strike, trade unions and personnel are deemed 
powerless when bargaining with the employer (Hummel, 2014).
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Informal factors concern specific traits rooted in the military culture. Although 
military culture encompasses many aspects, cohesion (related to the term of military 
esprit de corps), the existence of military discipline (Lang, 1965), but also informal 
repercussions (Van Winkle, Rock, Coffey, & Hurley, 2014), and military loyalty may 
affect how military personnel deal with austerity.
Cohesion has been described as crucial for success (or where absent of failure) of 
every military unit. According to van Creveld (2008, p.115), “Cohesion is what turns a 
unit, formation or army from a gathering of people accidentally thrown together into 
a machine capable of setting itself goals, fighting to reach them, and overcoming 
obstacles and taking losses as it does so.” Given its importance, we may assume 
that cohesion is strong in military. Importantly, this means that group norms will be 
enforced fervently. Janowitz (1960) pointed out that cohesion in the military units might 
work both to incite and suppress collective action. Moreover, there is evidence that 
high cohesion can have negative sides and even lead to anti-organizational behavior, 
in cases where norms, values, and attitudes in the group turn against the organization 
(see Newsome, 2007).
Military discipline is also seen as key characteristics of the military organization. 
Donohue (1993) argued that although the nature of the military discipline has been 
changing, irrespective of the way we conceive it, obedience remains one of its key 
elements. For the soldier on the bottom of the command chain this means that s/he 
has “no recourse but to obey; discipline is his primary virtue. His judgment concerns 
only how to overcome the external difficulties he encounters in the execution 
of orders” (Lang, 1965, p. 852). Therefore we expect discipline to suppress protest 
among personnel.
Loyalty, often described as one of the key qualities of military personnel, is explained 
by the so-called psychological contract (Farley et al., 2006), also referred to as 
social contract (Bartle, 2006a), and military covenant (Ingham, 2014). Although a 
psychological contract is present in most organizations, one could argue that within 
the military it goes a step further. Military personnel are expected to take exceptional 
risks, sacrifice a lot in terms of family life, health, and even their own lives while 
abstaining from exercising certain labor rights considered to be common good in 
Western democracies. In return, socioeconomic interests of military personnel are 
shielded from market forces, making the lack of labor rights irrelevant.
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Finally, informal repercussions (or reprisals) have been cited as an effective mechanism 
in preventing individual complaining about harassment both within (Van Winkle et al., 
2014; Williams, Fitzgerald, & Drasgow, 1999) and outside military (Brake, 2005).
We argue that these formal and informal factors influence how military personnel 
respond to discontent. Rather than taking these factors as a structural given, we assess 
how individual perceptions of these factors affect their response to discontent. This 
brings us to the level of analysis of the individuals and therefore to the realm of social 
psychology. People―social psychologists never tire of asserting―live in a perceived world 
and respond to it according to their perceptions (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 
2007). Therefore, we aim to understand why people who are seemingly in the same 
situation (i.e., face austerity measures) respond so differently to austerity based on the 
differences in their personal characteristics (e.g. age, educational level, gender) and 
the differences in how they perceive contextual characteristics (e.g., loyalty, discipline, 
cohesion)?
To sum up, existing literature offers a limited explanation into how military personnel 
respond to austerity-related discontent. We aim to fill that gap and to offer a systematic 
explanation of military personnel’s responses by observing four austerity-related 
response strategies: voice, silence, exit, and neglect. As in daily life, these response 
strategies are applied simultaneously, albeit in different frequencies. Therefore we are 
interested in the way personnel combine these responses to form unique response 
patterns. Using cluster analysis, we will classify the discontent-related responses 
into response-clusters. We compare the response clusters and examine how these 
response-clusters are influenced by (a) personal characteristics (age, gender, 
personal resources), chances to lose one’s job, chances of alternative employment, 
feelings of efficacy and norm of silence; (b) perceptions of formal factors typical for 
the military; and (c) perceptions of informal factors typical for the military (cohesion, 
discipline, and loyalty).
Methods
Data collection and procedure
Data used in this study was collected during an online survey conducted in 2013. The 
three major Dutch military trade unions (Algemene Federatie van Militair en Burger 
Personeel (AFMP), Marechausseevereniging (MARVER) and Algemeen Christelijke 
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Organisatie van Militairen (ACOM)) assisted us with the recruitment of the respondents 
by e-mailing their members with the invitation to participate and forward the e-mail 
to non-member colleagues. Also, unions promoted our survey in their magazines, 
newsletters, and websites. E-mails and news items all contained a link to our survey, 
which was conducted within Qualtrics online survey tool. Although online surveys 
are increasingly popular, lack of internet access might cause a skewed sample when 
dealing with certain populations (Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 2014). Yet, all Dutch 
military personnel have access to at least work e-mail and usually communicate with 
trade unions online, making online survey a well suited method for this population.
After inspecting the data, we excluded a group of retired employees from the 
sample (266 respondents), a group of civilian employees (52 respondents), and 
military personnel who failed to complete the survey fully (180 respondents).17 We 
opted for forced response answering, which results in either fully filled-in surveys 
or failure to finish the survey. These partially filled in surveys did not contain crucial 
demographic and behavioral information hence it was not possible to use them 
(respondents stopped before completing the first half of the survey). Eventually, the 




The dependent variables measured the response of Dutch military personnel to the 
austerity, reorganizations, and changes within the Dutch armed forces. We asked 
respondents to consider these developments and state how often they engaged 
in exit, voice, silence and neglect as a reaction to these developments in the past 
12 months on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (often). Principle 
components analysis produced four factors with eigenvalues above Kaiser’s criterion 
of 1 which in combination explained 66.18% of variance. The scree plot justified 
retaining four factors which fits our theoretical expectations on exit, voice, silence and 
neglect.
17 We were able to make a comparison between the group who filled in the survey and those who stopped 
based on the three first questions in the survey. Respondents who stopped filling in were on average 38.2 
years old compared to 41.3 in the sample, 88,3% were male compared to 93.8% in the sample, and 93.9% 
were member of an union compared to 96.5% in the sample.
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Exit. Exit was measured by asking how often respondents actively looked for a job 
outside the military.
Voice. Voice was measured with five items adapted from European Social Survey 
(2012) in which we asked how often respondents participated in five sorts of collective 
action: contacting a politician, signing a letter or a petition, boycotting a product or 
buying it, participating in a demonstration or protest action and giving money to a 
political group of party (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.65).
Silence. Silence is the form of behavior that is notoriously difficult to research as it 
concerns something that is essentially a nonbehavior. Based on the Van Dyne, Ang, 
and Botero (2003) three sorts of organizational silence, we used a short three-item 
scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.84). A sample item was “I did nothing because I was afraid 
of the consequences for myself.”
Neglect. Although anti-organizational behavior can be expressed in many ways, we 
decided to measure it in its mildest form to avoid doubts about confidentiality. We 
used two items: called in sick while not actually being sick or worked less hard than 
one actually should have (Pearson r= 0.54, p < .001).
Independent variables
Perception of formal restrictions was measured with three items (Cronbach’s alpha 
= 0.78) each proposing the easing of a specific restriction. Sample item is “In peace 
situations military personnel should have a right to strike.” Loyalty was measured with 
three items (Cronbach’s alpha= 0.78), adapted from Lee and Whitford (2008). Sample 
item is “If people criticize the armed forces, I defend my organization.” Perception 
of unit cohesion was measured with four items (Cronbach’s alpha= 0.79) based on 
Du Preez, Sundin, Wessely, and Fear (2012). A sample item is “In my unit there is a 
feeling of comradeship.” Perception of unit discipline was measured with one item–
“Discipline is important in my unit.” Perception of repercussions was measured with 
two items—“Complainers have less chance for a promotion” and “Complainers get 
fired first during reorganization” (Pearson r =0.66, p < 0.001). Efficacy was measured 
with two items (Pearson r = 0.28, p <. 001) “People like me can improve the position of 
military personnel” and “If enough employees demand change the position of military 
personnel will improve.” Norm of silence was measured with one item “A soldier 
should not complain”.
Two variables measured how austerity measures impact on personal position of 
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employees: perception of chances of losing job (measured with item “What is the 
chance you will lose your job in the coming 12 months”) and perception of chances for 
finding a job outside the armed forces (measured with item “In case you lose your job 
in the coming 12 months what is the chance you will find a new job outside the armed 
forces?“), both measured on a 5-point scale from very low to very high. Furthermore, 
we included measures for education level (measured on a 9 point scale), gender, 
age, rank and service (branch of Dutch armed forces).
Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample and a comparison with 
population characteristics of Dutch military personnel based on official statistics of 
the Dutch Ministry of Defense (Ministerie van Defensie, 2013).18 Our sample included 
6.2% of women, was on average 41.2 years old and included in total 7.7% of rank 
soldiers/corporals—a sample that is on average older, higher in rank, and slightly 
underrepresents females when compared to population. As the figures in Table 1 
reveal, respondents resorted the least to voice; to neglect a bit more often and to exit 
and silence the most.  As Dowding and colleagues (2000) argued, different response 
strategies to discontent are commonly used simultaneously. Therefore, we are not 
only interested in the frequency of the four response strategies, but also in how these 
strategies get combined into patterns of response to austerity-related discontent. To 
capture and understand these patterns, we continue our analyses in two steps.
First, to assess which patterns of response occur, we used cluster analysis based on 
standardized values of respondents’ scores on the four response strategies—voice, 
exit, silence, and neglect. Cluster analysis is commonly used to “discover the natural 
grouping(s) of a set of patterns, points, or objects” (Jain, 2010, p. 652). The resulting 
clusters each represent a typical pattern in which military personnel combine different 
response strategies to austerity related discontent. Second, we applied one-way 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) analysis with the observed clusters as 
fixed factors and personal characteristics and perception of the military context as 
dependent variables.
18 The list of independent variables includes the service (suborganization) in which each respondent is 
active. However, as the chi square tests shows no significant relation between suborganization and the 
behavior of personnel we did not include it in the later analysis. For the sample, it is important to note 
that it roughly corresponds to actual distribution of military personnel between different sub organization 
with somewhat lower representation of Marine personnel and somewhat higher representation of 
Constabulary personnel.





Mean SD Min Max % Mean %
Dependent variables
Neglect 1.61 0.90 1 5
Voice 1.44 0.56 1 5
Silence 2.53 0.98 1 5
Exit 2.51 1.42 1 5
Independent variables
Age 41.3 10.6 19 64 35.4
Gender
   Male 93.8% 90.7%
   Female 6.20% 9.30%
Service
   Army 35.90% 42.40%
   Air force 24.70% 15.60%
   Navy 8.60% 18.80%
   Constabulary 18.70% 13.40%
   Staff & other services 12.10% 9.90%
Rank
   Field & junior officers 
(OF1-5)
29.00% 22.50%
   Sub-officers (OR5 –9) 63.20% 45.50%
   Corporals & soldiers 
(OR1- 4)
7.80% 32.50%
Education level 6.44 1.90 1 9
Perceived chance of losing 
a job
1.84 1.23 1 5
Perceived chance of finding 
a job
2.70 1.44 1 5
Individual efficacy 3.23 0.92 1 5
Loyalty 2.95 0.94 1 5
Norm of silence 2.09 0.99 1 5
Perception of unit cohesion 3.30 0.83 1 5
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Cluster analysis: Patterns of response to austerity-related discontent
By using Duda-Hart Je(2)/Je(1) stopping rule index (Duda, Hart, & Stork, 2001) we 
concluded that there are six meaningful clusters. Subsequently, we run the K-means 
cluster analysis using the six clusters solution.
Table 2 presents the final cluster centers produced by the K-mean clustering analysis, 
based on the standardized values for voice, exit, silence, and neglect. Final cluster 
centers denote mean scores for each variable among cases belonging to a specific 
cluster and are thus representative for the typical case in that specific cluster (IBM 
Corp., 2011). Subsequently, we labeled each cluster of military personnel according to 
how often they engaged in exit, voice, silence and neglect.
Table 2. Patterns of response to austerity-related discontent based on standardized scores of voice, exit, 
silence and neglect.
Cluster 1 2 3 4 5 6
Cluster name Protesters Escapers Quiescents Conformers Obstructionists Combaters
Voice 1.25 -0.29 -0.51 -0.29 0.51 2.20
Exit -0.50 1.12 -0.80 -0.04 0.98 0.93
Silence -0.67 0.34 -0.63 1.18 0.83 0.06
Neglect -0.36 -0.37 -0.45 0.43 2.55 0.51
n 59 124 228 87 44 37
N% 10.2% 21.4% 39.4% 15.0% 7.6% 6.4%
Respondents in the first cluster, labeled protesters, engaged in voice far above 
average for the whole sample (1.25 SD). At the same time, they tried to find a new 
job, kept silent, and engaged in neglect below average. They are not numerous and 
represent 10.2% of our sample.
Personnel in the second cluster, escapers, tried to exit the organization far above the 
average for whole sample (1.12 standard deviation), while remaining silent just above 
average. This group of personnel opted to leave without trying to demand change or 
hurting the organization—they engaged in both voice and neglect below average. In 
terms of size, this is the second largest cluster, encompassing 21.4% of our sample.
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The largest cluster of personnel, quiescents, encompasses more than a third of our 
sample and is particularly interesting. Quiescents engaged below average in all four 
types of response strategies. They did not protest, did not look for another job and 
did not engage in antisocial behavior. Importantly, they also did not remain silent. This 
might sound paradoxical but upon reflection this pattern of behavior makes sense. 
We defined silence as being meaningful beyond simply remaining passive—those 
who remain silent do want to voice but still decide not to engage in it. For quiescents 
that is not the case, they are passive but they do not wish to voice either.
In that, quiescents differ from conformers who remained silent far above average 
(1.18 SD), engaged in voice below average, looked for a job outside the armed forces 
on average, and engaged in neglect somewhat above average. For this cluster of 
personnel we could rightfully claim that they “suffered in silence.”
The fifth cluster, obstructionists, often engaged in exit and silence, while at the 
same time resorting to neglect exceptionally often (2.55 SD above average for the 
whole sample) and in voice somewhat above average. Their discontent is primarily 
expressed by silently looking for another job while engaging in anti-organizational 
behavior.
Finally, the smallest cluster of personnel, combaters, engaged often in exit and 
neglect while staggeringly so in voice (2.20 SD above average for the whole sample). 
They reported remaining silent on average. Thus, combaters used every possible 
way of responding to austerity measures.
Understanding the patterns of response to austerity-related discontent
After describing the clusters, the next step is to investigate whether personnel 
belonging to different clusters also differ in terms of their personal characteristics 
and the way they perceive the military context. We conducted a one-way MANOVA 
analysis with clusters as factors and variables influencing the behavior of personnel 
as dependent variables. We found a statistically significant effect on the combined 
dependent variable, F(65, 2655) = 5.786), p <.001; Wilk’s ― = 0.535, partial ―2 =.12. Follow-
up analysis of variance tests show that the gender,19 discipline, and norm of silence 
variables did not differ significantly between different clusters. In all other variables 
19 Number of women in the sample (36) was too low to make a comparison—however, a total of 25 women 
clustered in Clusters 3 and 4 with no women in cluster 6.
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there were significant differences between at least two different clusters (see Table 
3). For these variables we conducted Tukey’s post hoc test to establish which specific 
clusters differ between each other significantly. We present these results with 
figures and provide information on significance of the specific comparisons between 
clusters.20
Table 3. Belonging to a specific cluster: One-way multivariate analysis of variance.
Variable     F
Gender 1.977
Age 4.650 ***
Education level 2.686 *
Rank 2.800 *
Perceived chance of losing a job 14.094 ***
Perceived chance of finding a job 5.255 ***
Individual efficacy 4.922 ***
Norm silence 2.116
Loyalty 22.107 ***
Perception of unit cohesion 17.804 ***
Perception of discipline 1.343
Perception of repercussions 15.695 ***
Perception of formal restrictions 12.163 ***
Degrees of freedom (5, 573)
= P <. 05, **=P<.01, ***=P<.001  
20  When comparisons are not significant, we state so and omit the p value (in which case p > 0.05).
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Losing a job, fi nding a job, and education
Figure 1 presents standardized scores on perceived chances of losing a job, fi nding 
a new job outside the organization in case of layoff , and respondents’ education level 
for each separate cluster.
Figure 1. Perceived chances of losing a job, fi nding a job outside the organization and education level.
Post hoc analysis revealed that quiescents perceive the lowest chance of losing their 
job (M = -0.28, SD = 0.77). They diff er signifi cantly when compared with the three groups 
with above average scores (escapers: M = 0.16, SD = 1.01, p < 0.001; obstructionists: 
M = 0.86, SD = 1.21 p < 0.001; combaters: M = 0.46, SD = 1.19, p < 0.001) but not when 
compared to conformers (M = -0.01, SD = 1.01) and protesters (M = -0.17, SD = 0.96), 
who report below average chances of losing their job. Obstructionists report the 
highest chances of losing their job in the coming 12 months, signifi cantly higher 
than all other groups (p < 0.001) except the second highest combaters. The chances 
of losing their job perceived by protesters, escapers and conformers do not diff er 
signifi cantly between each other. The particular pattern of behavior of quiescents now 
becomes clear—the fact that they resort to none of the response strategies including 
remaining silent refl ects the lack of threat perceived among this group.
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What about the chances of finding a new job in case of layoff? Escapers see their 
chances as highest (M = 0.38, SD = 0.97). This is not surprising, those with good 
prospects on the job market can indeed afford to consider exit. All other groups score 
significantly lower than escapers but conformers (M = -0.20, SD = 1.01, p < 0.01) and 
obstructionists (M = -0.20, SD = 0.99, p < 0.05) report the lowest chances of finding a 
new job. Weak position of these two groups in this respect is interesting as it translates 
into behavior that takes place under the radar. Obstructionists respond to their dismal 
situation both within and outside the organization with the weapon of the weak—
neglect in combination with silence. Conformers, who still fare quite well within their 
organization, but see no chances for employment outside the armed forces, opt only 
for silence, the safest option.
Even though protesters have the highest level of education, the only significant 
difference in education levels between the six clusters is that escapers (M = 0.15, SD 
= 1.01) are higher educated than quiescents (M = -0.17, SD = 1.06, p < 0.05) who are the 
group with lowest level of education. Surprising is that the lowest educational level is 
found is the group with low chances of layoff and average chances for a new job. This 
probably reflects the scarce technical and security profiles among this group; high in 
need in the broader society.
Loyalty and cohesion
The differences in loyalty to the organization and perceived unit cohesion show a 
similar pattern (see Figure 2). This is not surprising as both variables describe how 
personnel perceive their organization.
Regarding cohesion, post hoc test shows that quiescents (M = 0.3, SD = 0.85) perceive 
higher level of cohesion in their units than all other groups but differ significantly with 
conformers (M = -0.23, SD = 1.04, p < 0.001), obstructionists (M = -1.00, SD = 1.11, p < 
0.001), and combaters (M = -0.44, SD = 1.02, p < 0.001). Conformers perceive significantly 
higher cohesion than obstructionists (p < 0.001) but do not differ significantly from 
protesters (M = 0.06, SD = 0.85) and escapers (M = 0.06, SD = 0.89) who also do not differ 
between each other. These three groups—protesters, escapers, and conformers—
occupy a middle position around the average for the whole sample. On the low end 
of perceived cohesion are obstructionists and combaters who perceive exceptionally 
low cohesion in their units and do not differ significantly between each other. The 
behavior of these two groups, which is the most damaging for the organization, goes 
paired with a highly negative assessment of their work environment.
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Figure 2. Loyalty to the organization and perception of unit cohesion.
Similar results are found for feelings of loyalty to organization, where obstructionists 
(M = -0.92, SD = 0.81) and combaters (M = -0.54, SD = 0.96) report loyalty to the 
organization deep below the average. Quiescents (M = 0.42, SD = 0.91) report highest 
loyalty, signifi cantly higher than all other groups (p < 0.001), whereas conformers (M = 
-.14, SD = 1.02) again occupy a middle position together with protesters (M = -0.11, SD 
= 0.94) and escapers (M = -0.14, SD = 0.87).
Cohesion and loyalty show a similar pattern and both suff er greatly among the groups 
which engage in anti-organizational behavior. Unsurprisingly, strong loyalty and 
strong perceived cohesion is found among quiescents, a confi rmation that this group 
is well positioned within the organization. Although combaters and obstructionists 
score dismally low, protesters and escapers occupy a moderate position. Thus, 
although combaters and protesters both engage in voice very often, these two 
groups perceive their work environment diff erently. Protesters’ voice goes together 
with respectable levels of loyalty and cohesion, as theorized by Hirschman (1970). For 
combaters, voice might not be the manner to demand improvements but to express 
anger, which they express in every way possible, given their common engagement 
in neglect and exit.
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Formal restrictions to collective action, repercussions and effi  cacy
Figure 3 shows how respondents belonging to diff erent clusters see the possibility of 
easing of the formal restrictions to collective action, the existence of repercussions 
within the organization, and feelings of effi  cacy concerning protest actions.
Figure 3. Perception of formal restrictions, perception of repercussions and effi  cacy.
Quiescents (M = -0.41, SD = 1.01) oppose formal restrictions signifi cantly less than all 
other clusters (escapers: M = 0.12, SD = 0.92, p < 0.001; conformers: M = 0.16, SD = 0.89, 
p < 0.05; obstructionists: M = 0.64, SD = 0.74, p < 0.001; combaters: M = 0.50, SD = 1.00, 
p < 0.05) except protesters (M = -0.11, SD = 0.96). Quiescents also see signifi cantly 
less repercussions (M = -.37, SD = 0.93) than all other clusters (escapers: M = 0.15, SD 
= 0.92, p < 0.001; conformers: M = 0.33, SD = 0.98, p < 0.001; obstructionists: M = 0.42, 
SD = 0.98, p < 0.001; combaters: M = 0.68, SD = 0.76, p < 0.001) except protesters (M 
= -0.11, SD = 0.96) who experience repercussions just below the average. Combaters 
oppose formal restrictions signifi cantly more than quiescents (p < 0.001) and also 
see signifi cantly more repercussions than all other groups except conformers and 
obstructionists (p < 0.01 for comparison with protesters, p < 0.05 with escapers, p 
< 0.001 with quiescents). Only signifi cant diff erence in effi  cacy concerning protest 
actions is found between the group of combaters (M = 0.53, SD = 0.98) with the highest 
effi  cacy and the conformers (M = -0.21 SD = 1.19 p < 0.01) and quiescents (M = -0.13, 
SD = 0.89, p < 0.01), two groups with lowest effi  cacy. Importantly, although escapers 
score above average on effi  cacy, their optimism does not translate into voice–their 
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future lays outside the organization, hence no need to voice demands.
Although both protesters and combaters (and to a certain extent obstructionists) 
engage in voice, they see the organizational context regarding collective action in a 
completely diff erent light. Protesters see formal restrictions and repercussions more 
like quiescents, which confi rms their positive orientation toward the organization. For 
quiescents, the terms of the specifi c form of psychological contract as it used to exist 
still seem to apply. Personally unthreatened by austerity, they accept the rules of the 
game in which there is no place for protest and show high loyalty and cohesion as 
described earlier. This is unlike conformers, whose silence and lack of action goes 
paired with high perception of repercussions and less understanding for formal 
restrictions.
Age and rank
Figure 4 shows that the protesters are the oldest groups (M = 0.46, SD = 1.01). They 
are signifi cantly older than the youngest group of escapers (M = -0.29, SD = 0.91, 
p < 0.001) but also quiescents (M = 0.04, SD = 1.01, p < 0.05) and conformers (M = 
-0.02, SD = 0.97, p < 0.05). Escapers also diff er signifi cantly from quiescents (p < 0.05). 
Practically, although all other groups are around the average age of the sample, two 
groups stand out. Namely, protesters are older, whereas escapers are younger than 
the average.
Figure 4. Age and rank.
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The group with the lowest rank on average are protesters (M = -0.33, SD = 1.10). They 
differ significantly with the two groups with highest rank: conformers (M = 0.18, SD = 
0.99, p < 0.05) and obstructionists (M = 0.26, SD = 1.01, p < 0.05).




The aim of this study was to assess how Dutch military personnel respond to austerity 
measures. We approached this issue by focusing on four response strategies—exit, 
voice, silence, and neglect—and the way these strategies are combined into six 
response patterns. Based on the results of our study, we can now draw three main 
conclusions.
First, only a small minority of military personnel engage in voice and neglect, whereas 
exit is reported widely. Apparently, significant proportions of military personnel have, 
just like their organization (Heinecken, 2006), abandoned the concept of lifelong 
employment and are trying to pre-empt the layoffs by leaving the organization. For 
this group of personnel, the psychological contract has been re-written to fit the new, 
more flexible times and actually resembles the situation in many civilian organizations. 
When considering collective action, silence, however, is the most often reported 
behavior, which actually corresponds to widespread findings outside the military 
context (Marwell & Oliver, 1993) but also the traditional image of military personnel.
Second, in agreement with Dowding et al. (2000), we conclude that simply stating 
how often personnel engage in each of the four sorts of response strategies is not 
sufficient. Arguably, observing the patterns into which voice, exit, silence, and neglect 
combine is far more informative. By doing that, and by describing the six clusters 
among Dutch military personnel–protesters, escapers, quiescents, conformers, 
obstructionists, and combaters―we observed characteristic manners of combining 
response strategies. Moreover, it appeared that there is a large group of personnel 
(quiescents) who rather than engaging in any of the distinguished response strategies 
to austerity quietly abide by the circumstances and importantly, do not feel they are 
engage in silence either. 
Third, we can conclude that clusters we described are not only distinct in their 
behavior—their personal characteristics and perceptions of the military context differ 
as well. Values such as cohesion and loyalty are widely displayed by quiescents, 
the group who follow the modes of behavior that correspond to the traditional 
psychological contract as it used to exist between military personnel and their 
employer. Subsequently, they rarely engage in voice, neglect, or exit. The group 
who on the surface shows the same conventional behavior, conformers, reports 
lower levels of loyalty and cohesion and at the same time experience a bit more 
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risk of losing their jobs. Personnel who apply voice―protesters and combaters and to 
a certain level obstructionists―are split not only regarding how they combine other 
response strategies with voice, but also in the fact that protesters feel much better 
within the organization and also experience less personal distress caused by austerity 
than combaters. It seems that protest has two meanings for the armed forces—one 
constructive applied by personnel who still fares quite well within the organization 
but demands improvement and the other one used by personnel resorting to every 
possible route to express their opposition. Similar split can be described between 
escapers on one side and obstructionists and combaters on the other. Although 
personnel belonging to these clusters reports very similar levels of exit, obstructionists 
and combaters are in a far worse position in terms of how they perceive their chances 
for a new job outside the organization and also score lower on cohesion and loyalty. 
Subsequently, although escapers use their good position on the labor market to 
simply leave the organization without causing any further disruption, obstructionists 
and combaters engage in anti-organizational behavior and voice.
In sum, evidence presented in this study shows that military personnel engage in a 
variety of response strategies, which also combine into a number of typical response 
patterns. In spite of the fact that the largest group of personnel fits the traditional image 
of loyalty and passivity within the military, the behavior of military personnel proved to 
be quite diverse. Subsequently, we can conclude that when assessing the behavior 
of military personnel, applying the framework of exit, voice, silence, and neglect 
based on Hirschman’s (1970) approach makes sense. Yet, only by incorporating those 
different response strategies into encompassing response patterns can we fully 
understand how personnel respond to austerity and in all likelihood to discontent in 
general.
The results of our study thus corroborate the argument made by Dowding et al. 
(2000) that we should also focus on of the way different response strategies combine. 
In addition, we have shown that individuals displaying different response patterns 
differ significantly in terms of their personal characteristics and perception of the 
organizational environment. In other words, the meaning of a certain response strategy 
depends on which other response strategies are applied. The way threat of job loss, 
labor market position, and loyalty differ between different response strategies would 
be difficult to capture without the clusters we constructed and strengthen our view 
that this approach is fruitful.
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Although our focus was on a specific situation regarding austerity, the results of our 
study have multiple practical ramifications for the broader understanding of how 
military personnel deal with work-related discontent. The austerity measures in the 
Netherlands form a typical example of the broader process of transformation of the 
military organization in Western democracies in the period after the end of the Cold 
war. At the same time, in spite of differences, the context of the military organization and 
the limited possibilities to express voice also resemble other Western democracies. 
This allowed us to assess several overarching issues. First of all, we can evaluate the 
state of the specific form of psychological contract that used to exist in the military 
organizations. This specific form of psychological contract prescribed passivity and 
loyalty in return for an exceptionally well arranged socioeconomic position. Although 
literature forwarded the idea that it might be broken and gone (Farley et al., 2006; 
Heinecken, 2006), our data show that this is not the case for everyone. Personnel who 
feel low threat from austerity still behave according to old terms of what could and 
should be done and actually seem to show high levels of military values and no need 
for change or improvement in their collective rights. It is important to note that those 
who have diverged from the terms of the psychological contract do not necessarily 
turn against their organization. We did observe employees in dire straits who see 
no hope and resort to modes of behavior which could be described as detrimental 
for the organization (i.e. the obstructionists and combaters). Typically they also show 
low loyalty and perceive low cohesion in their units, possibly causing additional 
organizational problems. However, protest behavior is not a sign of trouble in itself. A 
big difference seems to exist between on the one side using voice or exit to improve 
things (and feeling empowered to do so), and on the other side voicing or exiting 
while at the same time engaging in anti-organizational behavior. In the first case, both 
voice and exit are applied by personnel still showing respectable levels of loyalty and 
cohesion, and not aiming to hurt their organization. In the second case, personnel 
want improvement, but also lack both means and faith in achieving it which results in 
behavior detrimental for the organization.
Limitations of the study
With this study we tried to fill in the void within the literature which rarely focus on 
how military personnel respond to discontent and especially austerity measures. 
While hopefully offering valuable insights, our study has not been able to resolve 
all the issues which arise from this interesting topic. For instance, military personnel 
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share many aspects of their unique position with other professions―legal limitations 
to collective action can be found among medical and other emergency services, 
while most uniformed professions tend to share similar cultural traits (see Soeters 
et al., 2006). Obviously, our study makes no such comparison and we cannot share 
observations regarding differences or similarities in behavior of military personnel with 
other groups of employees. Future research could reveal whether other professions 
with similar positions share some of the behavioral patterns we described among 
military personnel.
Furthermore, as our study is based on a single survey it does not allow us to say 
much about the changes in behavior of military personnel. Given the lack of data on 
the past developments and our focus on behavior of personnel in the year prior to the 
survey (thus 2013) we cannot make any definite claims whether personnel behaved 
differently in the past. Yet at the same time, this research design is well suited to help 
us understand the differences between (groups of) respondents.
Finally, a note must be given regarding the recruitment of respondents. We approached 
respondents through military trade unions. Although this hopefully removed some 
fears about confidentiality it did cause a somewhat less representative image of 
personnel. Our sample includes less women or lower rank personnel and less non-
union members than the full population of military personnel in the Dutch armed 
forces. However, although the exact percentages of different clusters in reality might 
be a bit different we are confident that our findings about existence and background 
of different modes of behavior are representative for the personnel active within 
Dutch armed forces.
Future research on this topic should address several key issues. We should assess 
how changes in the military organization influence the behavior of military personnel. 
Furthermore, to address the question regarding the differences or similarities with 
other sectors, a comparison with other groups of personnel would be useful. In similar 
fashion, an international comparison between militaries in different national contexts 
might help us understand how personnel’s behavior varies according to different 
rules and national situations.
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Change, protest, and exit might be the last words one would associate with the 
military, an organization often seen as a bastion of traditionalism and loyalty. Yet, 
since the end of the Cold War, many Western militaries have gone through a period 
of profound and rapid changes. This process led to substantial downsizing and to 
the introduction of a myriad of measures aimed at professionalization and increased 
efficiency. As a result, military personnel nowadays face worsened socio-economic 
positions and highly insecure career perspectives, as visible in the prevalence of 
temporary employment contracts in the organization. Traditional values, such as 
loyalty towards the organization, are under pressure. It has been suggested that 
under such volatile circumstances, military personnel might become more active in 
defending their position, either by engaging in protest or by exiting the organization 
(Moskos, 1977; Heinecken, 2006). This study uses panel data to focus on the Dutch 
military in 2013-2015, an example of a military organization in turmoil as in this period 
the economic crisis led Dutch government to severely cut Defense spending. 
Specifically, we examine whether and how protest and exit behavior of Dutch military 
personnel changed in response to the organizational and socio-economic pressures 
they experienced in early 2010s and whether feelings of organizational loyalty and the 
type of employment contract affected the severity of their response.   
Ever since the 1970s, scholars have been identifying numerous signs of a broader 
transformation of military organizations in Western democratic countries. They 
described how traditional military organization, strikingly distinct from the civilian 
society, moved towards an organization marked by civilian and business-inspired 
practices. Changes were introduced so military could become cheaper and smaller. 
An example is the widespread introduction of flexible contracts instead of lifetime 
employment. Subsequently, a realization arose that these shifts would result in 
structural socio-economic and organizational pressures on military personnel (King, 
2006; Levy, 2010; Moskos, 1977; Moskos, Williams, & Segal, 2000). In turn, such 
pressures undermined the existing labor arrangement within the military in which the 
absence of common labor rights such as unionization, striking and protest used to 
get compensated with a privileged socio-economic position. This exchange, often 
defined as a psychological (Bartle, 2006a) or social contract (Farley et al., 2006), implied 
that military personnel would remain loyal to their employer in case of a crisis, as in 
the greater picture they felt that their employer was protecting their interests. While 
observing how the terms of the psychological contract in the military organization 
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crumbled, various authors predicted or identified increased assertiveness of military 
personnel. This could, depending on the national context, include litigation, spread 
of unionization, increased protest behavior, and difficulties in retention of personnel 
(Moskos, 1977; Heinecken, 2006; Levy, 2010). 
At the same time, much of the literature dealing with labor relations within militaries in 
Western democracies restricted its scope to the description of the institutional level 
frameworks and trends affecting military personnel. Empirical evidence regarding 
protest behavior within military remains scarce to this date. Exit, however, has been 
researched far more often and we have a fairly good idea about the key factors which 
influence the propensity to leave the military (see for instance Van Eetveld, van de 
Ven, van den Tooren & Versteeg, 2013). However, while literature commonly refers 
to the specific military context and values which deeply influence the attitudes and 
behavior of military personnel, there is not much evidence on how key military values 
such as loyalty might influence the reaction of personnel to socio-economic and 
organizational pressures, in terms of protest and exit alike. Similarly, within the military 
context, there is limited research on whether personnel with temporary employment 
might behave differently when facing socio-economic and organizational pressures. 
Moreover, the studies which do exist and deal with the position of military personnel 
rarely rely on panel data and offer only limited insight into the effect of changes 
military personnel are experiencing and are thereby commonly limited to correlational 
analysis on cross-sectional data. To our knowledge, no studies have been produced 
which attempt, by using a longitudinal design, to improve knowledge on the causal 
relationship between socio-economic and organizational pressures on the one side 
and protest and exit on the other side among military personnel.  
In this study we present the results of a three-wave panel study among Dutch 
military personnel conducted in 2013, 2014 and 2015. By leaning on the voice, exit and 
loyalty framework first proposed by Hirschman (1970) we investigate whether and 
how changes in perception of socio-economic and organizational pressures caused 
changes in military personnel’s protest and exit behavior. We focus on two forms 
of protest behavior – signing a petition and attending a street demonstration, and 
exit behavior– which we define as actively searching for a job outside the military 
organization. Furthermore, we investigate whether and how organizational loyalty 
and type of employment contract moderate the effect of socio-economic and 
organizational pressures on protest and exit behavior among Dutch military personnel. 
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To investigate the causal effects, we apply the ML-SEM method proposed by Allison, 
Williams, and Moral-Benito (2017) that allows us to control for (1) the value of the 
dependent variable at previous time and (2) for the feedback effect of the dependent 
variable on the independent variable. 
The first section of this paper summarizes the key developments in the Dutch military. 
We proceed by highlighting the most important insights from the literature on the 
organizational transformation and labor relations within Western militaries. We then 
present the methods applied in this study followed by the key findings. We conclude 
by discussing the theoretical and empirical importance of our findings.
Dutch military in flux – an overview
Following the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, Dutch military entered a period of 
intense organizational change. For example, compulsory conscription got suspended 
and there was an increased engagement in overseas missions. Yet, the most striking 
development in this period was downsizing, caused by the sharp and steady 
decrease in Dutch defense spending. The economic crisis of 2008/2009 marked 
the culmination of this downward trend. In 2010 the Dutch government decided to 
curb the defense expenditures in a move which led to the loss of about one in five 
jobs within the organization (around 12 of the 60 thousand workplaces). In 2012, an 
additional austerity package extended the cuts even further. The consequences of 
these measures were felt all over the organization – a so called zero line was imposed 
on wages and personnel were under a constant threat of layoff. Military effectiveness 
took a heavy hit as well. For example, it is in this period that the Dutch government 
decommissioned the last tank unit of the Dutch armed forces. 
Our study covers the span of 2013 – 2015. During this period, the actual reorganizations 
caused by the austerity measures took place. The position of all personnel had to be 
re-evaluated and many services merged or disappeared. On top of that, several other 
issues arose as well. In 2013 it became clear that new national tax rules, which affected 
all citizens but were supposed to cause only minor fluctuations in income, had a 
particularly detrimental impact on military personnel. In some cases, military salaries 
decreased by almost 5 percent. Government also decided to raise the retirement age, 
causing a so-called retirement gap for military personnel who usually stop working 
earlier than civilians. Hence, aside numerous consequences for the organizational 
capabilities, personnel took the brunt of the pressures caused by austerity. 
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As a result of these developments, there was a remarkable wave of activism among 
personnel which included street protests, petitions, and public media statements by 
(retired) officers. Moreover, while many were fearing layoffs, it soon became clear that 
because of the increased voluntary departures and stalled recruitment Dutch military 
increasingly faced serious personnel shortage. At the same time, in the course of 
2014 and 2015, the decision to impose austerity on the military organization suddenly 
became highly contested, as the policy makers and public became increasingly 
aware of the ramification of a weak military. The security crisis which raged in Ukraine 
and the MH17 flight disaster brought back fears of a new Cold War while the Post-
Arab Spring crisis in the Middle East and the arrival of numerous refugees further 
alarmed Dutch policy makers and public. Subsequently, Dutch defense budgets in 
2014 and 2015 did not propose further downsizing and even reversed some of the 
austerity measures imposed earlier. 
Responses to discontent within the context of the military 
organization: protest and exit
Despite the convergence with the civilian mainstream, military remains a place 
profoundly unlike most other organizations (Boëne, 1990; Dandeker, 2001). Military 
uniqueness is rooted in the need to conform to the tasks of the military organization, 
but, at the same time the specific characteristics of the military organization also 
affect the way military personnel may express dissent. In every Western democracy, 
the legal framework governing the behavior of military personnel restricts access 
to some of the industrial action activities which are considered common for most 
civilian employees. In more extreme cases, such as Great Britain and United States, 
establishing trade unions is illegal and most forms of dissent are banned (Leigh and 
Born, 2008). In the Netherlands, the context of our study, the legal framework is more 
relaxed – trade unions conduct the collective bargaining and offer legal protection 
for their members.21 Individually, Dutch military personnel are allowed to participate 
in protest activities such as demonstrating or petitioning as long as they do not 
impede the functioning of the organization. However, striking, usually hailed as the 
most powerful mean of labor action, is forbidden (Hummel, 2014). In this paper, we 
21 In fact, military trade union representatives refer to 80% membership rate among Dutch Defense 




focus on the two most prevalent forms of protest behavior among military personnel, 
demonstrating and  petitioning. Both are legal and have been relatively frequent 
during our study. 
As often stressed by social movement scholars and their colleagues in other fields, 
doing nothing is the most common human reaction to discontent (Marwell and 
Oliver, 1993). Military is no exception to this rule. Silence, the conscious decision to 
do nothing when under pressure, has already been found to be the most frequent 
reaction to discontent among Dutch military personnel (Petrovic, Klandermans and 
van Stekelenburg, 2018). Yet, many individuals do engage in some form of action 
when facing discontent, even within the military. As stipulated by Hirschman (1970), 
besides voicing their dissent, people who face discontent can also opt for exit and 
leave the problematic situation altogether. While there are legal rules and contracts 
which limit the possibility to leave during a certain period, in general, Dutch military 
personnel are free to leave the organization if they wish so. In fact, searching for a job 
outside the organization is quite common (Petrovic et al., 2018) and poses a significant 
operational problem for the military organization (Ministerie van Defensie, 2017). In 
sum, in addition to petition signing and demonstrating, we also focus on exit behavior 
which we defined as actively searching for a job outside the organization.
Predictors of petition signing, demonstrating and job 
searching 
In what follows, we discuss various organizational and socio-economic pressures as 
factors which can explain why military personnel engage in protest and exit behavior 
and then discuss how loyalty and the type of employment contract might moderate 
this relationship. 
Socio economic and organizational pressures
Grievances lay at the heart of every protest (Klandermans, 1997), but may also lead 
to the decision to leave the troubled situation altogether (Hirschman, 1970). Several 
socio-economic and organizational pressures have been forwarded as common 
cause of grievance among personnel in contemporary Western militaries. These 
pressures are often linked to the process of transformation of Western military 
organization. In the 1970s, Moskos (1977) observed the changes in the military 
profession and described a shift from the institutional to the organizational model. 
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Later on, models of postmodern (Moskos et al., 2000) post-Fordist (King, 2006) and 
market (Levy, 2010) military have been introduced. They describe a set of changes 
encompassing almost every segment of the contemporary military organizations in 
many Western countries: sharp downsizing; abandonment of conscription; increased 
reliance on civilian employees and civilian companies within the traditional military 
domain; introduction of business inspired practices and management strategies 
aimed at increasing efficiency; introduction of temporary contracts replacing the 
previously dominant “job for life” oriented arrangements; and increased involvement 
in prolonged and intensive foreign missions. 
While not all the changes have had a direct detrimental effect on military personnel, 
there is a wide agreement that many of them result in considerable socio-economic 
and organizational pressures. Specifically, downsizing and budget cuts commonly 
lead to layoffs and job insecurity, while at the same time causing increased workload 
and lack of investment in military personnel who do get to stay in the organization 
(Heinecken, 2014). Other pressures are less material in their nature but lead to the 
erosion of traditional values and autonomy of the profession (Heinecken, 2014). 
Petrovic, Klandermans and van Stekelenburg (2017) found that Dutch military 
personnel, besides socio-economic pressures concerning job insecurity and 
salaries, commonly refer to such non-material pressures as the focus on efficiency 
and business-like practices, and the shift from a traditional, family-like military 
organization to an impersonal, harsh, business-like organization. In that study, Dutch 
military personnel also referred to deteriorating work atmosphere and exceptionally 
frequent function rotations as important factors behind their dissatisfaction. 
How did military personnel react to these socio-economic and organizational 
pressures? There is evidence that, once confronted with the introduction of business-
like practices, personnel stop trusting military leadership to defend their interests and 
increasingly consider new ways of applying pressure to their employer (Heinecken, 
2006). Spread of trade unions in several countries (Bartle and Heinecken, 2006) and 
incidental reports of protest in various European countries due to austerity (Petrovic 
and van Stekelenburg, 2017) seem to corroborate these findings. Still, largely due 
to the lack of empirical evidence, a clear link between grievances and protest has 
not been established. Studies which focused on exit do provide ample evidence 
that lower work satisfaction, lack of career perspective, decreasing job certainty, 
misbalance between work and private life and lack of leisure time, deployments, 
Chapter 4
102
lengthy reorganizations and lack of facilities lead to more frequent exit among 
military personnel (Rabkin, 2000; Weiss et al. 2003; van Eetveld, Ven, van den Tooren 
& Versteeg, 2013). 
Additionally, while not a result of the developments within the military organization, 
improved labor market position is commonly found to induce exit outside military 
(Farrel and Rusbult, 1992; Fugate, Kinicki & Ashforth 2004). There is also evidence 
that better labor market position might stimulate protest in some circumstances, for 
instance by making the threat of retribution, often feared by military personnel, less 
effective in preventing protest (Petrovic et al, 2017). 
In this study we investigate the effect of socio-economic and organizational pressures 
on petition signing, demonstrating and exit behavior. We investigate separate effects 
of perception of job insecurity and salary dissatisfaction as elements of socio-
economic pressures and satisfaction with (daily) workplace and function rotations 
as elements of organizational pressures. While existing literature offers clues on 
why socio-economic and organizational pressures might cause discontent among 
military personnel, there is almost no evidence on the relationship between specific 
pressurizers and protest. Therefore, we do not formulate hypotheses on each specific 
pressurizer. We do, however, formulate a hypothesis on the effect of perception of 
labor market opportunity, defined as chances of finding a new job in case of job loss. 
While clearly an element of socio-economic position of personnel, we formulate a 
separate hypothesis for it as it is related to the developments outside the military 
organization. Based on the existing evidence regarding organizational changes within 
the Western militaries and the general theories on the effect of grievances on protest 
and exit behavior, we propose the first two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: When perceiving an increase in socio-economic and organizational  
  pressures military personnel engage in more demonstrating,   
  petition signing and job searching. 
Hypothesis 2: When perceiving an improved position on the labor market military  
  personnel engage in more demonstrating, petition signing and job  
  searching.




While legal rules applicable to military personnel limit the possibilities to express 
dissent or even to leave the organization in some situations, the military organizational 
culture also matters when personnel consider applying the options which are 
available. Military is commonly portrayed as an example of a (semi)total institution 
(Goffman 1991 [1961]; Van Schilt, 2011) where life conforms to the institutional rules and 
regulations and many of the social norms prevalent in the “outside world” are rejected. 
Or, as a greedy institution which dominates the lives of individuals to an extent that it 
competes with other greedy institutions such as a family (Segal, 1986; Soeters et al., 
2006). Within such organizational culture, it is reasonable to assume that engaging in 
protest or exit will be highly dependent on the prevalent values and organizational-
cultural traits. In this study, we focus on loyalty, which, in addition to be being important 
for understanding behavior in non-military settings (Hirschman, 1970), has long been 
hailed as one of the most important military values (Coleman, 2009; Robinson, 2008). 
Within the military, it is seen both as  key to important collective organizational goals 
(Winslow, 1998) as well as a crucial value at unit level where family-like loyalty serves 
to support units in life dangerous situations (Connor, 2007; Coleman, 2009). 
In terms of labor relations, loyalty underpins the so-called psychological contract 
(Bartle, 2006a), alternatively also referred to as social contract (Farley et al., 2006) or 
military covenant (Tipping, 2008). Traditionally, the psychological contract is seen as 
a crucial element of the steering mechanism for labor relations within the Western 
militaries. Outside military literature, it is defined as a (usually unwritten) mutual 
agreement between an employee and an employer (Rousseau, 1989). Within the 
military, the psychological contract entails that in return for selfless service and lack 
of certain political and labor rights, military personnel would be shielded from market 
forces and provided with a stable socio-economic position. When facing a crisis 
causing discontent, military personnel would show loyalty and refrain from disruptive 
actions, knowing that in the greater picture, they enjoy the certainty of a job-for-life 
and a loyal employer. As the transformation of the military organizations undermined 
the socio-economic position of military personnel, questions rose whether the 
psychological contract may break down (Bartle, 2006a) and how this might impact 




Traditionally, loyalty has worked to suppress dissent and bind personnel to the 
organization. Outside the military, Hirschman assumed that loyalty suppresses 
exit but does not completely prevent it, because “the barrier to exit constituted by 
loyalty is of finite height” (Hirschman, 1970: 79). Hence, the possibility of personnel 
showing lower levels of loyalty might introduce forms of behavior previously seen as 
uncommon for military organization. 
Because of the long-term pressures caused by the transformation of the military 
organization, it is reasonable to assume that instead of uniformly high levels of loyalty, 
we will encounter personnel with varying levels of loyalty. Based on the existing 
literature, we expect that personnel with different levels of loyalty respond differently 
to socio-economic and organizational pressures as well as their position on the labor 
market. Specifically, we expect that the effect of socio-economic and organizational 
pressures as well as labor market position on demonstrating, petition signing and job 
searching will be stronger among military personnel with lower levels of loyalty than 
among those with higher levels of loyalty. To our knowledge, while numerous authors 
refer to the decreasing loyalty and the psychological contract under pressure, the 
role of loyalty in moderating the effect of discontent on response strategies among 
military personnel has not been researched, on the individual level. Hence, we aim to 
test the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: Personnel who reported lower levels of loyalty in wave 1 engaged in  
  more demonstrating, petition signing and job searching as an effect  
  of socio economic and organizational pressures than personnel   
  who reported higher levels of loyalty. 
Hypothesis 4: Personnel who reported lower levels of loyalty in wave 1 engaged in  
  more demonstrating, petition signing and job searching as an effect  
  of labor market position than personnel who reported higher levels  
  of loyalty
Temporary and permanent employment
The introduction of temporary employment forms within the military organization 
closely resembles the increasing reliance on temporary and flexible employment 
in other organizations in developed economies (De Cuyper et al, 2008). Commonly, 
temporary employment is described as less attractive than permanent employment, 
in terms of job security and general satisfaction, as it is considered as a way of shifting 
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risks from employer to employees (Guest, 2004). While offering the military organization 
flexibility, the consequences of temporary contracts for military personnel have 
been largely detrimental, e.g. by producing uncertainty and discontent, but also by 
stimulating occupational attitude towards the military profession, typical for the new 
modes of work within the military (Soeters et al., 2006). Indeed, temporary employees 
might be less attached to the organizational values and norms of behavior.
There is not much empirical evidence on differences in behavior between temporary 
and permanent military personnel. However, the differences between different types 
of employment have been thoroughly investigated in other fields. There is evidence 
that due to the nature of their employment, temporary workers are more easily 
satisfied with their situation than permanent workers and for instance do not respond 
to job insecurity, unlike permanent workers who experience job insecurity as harmful 
(Klandermans, Klein Hesseling and van Vuuren, 2010). In terms of organizational 
behavior, there is evidence that temporary workers engage in less organizational 
citizenship behavior, defined as individual behavior which promotes the wellbeing of 
the organization (Chambel and Castanheira, 2006). 
In 2004, the Dutch armed forces introduced a flexible personnel system to make 
sure that the organization remains “young” and to offer more effective education and 
labor market preparation trajectories for those who leave the organization. Around the 
age of 35 most military personnel will either receive a permanent contract or leave 
the organization. In this study, we investigate whether employees with temporary 
and permanent contracts reacted differently to changes in pressures they might 
experience. We formulated two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5: Permanent contract military personnel react to an increase   
  in socio-economic and organizational pressures by engaging   
  in demonstrating, petition signing and job searching more strongly  
  than temporary contract personnel. 
Hypothesis 6: Permanent contract military personnel react to an improvement   
  in their labor market position by engaging in demonstrating, petition  
  signing and job searching more strongly than temporary contract  





In 2013, 2014 and 2015 we conducted an online panel survey of Dutch military 
personnel.22 Respondents in the first wave were recruited with the help of the major 
Dutch military trade unions (ACOM, AFMP and MARVER) which promoted the survey 
by e-mail, on their website and in their magazines and newsletters. To reach non-
members as well we asked the respondents to spread the word about the study 
in their units and among colleagues. 23 Respondents who completed the first wave 
of the survey were asked for permission to be invited directly to participate in the 
second and third wave. The first wave was filled in by 577 military personnel, of whom 
422 provided us with an e-mail address and the permission to invite them for the 
second wave.24 244 respondents filled in the second wave. In the third wave, we again 
invited all 422 personnel from the first wave who stated they were willing to participate 
in further waves. 224 filled in the third survey. In total, 187 respondents filled in all three 
waves and 281 filled in at least two waves. Table 1 presents the sample description of 
the respondents who participated at least in two waves.
Measures 
Dependent variables
We asked the respondents to consider the austerity, reorganizations and changes 
within the Dutch armed forces and indicate on a five point Likert scale from ‘never’ to 
‘often’ how often they have, as a reaction to these developments, signed a petition or 
open letter; attended a demonstration or protest action; or actively searched for a job 
outside the organization in the past 12 months.
Independent variables
As independent variables we included a range of socio-economic and organizational 
pressures that could have been experienced by Dutch military personnel in each 
wave.
22  Petrovic, van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013-2015) Dealing with discontent in the Dutch military. 
Panel study. VU University. To be archived.
23 96,8% of respondents in our study are members of a trade union, that is a bit more than the approximate 
80% membership rate among military personnel in the Netherlands 
24 Due to the recruitment technique where the respondents were invited by a third party but could also self-
select by following the link on the trade union website it was not possible to calculate a response rate.
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Table 1: Sample description (for respondents who participated in at least two waves): 
Wave 1 (N=281) Wave 2 (N=244) Wave 3 (N=224)
% Mean SD % Mean SD % Mean SD
Gender(% female) 4.3% 4.9% 3.1%
Age at wave 42.0 10.61 42.9 9.79 44.3 9.67
Service
      Army 37% 36.8% 36.6%
      Air force 23.1% 24% 25.4%
      Navy 10% 7.6% 8.9%
      Constabulary 17.4% 18.4% 16.5%




      Field officers 
(OF3-OF5)
11.4% 12% 12.1%
      Junior officers 
(OF1-OF2)
16.7% 17.2% 19.2%
      Sub-officers 
(OR5 – OR 8/9)
65.1% 64.4% 64.7%
      Corporals 
(OR3/ OR4)
5.3% 5.2% 3.1%
      Soldiers etc. 
(OR-1/OR-2)
1.4% 1.2% 0.9%
We included two measures regarding employment – perception of own chances 
of employment outside the organization in case of layoff and the perception of job 
insecurity, measured on a five-point Likert scale where higher values indicate higher 
employment chances and higher threat of losing one’s job. 
We also included a one item measure of salary dissatisfaction, a three item measure 
of dissatisfaction with one’s workplace which has been constructed as an average 
score of items measuring job content, satisfaction with direct superior and satisfaction 
with work atmosphere (Cronbach’s ―=0.70) and a measure of opposition to job rotation, 
which has been mentioned often as a source of dissatisfaction in the qualitative study 
by Petrovic, van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2017) included in this dissertation. 
All three have been assessed on five-point Likert scales where higher values indicate 




We include two moderators – loyalty and employment contract type, as measured 
in the first wave of the study. Loyalty – was constructed as an average of three items, 
adapted from Lee and Whitford (2008): 
“If people criticize the armed forces, I defend my organization”; “armed forces can 
count on my loyalty”; “I would recommend working at the armed forces to other 
people”, measured on a five-point Likert scale where higher values indicate higher 
loyalty (Cronbach’s ―=0.78) during the first wave of the study. In that way we investigate 
how differences in loyalty among personnel in wave 1 influenced their behavior later 
on in the study. 
Employment contract type – we compare two groups of military personnel – based 
on a division between temporary and permanent contracts25, also measured in the 
first wave of the study. 
25 We differentiate between two types of contract: temporary (category assigned to respondents working 
under contract types FPS 1, 2 and BBT) and permanent (respondent working under contract FPS 3). For 
the sake of clarity we treat contract type as a fixed characteristic. In reality, contracts can change, but 
between the waves I and III, less than 10% of the 224 respondents who participated in those two waves 
report a switch from a temporary to permanent contract, a number too low to be meaningfully analyzed. 





Table 2 presents the average scores and standard deviations for all independent, 
moderating, and dependent variables. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Wave 1 (N=281) Wave 2 (N=244) Wave 3 (N=224)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Min Max
Labor market 
position
1.63 1.42 1.81 1.45 1.82 1.44 0 4
Job insecurity 0.75 1.16 0.63 1.02 0.59 1.06 0 4
Salary dissat-
isfaction
2.37 0.98 2.70 0.98 2.48 1.08 0 4
Rotation op-
position
2.95 1.28 2.88 1.29 2.90 1.28 0 4
Workplace 
dissatisfaction
1.38 0.82 1.33 0.83 1.28 0.87 0 4
Loyalty 1.92 0.96 1.93 0.92 1.95 0.97 0 4
Contract 
(1=permanent)
0.71 0.46 0.73 0.45 0.71 0.45 0 1
Petition sign-
ing
1.27 1.24 1.07 1.25 1.59 1.40 0 4
Demonstrat-
ing
0.45 0.94 0.53 1.02 0.51 1.05 0 4
Exit 1.53 1.44 1.53 1.39 1.31 1.38 0 4
Mean level changes in petition signing, demonstrating and exit
Descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 show relatively stable average scores 
in petitioning, demonstrating and exit. On average, respondents report signing 
petitions somewhat less often in the second wave but in the third wave the average 
of petition signing increased more than half a point on a five-point scale. Personnel 
report engaging in exit behavior a bit less in the third wave and there was also a 
small increase in attending a demonstration or a street protest in the second and 
third wave. Labor market position improved slightly between waves one and two 
while job insecurity somewhat decreased. Dissatisfaction with salary increased at first 
but then decreased in wave 3 while average opposition to rotations and workplace 
dissatisfaction show some smaller fluctuations.
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We now focus more closely on the dependent variables – petition signing, 
demonstrating and exit. Upon comparison of the individual scores between different 
waves (see Table 3) we can conclude that behind the relative stability of the average 
scores, individual behavior shows more volatility.
Respondents reported the least change in terms of demonstrating with around 
three quarters of all respondents reporting identical levels of demonstrating both 
between waves I and II and between waves II and III. Demonstrating is a time and 
effort consuming type of activism and attendance is highly dependent on whether 
demonstrations are organized. The lack of change is almost fully driven by a large 
group of respondents who did not report participating in demonstrations in any of the 
three waves (65% of 281 respondents who participated in at least two waves reported 
that they never attended a demonstration). Still, between the waves, around one in 
four respondents reported either less or more demonstrating. 
That is to say, if we observe petitioning, we see that in wave II less than a fifth of the 
respondents (18.5%) reported signing petitions more often than in wave I while in wave 
III 40.7% of the respondents reported signing petitions more often than in wave II. 
Similarly, between waves I and II a half of all respondents report same levels of active 
search for a new job, while the other half is almost equally divided between the group 
who searched for a new job more often and the group who did that less often.
Table 3: Individual changes between waves for different types of behavior
Demonstration Petition Exit
Waves I-II II-III I-II II-III I-II II-III
Increase 12.6% 13.9% 18.5% 40.7% 26.6% 23.5%
Stable 77.5% 73.3% 53.3% 43.9% 50.0% 46.0%
Decrease 9.8% 12.8% 28.3% 15.5% 23.4% 30.5%
In sum, a relatively stable average scores hide a variety of individual changes. In the 
next section, we focus on explaining these individual changes.
ML-SEM analysis
When aiming to make causal inferences with non-experimental data, panel data can 
be useful as it allows us to control for unobserved, time-invariant confounders and to 
model the direction of causal relationships. However, it has been noted that achieving 
both at the same time is difficult and can lead to serious estimation problems. A way 
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to resolve this issue is the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation. Allison, Williams and 
Moral-Benito (2017) show that the ML method falls within the framework of linear 
structural equation models (SEM)  and that the ML-SEM method can be employed 
with satisfactory results when compared to other ML methods26. By applying this 
method, we are able to estimate causal relationships and study how changes in 
the dependent variable are caused by changes in the independent variable on T-1. 
Furthermore, we use the FIML method available in Stata software to deal with the 
missing values and use the available data optimally. 
In addition to main effects, we also included interaction effects with loyalty and the 
type of employment contract. All coefficients in Tables 4-6 reflect the effect of a one-
unit change in the independent variable on the change in the dependent variable. 
We present three models for petition signing, demonstrating and exit each. In all 
three models predictors are included on T-1 and all models include the dependent 
variable as the predictor (T-1). For the variables loyalty and employment contract we 
use the measure on T1; therefore they do not vary through time and are treated as 
exogeneous. Model 1 includes main effects of socio-economic and organizational 
pressures and labor market position. Model 2 includes interactions with loyalty, 
models 3 includes interaction with employment contract. Table 6 summarized the 
results of the six hypotheses, for the three dependent variables.
26 To investigate causal relationships in this article we use the xtdpdml command in Stata, and follow the 




Table 4: Regression coefficients and robust standard errors for petition signing (3 waves)
All  independent variables and petition signing (T-1);  
moderators (T0)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Petition signing (0-4) 0,22 (0,17) 0,21 (0,15) 0,20 (0,16)
Labor market position (0-4) 0,03 (0,10) 0,38 (0,22) 0,00 (0,20)
Job insecurity (0-4) 0,10 (0,09) -0,23 (0,19) 0,30 (0,16) ̊
Salary dissatisfaction (0-4) 0,14 (0,12) -0,23 (0,26) 0,22 (0,22)
Rotation opposition (0-4) -0,12 (0,11) 0,64 (0,21)** -0,20 (0,25)
Workplace dissatisfaction 
(0-4)
0,10 (0,12) 1,01 (0,31)** -0,42 (0,25)








Rotation opposition*Loyalty -0,39 (0,11)***
Workplace * Loyalty -0,40 (0,13)**




Job insecurity*Contract -0,28 (0,19)




Workplace diss.* Contract 0,66 (0,29)*
Walc Chi 2 7.77 51.57*** 15.00
BIC 15735.53 29675.29 23031.68
AIC 15304.10 28311.29 21667.67
― p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Model 1-3: ML-SEM panel models. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 4 presents the results for petition signing. In Model 1, the non-significant effects 
imply that it is unlikely that changes in perception of socio-economic pressures or 
perception of labor market position led military personnel to sign more petitions 
over the period of this study. Therefore, for petition signing, we see no evidence for 
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the claim that military personnel who perceive an increase in socio-economic and 
organizational pressures engage more in petition signing (H1 rejected for petition 
signing), nor do personnel who perceive an improved labor market position engage 
in more petition signing (H2 rejected for petition signing).
However, Model 2 shows that there are some variations according to the degree of 
loyalty. Among military personnel who report lower loyalty, increased opposition to job 
rotations (.64) and dissatisfaction with their workplace (1.01) led to more petition signing 
over the period of this study. The significant negative interaction effects with loyalty 
(-.39 and -.40) indicate that the effects of opposition to job rotations and workplace 
dissatisfaction decrease among more loyal military personnel, in concurrence with 
H3. Also, there is marginally significant statistical evidence for a negative interaction 
effect between labor market position and loyalty (-.17).  This offers support for H4 that 
personnel with higher loyalty levels might react to improved labor market position 
with less petition signing than those with lower level of loyalty.
Model 3 shows that permanent contract personnel react to workplace dissatisfaction 
by signing petitions, more so than temporary contract personnel, as seen in a positive 
interaction effect (0.66), offering partial evidence for the hypothesis (H5) that permanent 
contract personnel might react to socio-economic and organizational pressures more 
harshly than those with temporary contracts (H5). For the other measures of socio-
economic pressure there is no evidence that these would lead to different reactions 
between permanent and temporary contract personnel. Also, there is no evidence for 
H6 that improved labor market position might lead to more petition signing among 
permanent contract personnel than among temporary contract personnel. 
Demonstrating
Table 5 presents the results for demonstrating. The results of the analysis presented 
in Model 1 show that only increased perception of job insecurity (0.10) led military 
personnel to demonstrate more often. This is a marginally significant effect. As the 
effects of the other socio-economic pressures are not significant, there is only very 
limited evidence for the claim (H1) that military personnel who perceive an increase 
in socio-economic and organizational pressures demonstrate more. There is no 
evidence for the claim that an improved labor market position led military personnel 
to demonstrate more, thereby rejecting H2.
Model 2 offers no evidence that increased socio-economic and organizational 
pressures (as stated in H3) nor improved position on the labor market (as stated in H4) 
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led to more demonstrating among personnel with lower loyalty than among those 
with higher loyalty, therefore we reject H3 and H4 for demonstrating. 
Table 5: Regression coefficients and robust standard errors for demonstrating (3 waves)
All  independent variables and demonstrating (T-1);  
moderators (T0)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Demonstrating (0-4) 0,18 (0,23) 0,16 0,20 0,16 0,22
Labor market position (0-4) 0,00 (0,06) -0,04 0,15 0,07 0,13
Job insecurity (0-4) 0,10 (0,06) ̊  0,18 0,13   0,21 0,10*
Salary dissatisfaction (0-4) 0,04 (0,07) 0,12 0,17 -0,02 0,14
Rotation opposition (0-4) -0,07 (0,07) -0,07 0,15  -0,08 0,16
Workplace  
dissatisfaction (0-4)
0,01 (0,08) -0,04 0,31 -0,14 0,16
Loyalty (0-4) -0,07 0,29
Labor market  
position*Loyalty
0,02 0,07







Workplace * Loyalty -0,01 0,09
Permanent contract (0-1) -0,17 0,75
Labor market position* 
Contract
-0,10 0,15







Workplace diss.* Contract 0,21 0,18
Wald Chi 2 5.07 34.95*** 11.47
BIC 14931.85 28891.70 22229.82  
AIC 14500.42 27527.69 20865.82
― p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Model 1-3: ML-SEM panel models. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Changing behavior in a changing organization?
115 
4
Model 3 offers evidence that temporary personnel react to increased job insecurity by 
demonstrating (.21), while the negative, but the statistically non-significant interaction 
effect (-0.16) suggests that temporary contract personnel react somewhat more 
strongly to job insecurity by demonstrating than permanent contract personnel. 
This finding contradicts H5 where we stated that it is permanent contract personnel 
who would react to socio-economic and organizational pressures more harshly. 
For demonstrating, there is no evidence for H6 that permanent contract personnel 
demonstrate more often due to improved labor market position than temporary 
contract personnel. 
Exit
Table 6 presents the results for exit - actively searching for a new job outside the 
organization. Model 1 shows that military personnel who were dissatisfied about 
frequent function rotations searched for a new job outside the military organization 
(.23). This finding offers some limited support for the hypothesis that socio-economic 
and organizational pressures lead to more exit (H1) while we see no evidence that 
improved labor market position would lead to more exit (H2). 
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Table 6: Regression coefficients and robust standard errors for exit (3 waves) 
All  independent variables and exit (T-1); moderators (T0)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Exit 0,34 (0,18) 0,25 (0,17) 0,33 (0,17)
Labor market position 
(0-4)
-0,02 (0,09) 0,21 (0,20) -0,34 (0,17)*
Job insecurity (0-4) 0,06 (0,09) 0,29 (0,18) -0,39 (0,15)**
Salary dissatisfaction 
(0-4)
-0,14 (0,10) -0,49 (0,23)* 0,07 (0,19)
Rotation opposition 
(0-4)
0,23 (0,10)* 0,23 (0,19) 0,36 (0,22) ̊  
Workplace  
dissatisfaction (0-4)
0,06 (0,11) 0,71 (0,28)* 0,10 (0,22)




Job insecurity*Loyalty -0,14 (0,09)
Salary dissatisfac-
tion*Loyalty




Workplace * Loyalty -0,30 (0,12)*











Workplace diss.*  
Contract
-0,08 (0,25)
Wald Chi 2 14.46* 60.90*** 43.44***
BIC 15676.68 29594.32  22949.79
AIC 15245.25 28230.32 21585.79
― p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Model 1-3: ML-SEM panel models. Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Model 2 demonstrates that while workplace dissatisfaction led the least loyal 
personnel to search for a job outside the military (.71), for dissatisfaction with salaries 
the opposite is true. The negative main effect (-0.49) and the positive and  marginally 
statistically significant interaction effect (0.18) lead to the conclusion that it is the 
less loyal personnel who responded to increased dissatisfaction about salaries by 
searching for a new job less often, a surprising result. Therefore, there is contradictory 
evidence about H3 which predicted that loyalty might soften the effect of socio-
economic and organizational pressures and prevent loyal military personnel from 
exiting. There is no evidence that more loyal personnel engaged less in job searching 
when perceiving improved labor market position when compared to less loyal 
personnel (therefore rejecting H4). 
Model 3 shows that it is permanent contract personnel who respond to job insecurity 
by exiting more than temporary contract personnel (0.65), offering partial support for 
H5 for exit. At the same time, a negative statistically significant main effect (-0.34) 
and a statistically significant positive interaction effect (0.46) show that it is temporary 
contract personnel who responds to improved chances on the labor market by 
engaged in less job searching while permanent contract personnel responded by 




Table 7 summarizes the findings for each of the hypotheses, for petition signing, 
demonstrating and job searching. 
Table 7: Results overview
H1 H3 H5 















Green: evidence in support of hypothesis
Red: evidence contradicting hypothesis
No color: no evidence in support of hypothesis 
*: marginally significant effect
Discussion
Scholars who wrote about the changes engulfing militaries in various Western 
countries recognized that we might be witnessing a shift in the traditional relationship 
between military personnel and the military as their employer (Moskos, 1970; King, 
2006; Levy, 2006). Possible consequences of a structurally worsened position of 
military personnel and their increasingly civilian-like profession were thought to 
include a weakened link to the organization and the abandonment of traditional 
norms of behavior. As a result, both protesting and exiting were suddenly seen as 
realistic ways in which military personnel would be responding to socio-economic 
and organizational pressures (Heinecken, 2006). 
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Until now it was not clear whether the shift towards a more assertive  military personnel 
actually materialized. In order to address this hiatus, the current study investigated 
how military personnel who face increasing pressure due to various forms of 
organizational developments react in terms of protest (defined as petition signing and 
demonstrating) or exit (defined as job searching) and whether their feelings of loyalty 
and the type of their employment contract might influence their reaction. Our study 
was conducted during a period of austerity measures and reorganizations within 
the Dutch military, which provided us with an opportunity to study personnel facing 
a variety of socio-economic and organizational pressures. Furthermore, the  panel 
design applied in this study allowed us to investigate the causal effects of socio-
economic and organizational pressures on protest and exit, therefore going a step 
further than a correlational analysis in cross-sectional research.
In this study we found only limited evidence of a causal relationship between 
increased socio-economic and organizational pressures and voice and exit among 
military personnel (H1). Indeed, our results show that opposition to function rotations 
leads to more exit and that perceived job insecurity leads to more demonstrating. 
There is not enough evidence about other effects. At the same time, when loyalty and 
the type of employment contract are considered, we found more evidence about 
various behavioral consequences of socio-economic and organizational pressures. 
We found evidence that workplace dissatisfaction induced personnel reporting lower 
loyalty to sign petitions and search for another job more than personnel reporting 
higher loyalty, while opposition to function rotations led personnel reporting lower 
loyalty to engage in petition signing more frequently than personnel reporting higher 
loyalty. Also, there is evidence that improved position on labor market led personnel 
with lower loyalty to sign petitions more frequently than personnel with higher levels 
of loyalty. Interestingly, it is personnel with lower levels of loyalty who responded 
to dissatisfaction with salaries by exiting less often. While the results offer some 
evidence for the hypotheses (H3 and H4) that socio-economic and organizational 
pressures and improved labor market position lead personnel with lower levels of 
loyalty to react more often by protesting or exiting, this is an exception that should 
not surprise us completely. In fact, in Petrovic, Klandermans and van Stekelenburg 
(2018), where we analyzed the wave 1 data of the same panel study, we showed that 
the relationship between loyalty on one side and voice behavior is complex as both 
high and low loyalty personnel might under certain circumstances engage in voice, 
with similar conclusions also applying to exit. 
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We found mixed evidence for the hypothesis that permanent personnel might react 
to socio-economic and organizational pressures by protesting and exiting more than 
temporary personnel. In fact, it is temporary personnel who reacted to job insecurity 
by demonstrating and to increased dissatisfaction about function rotations by 
exiting.  At the same time, in concurrence with our hypotheses, permanent contract 
personnel reacted to job insecurity and improved labor market position by searching 
for another job to some extent. Permanent contract personnel also reacted to 
increased workplace dissatisfaction by signing petitions, unlike temporary personnel 
who tended to abstain from signing petitions when experiencing increased workplace 
dissatisfaction. These results support the findings from other organizational fields that 
it is permanent contract employees who experience job insecurity as harmful and 
thus might react to it by exiting. At the same time, (weak statistical) evidence about the 
stronger reaction of temporary contract personnel to job insecurity by demonstrating 
goes against the same expectation that temporary employees are easily satisfied 
(Klandermans, Klein Hesseling and van Vuuren, 2010). Very limited evidence about 
differences in protest between temporary and permanent contract personnel implies 
that, unlike exit behavior, protest behavior might result from pressures which influence 
behavior irrespective of the contract status of personnel. 
What are the most important lessons we learn from these results? Our first lesson 
concerns the concept of loyalty, a term well known within the literature on both 
civilian as well as military organization. Various authors recognized an exceptional 
role of loyalty at all levels of military organization (Coleman, 2009; Robinson, 2008). 
Importantly for our subject, it has been argued that loyalty plays an important role in 
preserving the terms of unwritten psychological contract in the military organization. 
Up until now, there has been scarce empirical evidence on how loyalty impacts 
reactions of personnel who experience socio-economic and organizational pressures. 
Our findings offer some evidence for the thesis that loyalty influences how military 
personnel respond to socio-economic and organizational pressures – regarding 
workplace dissatisfaction (for exit and petition signing), rotation opposition (for petition 
signing) and marginal statistical evidence that loyalty moderates the effect of labor 
market position on petition signing. In face of a strict statistical test, we confirmed 
that military personnel abstained from protest and exit behavior not only because of 
the rules, but also because of their feelings of loyalty to the military organization and 
its goals in spite of the grievances they experience. Yet, for the dissatisfaction with 
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salaries, the opposite was proven to be true for exit as it was more loyal personnel 
resorted to exit. This is a surprising result which underscores the need to explore 
the meaning of loyalty and the possible repercussions of disappointment among 
loyal personnel due to the lack of satisfactory financial remuneration. One might 
hypothesize that high loyalty might also lead to disappointment – so further research 
is needed on how loyalty might interact with broken promises and dissatisfaction.
Second, while we confirmed expectations from other fields that permanent personnel 
might react more harshly to pressures (in this case by exiting), we also found that in 
some cases, temporary personnel might be more prone to engaging in protest such 
as a result of pressures. This is an important finding within the military context, as 
it might show that introducing temporary contracts might also mean more (novel) 
reactions to socio-economic and organizational pressures. Personnel who see 
military only as a temporary phase instead of a job for the rest of their life might be 
less prone to adhere to traditional norms of military organization.   
Third, proving causal effects can be elusive and we found very few statistically 
significant direct effects, when not accounting for moderation effects. A reason for 
this can be the relatively short time span of our study (three waves within three years) 
and the fact that we started the first wave after the first, large budgetary cuts which 
might have caused a large initial rise in dissatisfaction among personnel and in their 
protest/exit behavior. This might have made our results an underestimation of the 
effects of dissatisfaction. In that sense, we were a bit “late” and future research should 
address this by following personnel over a longer period of time and thus being able 
to capture the effects of sudden increases in dissatisfaction. 
Taken together, the most important contribution by this study is the empirical test 
for predictions about protest and exit behavior which have been theorized about but 
have rarely been documented in terms of individual behavior by military personnel. 
We offer limited causal evidence that military personnel who are exposed to socio-
economic and organizational pressures engage in protest and exit more often, but 
we offer more evidence that differences in loyalty affect how military personnel react 
to socio-economic pressures in terms of protest and exit. While scholars of social 
movement and employee behavior might see the relationship between grievances 
and protest and exit behavior as not particularly ground-breaking, within the military 
context this is a novel finding. For those interested in military organizations these 
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findings offer valuable information on how military personnel might behave in their 
new, more turbulent position as employees in a changing military organization. 
Future research within the field of military studies would profit from engaging in 
systematic studies which would follow personnel over a longer period and in various 
countries and organizations. In our study, a focus on a single country and organization 
means we were unable to account for the differences in context, such as for instance 
the effect of various legal rules which personnel in different Western countries have 
to adhere to. In addition to comparison with different military organizations we would 
also profit by learning from other fields. Organizations which operate under similar 
stressors, such as police and health care might be a good example, but when reading 
about changes engulfing military organizations one might recognize similarities with 
other organizations with a (previously) strong professional culture, such as academia. 
Finally, as the results of this study show, in addition to legal rules, characteristics 
of the organizational culture matter as well, and characteristics such as cohesion, 
discipline but also the fear of repercussions must be taken into account when trying 
to understand the behavior of personnel, within military and elsewhere.
For policy makers, the findings forwarded in this study might be interesting as they 
offers hints on how military personnel behave in the new setting created by changes 
within this organization. While reforming the old-fashioned ways of work might lead 
to improvements, this might also mean a more assertive and flexible military force. As 
this study shows, military personnel, just like all other citizens and employees might 
decide to put their interests first when facing hardship. Failing to comprehend this 
might cost us a great deal in moments we have to rely on this group of citizens. 







Research question and key findings
Designing a study about discontent among military personnel is nothing less than 
a peculiar endeavor. While discontent might often be related to protest, protest is 
a rare form of behavior, even within the civilian society. Inside the military, protest is 
even scarcer and is commonly considered to be opposite to the very idea of what 
military service is like. To illustrate this point, one can search the Internet for the 
words military and protest and find that almost all results describe military being used 
to curb civilian demonstrations, while only a few results refer to military personnel 
engaging in protest themselves. If scholars do focus on protest and the military, their 
key interest tends to be the interaction between civilians and the military, especially in 
authoritarian societies (see for example Croissant, Kuehn & Eschenauer, 2018). 
In many countries, rules do not only prevent military personnel from engaging in public 
demonstrations themselves but also impose restrictions on much more modest 
activities such as joining a trade union or signing a protest letter. In the Netherlands, 
a researcher of discontent within the military will encounter a research field which is 
less sharply divided from the civilian society than elsewhere. Even though striking is 
banned, military trade unions and public protests of personnel are not unlawful. And 
yet, until the 2010s, large scale protests of Dutch military personnel were an exception 
and personnel and (ex)officers largely refrained from expressing their opposition in 
public. Even now, for Dutch military personnel (just like for many other citizens) protest 
is not a primary response. Therefore, this dissertation relied on a broader approach 
and focused on more than one sort of response to discontent. Hence, the overarching 
question presented in this dissertation focuses on the way Dutch military personnel dealt 
with work-related discontent during a turbulent period of austerity and reorganizations 
in the early 2010s. 
The results presented in three empirical papers, based on both qualitative and 
quantitative methodology, show that most personnel still greatly appreciate their 
jobs. At the same time, many are worried about detrimental developments which 
threaten both their own position as well as the Dutch armed forces in general. This 
includes both budgetary issues and also various organizational-cultural shifts from a 
traditional, almost family-like military towards a more professional, efficiency-oriented 
organization. Importantly, a small but not negligible minority of personnel experience 
great distress, often because they feel their jobs are under threat while at the same 




Dutch military personnel react to work-related discontent in various ways. The results 
presented in this dissertation show that in spite of turmoil, most personnel opt to do 
nothing. Yet, within this seemingly passive majority, there are crucial differences in 
motivations for such behavior. While some personnel do nothing as they are satisfied 
with their own position, others do feel grievances but still decide to remain silent as 
they have no faith in improvement or fear the consequences if they do raise their 
voice. The second most frequent strategy identified is exit - searching for a job outside 
the military. And yet, during the interviews personnel stressed that actually leaving 
the organization often proves to be quite difficult, for example because of strong 
attachment to the organization. In fact, when talking about options outside the military, 
personnel often mentioned organizations which they considered to have a similar 
organizational culture, such as police. I found protest and neglect (anti-organizational 
behavior) to be the least frequent reactions to work-related discontent. Among the 
group of personnel who do engage in any form of protest, I found personnel who 
aim for a positive change and remain loyal to the organization, but also those who 
feel under threat and combine protest with neglect (anti-organizational behavior). 
Finally, while results show that military personnel who experience increased socio-
economic and organizational pressures engage in protest and exit more often, this 
kind of relationship applies primarily to personnel who report lower loyalty and to a 
smaller extent among those with permanent contracts. 
Scientific relevance
Why study discontent within the military? After all, discontent and protest in other 
fields of life are a common topic of research. Often, the focus is on the “usual suspects”, 
for example, large social movements on the left side of the political spectrum. This 
dissertation shows that it is worth looking into places outside natural hotbeds of 
contention. In fact, as large majorities of citizens might never attend a demonstration 
or sign a petition, it makes sense to investigate how groups which are less prone to 
protest experience discontent and how they react to it. In this dissertation, I asserted 
that while military personnel might not protest as often as others, they too feel 
discontent and might change their behavior accordingly, for instance by increasingly 
engaging in protest options which are available or by looking for another job or even 
engaging in anti-organizational behavior. By shedding light on the far-going effect of 
the military organizational context this dissertation contributes to the realization that 
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the effects of social turmoil can be highly dependent on the context matters where 
citizens experience it. Therefore, findings presented in the previous chapters offer 
insights relevant for those interested in developments within the military but also for 
those are interested in broader social movements and society.
Many existing studies on military personnel and discontent within the military are 
practical in nature, organized by the military organization itself and focused on 
identifying detrimental consequences of discontent among personnel for the 
operational capabilities– for example the problems with recruitment or retention. 
Hence, we know a lot about the impact of austerity on military capabilities in countries 
which cashed in on the so-called peace dividend after the end of the Cold War (see 
for instance O’Donnell, 2012). At the same time, military sociologists who are studying 
changes in military profession and organization stress that military capabilities are 
only one facet of the transformation of the military organization. In fact, they go far 
beyond budgetary constraints and influence various facets of work and life within 
the military, bringing profound changes to military profession (Moskos et al., 2000), 
for instance the increased reliance on business inspired practices or the perceived 
individualization. Empirical evidence of what this means for military personnel, work-
related discontent they experience and how they react to discontent within the 
specific military context has been scarce. 
Findings presented in this dissertation contribute to addressing these gaps in 
knowledge. There are three aspects I would like to emphasizes in particular: work-
related discontent, reactions to discontent among military personnel and the concept 
of loyalty. 
Work, discontent and change
During the interviews with Dutch military personnel I met a variety of motivated 
individuals who were highly engaged in their job and greatly appreciate their 
organization. At the same time, I learned that many were deeply concerned about 
the changes which they observed in the military organization. In concurrence with the 
literature on the transformation of the military organizations this dissertation confirms 
that the changes are often rooted in budgetary problems which subsequently tend to 
affect the socio-economic position of personnel. However, as personnel often stressed 
during the interviews, these changes go even further. They affect the social fabric 
of the organization by altering the way work is organized and the way relationships 




deterioration of the socio-economic position present a painful development, what 
also matters is the shift away from the traditional military organization towards an 
organization which increasingly resembles what personnel describe as private 
sector companies. Within this new arrangement, personnel see a disappearance of 
warm, family like relationships and the rise of an impersonal and cold stance of the 
organization. These observations largely fit within the transformations described in 
the I/O and postmodern military models (Moskos, 1977, Moskos et al., 2000). The 
results of the panel survey presented in this dissertation offer similar findings. While 
on average military personnel score high on work satisfaction, they are very worried 
about the negative changes within the organization, for example the increasing 
individualism and the tendency towards impersonal treatment of personnel. In 
general, results show a mixed image concerning the material side of the work - despite 
reorganizations and downsizing, most personnel perceived low risk of losing their 
jobs. This reflects the fact that while many jobs were cut during the reorganization, the 
large majority of personnel could still stay. Many personnel expressed dissatisfaction 
with their salaries, a feeling which was often mentioned during the interviews and was 
confirmed in the panel study. Military personnel I interviewed relate this problem to 
the years of wage freeze and the gap between military and civilian income. 
Reactions to work-related discontent among Dutch military personnel
One of the key findings of the three empirical studies in this dissertation is that it 
is illusory to talk about how military personnel behave as a whole – behind the 
average scores, a variety of individual strategies and choices are hidden. Even the 
same behavior, protest, can be interpreted differently if observed as a segment of a 
larger pattern. There are protesters who still believe in the Dutch military and aim for 
improvements – thus voicing their disagreement while still showing reasonable levels 
of loyalty, a model of behavior recognized by Hirschman (1970). At the same time, 
there also are protesters, whose loyalty towards the organization has disappeared 
and who combine protest with other, less organization-friendly strategies such as exit 
and neglect. 
Exit is a frequent reaction to discontent within the military organization (Apt, 2014; 
van Eetveld et al., 2013; Korb and Duggan, 2007). Data presented in this dissertation 
confirm this and show that considering exit is widespread among Dutch military 
personnel. At the same time, as I often heard during the interviews, actually leaving 
the organization is more difficult than it seems. Not only have most military personnel 
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spent many years within their organization, they tend to be emotionally invested in 
their jobs and find it difficult to accept that they will have to continue their careers 
within the civilian world. This attachment does have its limits. Panel study results show 
that when socio-economic and organizational pressures increase, military personnel 
do engage in exit more often than before, outlining a clear consequence of the 
organizational turmoil. 
Students of social movements argue that even in times of great social unrest, 
a majority of citizens never join a street demonstration or engage in other kind of 
protest (see for example Marwell and Oliver, 1993). When I started this research, 
I knew that military personnel are even less likely to engage in protest than most 
civilians. Therefore it was not surprising that one of the key results is that silence, 
abstaining from protests behavior instead of express their opposition, is by far the 
most frequently reported reaction to austerity, closely followed by exit. At the same 
time, a closer look at cluster analysis in chapter 3 shows that another type of behavior 
is even more common. Even in the height of the organizational turbulence caused 
by reorganizations, cluster analysis in chapter 3 shows that the largest single group 
of personnel (almost 40%) rarely engaged in any type of reaction to austerity. They 
do not react but they also say they are not engaging in silence – doing nothing while 
one would prefer to voice one’s discontent. The background and assessment of the 
professional position of this group shows that the reason they felt no need to react 
to the organizational turmoil is because they feel low threat from austerity, report 
high loyalty and feel strong cohesion. In short, they are adhering to the terms of the 
psychological contract as it used to be prevalent in the military organization and feel 
that the organization is treating them well. While they are still a minority, behavior 
and attitudes of this fairly large group of personnel contradict the literature which 
warns for a possible breakdown in psychological contract and widespread discontent 
among military personnel (Farley et al., 2006; Heienecken, 2006). These findings do 
correspond with interviews presented in chapter 2 during which many personnel 
stated that they enjoy their work very much and feel their jobs are not under threat. 
Within the same organization, several realities co-exist – one experienced by those 
under pressure who decide to leave the forces, or engage in, for the military, atypical 
behavior such as protest or neglect, other one experienced by those suffering in 




When deciding to engage in protest, no citizen is free to act as they wish – they 
inevitably face restrictions. Citizens cannot protest everywhere and at every time. 
Certain forms of protest are not allowed, as they might endanger safety or cause 
extreme nuisance to other citizens. Moreover, some citizens face more restrictions 
than others, especially when their protest is related to work. Engaging in a strike is 
sometimes not allowed and some employees, like those working within police or 
healthcare, are almost never allowed to strike. Military professionals are at the extreme 
end of the group of citizens who face restrictions as only a few citizens might have 
less rights when considering protest as a course of action.
In this dissertation two sorts of restrictions were scrutinized –formal and informal 
ones. In practice, the line between the two is blurred. Take the ban on striking which is 
a formal restriction but often translates into feelings of powerlessness. Or the fact that 
some of personnel I talked to thought that public demonstrations are illegal. When 
interviewing military personnel, we heard that they have little faith in the influence 
exerted by the trade unions and co-determination bodies as they know that political 
and military leadership do not fear these organizations. Therefore, we were not 
surprised to find great support for the one incident in which trade union did have such 
(legal) power and actually used it to slow down the reorganization process in order 
to exert pressure on the government.27 Most military personnel in our quantitative 
study supports extending the right to strike in the situations which would not impede 
military operations.28 During the interviews, personnel discussed  the possibility of 
extending the right to strike and saw it as a reasonable demand for those working 
on the boundary between the military and the civilian world, such as constabulary 
guarding border crossings at airports. Unsurprisingly, the fact that civilians can use 
their right to strike and fight for a better position, even though their strike action might 
have a similar impact as a hypothetical strike by military personnel working side-by-
side with those same civilians, is seen as unfair. 
Other, informal restrictions matter as well. Worryingly, during the interviews, 
personnel cited pressure to restrain from protest by superiors and implicit threats of 
consequences. This feeling is widespread, as later confirmed by the results of survey 
data. 




Military personnel in the Netherlands do engage in protest options available to 
them, for instance attending a street demonstration or signing an open letter or a 
petition, be it in small numbers. A major finding in Chapter 4 in this dissertation is that 
it confirms that for some personnel (notably those reporting lower loyalty and working 
under permanent contracts) increased pressures do lead to more demonstrating and 
petition signing among military personnel. While this empirical relation might not 
seem exciting at first, within the military context, it is a relative novelty. Traditionally, 
military personnel under pressure were supposed to accept the pressures and show 
loyalty and not come into action. At least for personnel who report lower loyalty or 
work under permanent contracts, the prediction of more assertive military personnel 
(Moskos, 1977) did materialize.
Our results also provide information on how Dutch military personnel see trade 
unions. Interestingly, most personnel we interviewed see them not as a vehicle for 
collective protest, but rather as an organization offering support in case of individual 
work-related conflicts. For example with the organization as an employer but also 
with colleagues and superiors. Furthermore, the position of trade unions seems to be 
changing. In fact, for a long period of time being a member of the trade union was a 
norm for most military personnel (around 80% are is unionized). Our interviews show 
that this norm has been weakening and that personnel is questioning the usefulness 
of trade union (membership). Apparently, the changes within the military organization 
which have weakened the unique military culture might also be hurting the norms 
and the traditions of being a trade union member among Dutch military personnel. 
This shows that changes in the military organization might not necessarily lead to 
protest-prone military personnel but rather cause a weaker bond with the military 
world. In the end, Dutch military personnel might increasingly start resembling civilian 
employees in the Netherlands who are nowadays rarely a member of a trade union.  
Loyalty
Loyalty is a central concept in this dissertation. We borrowed this concept from two 
separate and equally relevant sources: the framework proposed by Hirschman (1970) 
where it is an element crucial for understanding organizational behavior and from 
the military sociological literature where loyalty has been hailed as a key military 
value, crucial for military readiness (Coleman, 2009; Robinson, 2008; Winslow, 1998). 
However, loyalty is more than a scientific concept as it has a clear meaning in the 




up themselves during the interviews when discussing their jobs, often long before 
the prepared questions about loyalty were asked. Personnel describe loyalty as 
something very important for their organization and the way they see their profession. 
Dutch military personnel I interviewed described loyalty as a two-way relationship. On 
the one hand, they might be asked to accomplish tasks which go further and demand 
more than in most civilian jobs and do so without complaining, fear or discussion. Yet 
they also expect their organization to be loyal to them. The way personnel talked to 
us about loyalty closely follows the way military sociologists refer to the relationship 
which has been described as a social or psychological contract (for instance Bartle 
2006a). During the interviews military personnel highlighted that while loyalty might 
inspire them to make the extra effort, it can also be a reason to become angry when 
they notice that loyalty has become a one way street where personnel make sacrifices 
but do not get respect from their employer. This hints at a possible two-sided sward 
of a psychological contract, which, in case it erodes, could make personnel see their 
employer as untrustworthy. 
Panel study presented in chapter 4 offered empirical evidence for the importance of 
loyalty as there is evidence that loyalty influences the behavior of military personnel 
under pressure. Those who still feel more loyal to their organization engaged in 
protest and exit behavior less often when facing increasing socio-economic and 
organizational pressures than those who are less loyal. However, this is only one side 
of the medal. The cluster analysis presented in Chapter 3 shows that relatively loyal 
personnel do protest as well. Their goals might be found in the wish for improvements 
and support for the organization and is not paired with organization-unfriendly forms 
of behavior (such as neglect). 
A note on data collection
Obtaining access is a challenging feature of any study within the military organization. 
Those who have unlimited access to military organization often serve within it 
themselves and are bound by its needs and regulations. Therefore, they face limits 
in organizing and presenting their research (Soeters, Shields and Rietjens, 2014). 
Outsiders who would like to research and publish might find it difficult to access 
the field because of the limits imposed by the organization. Additionally, military 
personnel themselves might distrust outsiders when it comes to observing and 
evaluating the ways military organization function. In this project, I was able to gain 
access to the research field with the support of three military trade unions (ACOM, 
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MARVER and AFMP). Working with the trade unions highlighted my motivation to use 
the results in order to improve the well-being of military personnel instead of aiming 
to uncover problems and missteps by those who work within it. This was crucial, 
given the fact that I was studying discontent and protest, often seen as a threat or an 
embarrassment by military and civilian leadership alike. 
Societal relevance
Why investigate discontent in the military? In the Dutch context, military is not only 
one of the largest employers but it is also a place where broader societal changes 
made a significant impact on those working within it. In the past decades, Western 
world grappled with what was perceived as subpar efficiency within the public sector. 
The solution included a move towards business-like practices, privatization but also 
austerity and downsizing, commonly applied by cutting salaries and reducing the 
workforce. This process was clearly visible in Western militaries which had to keep 
up with rapid geopolitical, technological and societal changes in the past several 
decades. The findings presented in previous chapters help us understand what this 
meant for military personnel. This dissertation does not claim that efforts to make 
the public sector (and the military) more cost effective are wrong or misplaced. In 
fact, during the interviews, military personnel often stressed that professionalization 
and being sensible with taxpayer’s money is not bad at all! But running a military, 
a school or a hospital like a department store might not always produce the best 
results. Indeed, this dissertation gives some insight into the risks of such endeavor. 
The position of military personnel has been normalizing – they are exposed to same 
pressures and worries as many other civilian employees. Does the society really want 
this? As military personnel act more and more like regular, civilian employees, the 
rules which limit the expression of their discontent – such as the ban on striking – 
might in the end not mean that much. While military personnel might be unable to 
communicate the scope of the issues their organization faces by protesting, they 
are still able to protect their individual position in many other ways, for example by 
searching for another job and leaving. Ironically, the limitations on protest in regular, 
peace times might have the unfortunate consequence of hiding the organizational 
problems from broader society and policy makers. Prevented by rules and norms, 
personnel might keep silent about important issues which they experience in their 




example of the Marines in the very beginning of this dissertation. Both policy makers 
and citizens alike should think about the position of military personnel and sensible 
ways for military personnel to express their dissatisfaction. It would be fair to do so 
given the role and sacrifices of this group of citizens. 
Limitations and future research
Sampling
In this dissertation, unique data was presented on dealing with work-related 
discontent among Dutch military personnel. As mentioned earlier, obtaining a sample 
of military personnel is no easy task and I was extremely grateful for the help trade 
unions provided in gaining access to military personnel. However, an ideal sample 
would be a random sample of the population of military personnel, a strategy which 
could only be applied while cooperating with the organization itself. In this case 
cooperating with trade unions offered researchers an independent position from 
the employer. A consequence of this choice is that the sample contains more union 
members, is higher in rank and older than the actual population of military personnel. 
When interpreting the results regarding the frequency of certain forms of behavior, 
this limitation should be taken into account: in particular, the sample lacks young and 
low rank personnel. As they have less experience with the military organization in the 
past, it would be interesting to focus on the changes in attitudes and behavior among 
this group of personnel. Focusing on younger personnel might help us understand 
whether the traditional norms and mores so typical of the military organization will be 
able to persist or is the military up for even more change in the future. 
Comparison with other sectors and countries
Military personnel are living and working in a world apart. I took this as a given in 
this dissertation, and while most researchers would agree to a certain extent, it is 
important to compare military personnel to other professional groups in terms of 
pressures they face, the context they operate in and the ways they react to pressures. 
Both similar ones, like police and firemen, and less similar ones, such as civilian public 
servants or even those employed in the private sector. 
Additionally, we would benefit immensely from international comparison. Military 
personnel in the Netherlands enjoy a specific, relatively free position, therefore 
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presenting us with a good opportunity to study protest in a place where it can occur. 
However, I did not have a chance to compare the Netherlands to other countries, 
where the position of personnel and the scale and consequences of the changes 
within the military organization might be different. It would have been interesting 
to assess how these different settings influence the behavior of military personnel. 
Will military personnel resort to exit or neglect more often in countries and military 
organizations which restrict their options to voice more rigorously? A puzzle like 
that cannot be answered based on a single country-study. Therefore, it remains a 
question whether our conclusions about the attitudes and behavior of Dutch military 
personnel extend to other Western countries. Addressing it will help us shed more 
light on issues of discontent and protest in the military, a phenomenon which we are 
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LIST OF INTERVIEW TOPICS

1. To begin, can you tell us a bit about yourself ?
2. When did you start serving in the armed forces ?
3. Why did you decide to serve in the armed forces ?
4. Could you tell us a bit about your average day at work ?
5. What do you think about serving in the armed forces ?
6. If you consider your current job, which things are you most satisfied with ?
7. Are there also things which are less good ?
8. Who or what caused that ?
9. Which possibilities are there to address the issues you are unsatisfied with ?
10. How were things within the armed forces in the past?
11. How do you think things will develop in the future ?
12. At the moment there is a major re-organization within the armed forces. Did you 
notice it and what do you think about it ?
13. Have you ever considered leaving the armed forces ?
14. What was the reason for that ?
15. Do you know any colleagues who left the armed forces? Do you know why  
they left ?
16. Have you ever contacted your trade union ? Why or why not ?
17. What do you think about military trade unions ?
18. Would you recommend other people to apply for a job at the armed forces ?
19. The term “loyalty” is often used within the armed forces. What does it mean for you ?
20. Imagine you are at a birthday party and other guests say negative things about the 
armed forces. What would you do ?
21. Are you proud to serve in the armed forces ? If so, what in particular makes you 
proud ? Are there moments when you are ashamed of the armed forces and why ?
22. It is sometimes said that military personnel need to make more sacrifices that those 
working for a civilian company. Do you agree and could you explain why or why not ?





The overarching question presented in this dissertation focuses on the way Dutch 
military personnel dealt with work-related discontent during a turbulent period of 
austerity and reorganizations in the early 2010s. This question is interesting for  two 
main reasons. First, just like military personnel in many other Western countries in 
the post-Cold War period, Dutch military personnel have been facing a changing 
organization. Arguably, this brought increased organizational and socio-economic 
pressures and a prolonged period of turmoil. Second, military personnel operate 
within a specific context, marked by a unique military culture and specific legal 
rules. These two factors have a decisive influence on the way personnel can react 
to discontent. Due to legal rules, Dutch military personnel are not allowed to strike 
and when exercising their right to join associations, protest or publicize, they may 
not jeopardize the functioning of the military organization. Because of the specific 
organizational culture, they function within an organization which places high 
importance on loyalty, hierarchy, discipline and cohesion and is commonly perceived 
to be restrictive towards any form of dissent.
By leaning on the thesis of Hirschman (1970) and of those who applied his work, this 
dissertation investigates how Dutch military personnel dealt with discontent by looking 
at various possible reactions to discontent – voice, defined in terms of participation 
in collective protest, exit, defined as an attempt to leave the organization, silence, 
deliberately deciding not to protest, and neglect, engaging in anti-organizational 
behaviour. 
This dissertation consists of an introduction, and discussion and four chapters, 
each but one based on a published article. The first chapter offers a review of the 
relevant literature concerning the transformation of Western militaries, the unique 
context of the military organization and the empirical evidence on protest within the 
military organization. The article assesses the evidence amassed so far, identifies the 
limitations in the existing research and proposes an encompassing framework for 
future studies of protest within militaries in Western democracies. The second chapter 
presents the results of 24 in-depth interviews with Dutch military personnel focusing 
on positive and negative experiences while working in the military, the strategies they 
apply to cope with discontent and the restrictions they face when doing so, the role 
of the trade unions, the possibility of exit and finally loyalty and their work-related 
pride. The third chapter presents the results of the first wave of an online panel study 




silence and neglect. The fourth chapter presents the results of a three waves panel 
study and focuses on finding evidence for causal relationship between, on the one 
side, changes in socio-economic and organizational pressures and the perceived 
labour market position and, on the other side, two forms of voice (petition signing and 
demonstrating) and exit. 
The results presented in the three empirical papers show that most Dutch military 
personnel still greatly appreciate their jobs. At the same time, many are worried about 
detrimental developments which threaten both their position as well as the Dutch 
military organization in general. Dutch military personnel react to these developments 
in various ways. Our results show that in spite of turmoil, most personnel opt to do 
nothing – hence engage in behaviour we defined as silence. Exit is also reported 
widely, while only a small minority of military personnel engage in voice or neglect. The 
results of the panel data analysis produced limited evidence of a causal relationship 
between increased socio-economic and organizational pressures and protesting and 
exit among all military personnel. At the same time, there is evidence that personnel 
reporting lower levels of loyalty and those with permanent contracts engage in more 
protest and exit once confronted with socio-economic and organizational pressures 
or when they perceived an improved labour market situation. Taken together, these 
results offer insights into how discontent is dealt with within the specific military 
context. Furthermore, they paint a picture of many consequences of changes and 
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The overarching question presented in this dissertation focuses on 
the way Dutch military personnel dealt with work-related discontent 
during a turbulent period of austerity in the early 2010s. This question 
is interesting for two main reasons. First, just like military personnel 
in many other Western countries in the post-Cold War period, Dutch 
military personnel face a changing organization. Arguably, this means 
increased organizational and socio-economic pressures and a 
prolonged period of turmoil. Second, military personnel operate within 
a specifi c context, marked by a unique military culture and specifi c 
legal rules. 
By leaning on Hirschman (1970) and of those who applied his work, I 
looked at various possible reactions to discontent – voice, defi ned in 
terms of participation in collective protest, exit, defi ned as an attempt 
to leave the organization, silence, deliberately deciding not to protest, 
and neglect, engaging in anti-organizational behaviour. 
The results show that most Dutch military personnel still appreciate 
their jobs. At the same time, many are worried about detrimental 
developments which threaten both their position as well as the 
Dutch military organization in general. Personnel react to these 
developments in various ways. In spite of turmoil, most opt to do 
nothing – hence engage in behaviour defi ned as silence. Exit is also 
reported widely, while only a small minority engage in voice or neglect. 
Panel data analysis produced limited evidence of a causal relationship 
between increased socio-economic and organizational pressures 
and protesting and exit among military personnel. At the same time, 
there is evidence that personnel reporting lower levels of loyalty and 
those with permanent contracts engage in more protest and exit once 
confronted with socio-economic and organizational pressures or when 
they perceived an improved labour market situation.
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